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Is there a morally significant difference between a terror bomber and a 
tactical bomber if they cause the same number of deaths? If so, what is the 
basis for that distinction? Double Effect Reasoning (DER) provides an 
account of the conditions under which an action that causes harmful effects 
is permissible (the examples usually involve death), even if the bad effect 
would prima facie fall under a prohibition (such as the prohibition on 
murder). One of the four conditions of traditional versions of DER is the 
claim is that an agent’s intentions can be morally determinative, and provide 
a way to draw intuitively attractive moral distinctions between cases. This 
thesis offers a critical analysis of the role intention plays in DER.  
 
There is a long history of double effect type reasoning, and in Chapter 2 I 
argue that it goes back at least as far as St Augustine, but not quite as far as 
Aristotle. After considering the central cases and traditional formulation of 
DER along with its history in the first two chapters, this thesis examines 
disputes over the role of intention in DER. In Chapter 3 I make the case that 
the philosophy of action, and in particular the way intention is understood 
in relation to action, is more important to the interpretation of DER than 
previously acknowledged. If the formation of an intention is an action and 
an instance of agency, then there are better prospects for intention to have 
some sort of fundamental moral significance. In Chapter 4 I consider T.M. 
Scanlon’s influential view that intention has only derivative or secondary 
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moral significance, and drawing on chapter 3 I argue pace Scanlon that 
intentions can and should be taken into account when deciding what to do. 
Chapter 5 addresses another difficult puzzle for proponents of DER, the 
‘problem of closeness’, which arises because a very fine grained description 
of what an agent actually intends counter-intuitively appears to allow agents 
not to intend harmful effects, even effects that are very close to what they do 
intend. E.g. a terror bomber who only intended to make the civilians appear 
to be dead is not obviously captured by DER’s intention condition. I argue 
that solutions to closeness that rely on coarser grained accounts of intention 
are difficult to sustain, but that we should move beyond a narrow focus on 
deliberate killing to include other ‘close’ prohibitions.  Finally in chapter 6 I 
consider the application of DER, as developed in previous chapters, to the 
law. I argue that, in spite of philosophical debate, DER is not too 
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Chapter 1. Introducing Double Effect 
 
§1.1 Introducing double effect 
 
The project developed here concerns double effect reasoning (DER). This 
theory is often presented as a way to solve problems in normative ethics, 
such as whether, faced with a prohibition on killing, it is permissible to 
prescribe pain medication that hastens death. Dealing with the 
permissibility of actions that involve outcomes that are both good and bad, 
DER provides four conditions (under the most usual formulations) which 
are individually necessary and jointly sufficient to render an action 
permissible. The standard case used to illustrate this is the terror/tactical 
bomber example. DER is invoked to explain why, all other things being 
equal, it is intuitively plausible that the tactical bombing of an enemy 
munitions factory is permissible, even if a schoolchildren nearby are killed 
as a side effect, and on the other hand, that it would not be permissible for a 
terror bomber to bomb the same area with the intention of harming the 
school children. The difference is explained in terms of the agent’s 
intentions: the bad effects of an otherwise good (or neutral) action may not 
be intended as an end or a means, and there must be a proportionate reason 




§1.2 A Working Formulation. 
 
There is substantial consensus on what DER involves when it is understood 
as a way to interpret and apply moral prohibitions, and at this stage it will 
help to outline the four standard conditions. DER is most often, and for the 
purposes of finding a ‘working formulation’ for this thesis, formulated as 
comprising four conditions which if fulfilled will make an action morally 
permissible even though it has evil effects (that would be prohibited if 
intended). The conditions are individually necessary and only jointly 
sufficient for the permissibility of the considered action: 
 
1) That the action in itself from its very object be good or at least 
indifferent;  
2) That the good effect and not the evil effect be intended; 
3) That the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect; 
4) That there be a (or set of) proportionately grave reason(s) for 
permitting the evil effect.1 
 
It is important to note that DER does not recommend or determine that a 
particular action should be performed; meeting the conditions does not 
justify the action under consideration since other factors such as the 
opportunity cost of doing nothing, or something else entirely are not in 
scope. The conditions should be understood as having a veto power over the 
 
1 Mangan, J. “An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect” Theological Studies 10 
(1949) p43. 
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permissibility of the action in question, and this does not imply that the 
action is justified. The principle invoked in this way of understanding DER 
and permissibility is that “something is good by reason of being good in 
every respect, bad from being bad in any”2. An agent could be faced with 
many permissible actions, some of which are better than others; an agent 
might reasonably opt for the better of two permissible actions in this case, 
but DER does not provide this kind of guidance about the relative merits of 
permissible actions. DER underdetermines the all things considered best 
course of action to take, but does fulfill the more modest role, it is claimed 
here, of determining permissibility. 
 
The first condition of DER, that the act itself be good or indifferent, prohibits 
one considering DER in relation to the potential good and bad effects of an 
already impermissible action. Below I consider the permissibility of tactical 
bombing, but if the pilot were fighting an unjust war, then any bombing 
would be impermissible. Torturing might have good and bad effects that fit 
the criteria of DER, but torture itself is wrongful so its further effects cannot 
render it permissible even if they fit DER criteria.  
 
The second condition is the focus of this thesis and a key part of DER. If 
intentions are to be relevant in the way DER suggests, further philosophical 
work is needed: How should intentions be understood? Why and how do 
they have moral significance?  Can the right kind of distinction be drawn 
 
2 Anscombe, G.E.M. Action, Intention and Double Effect in Geach, M. and Gormally, L. (eds.) 
Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe (Exeter, Imprint Academic, 2005) 
p213. 
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between intention and foresight? These questions will be considered in 
chapters 3 and 4, but our starting point here is an agent’s practical 
reasoning about what they are doing or plan to do. When we deliberate 
about actions, we have ends in mind. If we intend an end then we have a 
practically orientated pro-attitude towards achieving that end. In acting on 
an intention, I may deliberate about and adopt the means that I believe 
would be effective in order to realise my goal. Controversy surrounding the 
third condition concerning the means is related to disputes over the second 
intention condition, since means and ends are similarly chosen or adopted 
in being intended. There are, however, special problems here. How can we 
identify what counts as the means to an end? These questions about 
intending ends and means will be considered in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.  
 
The fourth proportionality condition can be understood in (at least) two 
ways, and this receives attention in chapter 6. Firstly and perhaps most 
straight forwardly, it requires that the good outcomes must outweigh the 
bad outcomes. Even though the prospect of this kind of balancing good and 
bad is fraught with problems, examples in the literature are couched in a 
way to circumvent issues about the calculus and commensurability of the 
good and bad3. Grisez however points to an alternative interpretation of this 
condition: “One may not use a possibly deadly drug if a safer one is available 
and will do”4. Thus he interprets proportionality as concerned with 
 
3 This is a significant theoretical problem that is difficult for all theories of evaluating action, not 
just DER. 
4 Grisez G.G. “Toward a Consistent Natural Law Ethics of Killing” in The American Journal of 
Jurisprudence vol 66 1970 p78. 
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minimising harm rather than merely making sure it is outweighed by the 
good. Incidentally, I think this is what was meant by St Thomas Aquinas (See 
Chapter 2) in part of the passage that is usually attributed with being the 
first instance of DER: “Wherefore if a man, in self- defence, uses more than 
necessary violence; it will be unlawful”5. It will be noted that this 
interpretation appears to be in direct contradiction to the claim that DER 
permits rather than justifies. If the proportionality condition, interpreted in 
this way, means that one should act in the best possible way, then this 
refutes my claim that DER does not attempt to justify action, since the best 
possible permissible action is, by definition most likely to be justified 
(presuming there is such a thing as a justified action). 
 
This argument is based on a simple error. The fourth condition, interpreted 
in line with Grisez, should be understood to mean that out of the possible 
actions, (permissible or impermissible) we should be testing the one with 
the least evil involved for permissibility. This is entirely distinct from the 
claim that DER pronounces on the relative merits of two (or many) 
permissible actions. The second claim is a strong claim that implies 
justification, and the first, a weaker claim that underdetermines justification, 
but as previously stated, when accompanied by the other conditions, 
provides sufficient grounds for permissibility. 
 
 
5 Aquinas, T. Summa Theologica II-II Q.64 art. 7 “Is it lawful to kill a man in self defence?” on 
[http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3064.htm]. 
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Before considering how these abstractions apply to real life or thought 
experiment situations, there is a problem here that will be conspicuous to 
most analytical philosophers, and that is the use of the term ‘evil’. Since the 
DE originated in discussions of moral theology, this usage is not 
inappropriate; however it does have meta-ethical implications that some 
philosophers may be hostile to. ‘Evil’ as used above does not imply or need 
to have any direct relation to the contemporary debate concerning evil 
character. I distinguish evil-ness from evil effects; what DER provides is an 
account of whether and in what circumstances knowing an evil effect will 
occur from one’s actions affects the character of the act and thus whether 
the proposed plan may be enacted. In the a-symmetrical cases (the ‘body 
parts’ and ‘beggar’ examples examined below) both scenarios involve the 
same evil effects, but one (according to DER) would be an example of 
evilness and the other would not. That is, one turns out to be permissible 
and the other prohibited. I don’t believe that the meaning relevant to DER is 
maintained if ‘harmful effect’ is substituted for ‘evil effect’ since it doesn’t 
capture the extent to which proponents of DER would avoid participating in 
evil, even as a means to a very good end. Perhaps an explanation more 
amenable to contemporary ethical discussion would have ‘evil effect’ 
replaced by ‘effect which if intended is a violation of an absolute moral 
prohibition’. This is cumbersome and could be inserted where I use ‘evil’ 
and ‘bad’ effect. Fortunately the examples found in the literature (and this 
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thesis) focus on effects that are widely considered to be both evil, bad, and if 




Case studies in the double effect literature are used widely both to illustrate 
DER and to tease out conceptual problems. They do so in a number of 
disputed areas; concerning a morally relevant difference between intending 
and foreseeing (there are examples for and against); in the explanation of 
how DER might apply to cases; and in testing what feature of the case is 
doing moral work. Frances Kamm mentions two kinds of distinctions made 
by the literature; examples (and arguments) that distinguish between 
intending bad from foreseeing bad and those that distinguish intending 
good from foreseeing bad7. These are different kinds of distinctions and 
both are important to DER8. The first distinction would establish that 
intention is important and morally relevant whereas the second is both 
more controversial and central to DER in that it would establish that it is 
possible to foresee bad will occur while at the same time intending good. 
The plane and prisoner examples more clearly attempt to establish the first 
distinction and the rest the second kind. 
 
 
6 I am reluctant to use the terms “evil effect” and “doctrine” of double effect since DER is also 
available to secular moral absolutists such as many deontologists. The most commonly cited 
absolute prohibition is the prohibition against murder, and I put aside questions of judicial killing, 
and permissible intentional killing in a just war in order to focus on the analysis of DER.  
7 Kamm, F. Intricate Ethics (Oxford, OUP, 2007) p128 n.50. 
8 Kamm makes the point that the second claim is a more accurate description of the double effect 
distinction, and I agree, but the first distinction is also important. 
 13 
The Plane example 
 
Anthony Kenny describes a situation where a pilot steers a stricken plane 
towards a particular suburb9. In one case he steers towards the suburb in 
order to minimise the loss of life from the crashing plane and in the second 
case “he takes the course he does because the suburb is where his wife’s 
lover lives and he is anxious, when he leaves this life, to take this obnoxious 
person with him.”10 There seems to be a clear moral difference between 
these cases, and DER supports this through the second condition. 
 
The Prisoner example 
 
A prisoner, suffering torture at the hands of his captors might foresee, even 
with certainty, that maintaining discretion (if information is the issue) and 
not yielding will eventually lead to his death. Only with a morally relevant 
distinction between intention and foresight, can this perseverance be 
evaluated as anything other than suicidal11? I believe it is clear in this 
example that one might intentionally refuse to yield while merely foreseeing 
death as an unintended side effect. The prisoner will have to accept death, 
but to do this while intending a separate good end does not mean death is 
intended nor does it mean that death would be considered as a means to 
avoid yielding. It would be unacceptable to consider this prisoner suicidal, 
 
9 Kenny, A. “The Principle of Double Effect” in his Essays on the Aristotelian Tradition (Oxford, 
OUP, 2001) Chapter 3. (Previously published as “Philippa Foot and Double Effect”) 18 
10 Kenny, A The Principle p55. 
11 This argument, of course, is based on the premise that suicide is wrong. 
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and this lends weight to maintaining the separability of intention and 
foresight in certain and highly probable outcomes. 
 
The Body Parts and Beggar examples 
 
There seems to be an important difference and asymmetry between the 
following (the body parts example); A doctor chooses, rather than giving a 
full dose to save one patient, to split what remains of a scarce drug to save 
five patients; and the second scenario where a doctor chooses to kill 
(through act or omission) one patient in order to use their body parts to 
save five other patients. Foot offers a more nuanced version (the beggar 
example): she identifies a difference between not giving food to a beggar for 
the reason that resources are scarce and others are in need, and when he 
dies using his body for medical research; and not giving food to a beggar in 
order for him to die so we can use his body for medical research. This 
example contrasts using an available body for research against making a 
body available for research through neglect. This significant difference is not 
explained by a difference in the consequences or proportionality because 
they are the same. In the body parts example, the difference might be 
explained through a difference between doing and allowing, where it is 
permissible to allow a patient to die, but not permissible to kill a patient. 
The beggar example on the other hand cannot be explained using this 
method since in both cases the death is allowed to occur. The difference 
between the intuitively permissible and impermissible parts of the beggar 
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example is to be found in the reasons for allowing death, or in other words, 
the intention with which the agent acts. 
 
Double Effect Reasoning applied to both the body parts and the beggar 
example renders the second part of the cases impermissible and the first 
permissible. In the second parts the death of the patient (or beggar) is used 
as a means to achieve the good end of saving the five (or providing for 
medial research) and so violates the third condition12. The first 
(permissible) parts of the examples involve no suspect intent, no bad means 
and the proportionality condition is satisfied. 
 
Palliative Care – a doubtful example 
 
A very common example in accounts of DER is in palliative care. This case 
will be examined in more detail in Ch6, but the general details are important 
as a very common example of DER. In clinical situations of terminal care 
when managing extreme pain, DER offers clinicians a fine distinction 
between the (permissible) so called terminal sedation and (impermissible) 
euthanasia through sedative medication. Morphine used to relieve pain 
depresses breathing and can hasten death, so obviously only in severe 
situations would such steps be necessary. It seems intuitively plausible that 
 
12Further, on a sophisticated understanding of intention considered below a link between the 
second and third conditions is highlighted. The means, if bad, is not just excluded because of the 
third condition but also by the second, which includes means as intended within the plan of the 
agent. The argument will run along the lines that one can’t side step the impermissibility by 
claiming the death of the patient/beggar is a mere means, since using something as a means 
entails that one intends it. 
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two doctors with the same patient before them might prescribe the same 
titration of morphine, one with the permissible intention to relieve pain, 
while merely foreseeing the hastening of death, the other with the intention 
of hastening death (perhaps with the side effect of pain relief!). This 
example however, even though it is used extensively as almost a paradigm 
case of DER in philosophical literature, is not up to date with current best 
practice in palliative care13. In fact, quite the opposite effects are achieved by 
prescribing morphine in the right dosage. During terminal stages of life 
correct morphine use actually helps patients live longer, since the effects on 
a patient’s airways have been more accurately controlled to help rather than 
hinder their breathing. I think that particularly in this area of applied ethics 
and casuistry, using an outdated example could be more damaging and 
misleading than we might imagine. If philosophers are not to be dismissed 
by the professions that would have a use for the principles they debate, care 
is needed to make sure that not just the principles, but the examples are 
relevant to current practice. Having said this, the right kind of situation (for 
double effect to be relevant) may still arise for doctors in emergency 
situations so the example should not be totally discarded by philosophers.  
 
The Bomber examples 
 
 
13 This example is arguably misleading since it is not up to date with current best practice in 
palliative care. See Ch6 and Fohr, S, A. Double Effect and Pain Medication: Separating myth 
from reality Journal of Palliative Medicine 1998; 1: 315-328. 
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Double Effect also famously distinguishes between a Strategic Bomber and a 
Terror Bomber, and this is one of the clearest applications. Two bombing 
missions might drop their bombs in the same place, but when one 
aims/intends to disable a military target with the side effect of harming 
innocents nearby and the other bombs that place precisely because it will 
harm innocents nearby a distinction is widely held to be intuitively evident. 
This example presumes that the pilots are engaged in fighting a just war, 
since in an unjust war any act of bombing would be wrong, and would be 
rendered impermissible by the first condition which states that the action of 
bombing must itself be good or neutral. Interestingly, the concept of a just 
war itself is very likely to make use of DER, since going to war certainly has 
bad effects that are foreseen, not intended. 
 
§1.4 Some initial clarifications 
 
The reason I prefer to call it Double Effect Reasoning, and do not follow 
much of the literature in referring to the ‘principle’ of double effect, is that 
there are a number of conditions involved and it is potentially misleading to 
imply that it involves just one claim14. Furthermore, there are a number of 
related versions of DER in the literature, many of which boil down DER to 
one or two principles, or add others, such as Daniel Sulmasy’s reformulation, 
which extends to 19 conditions and sub-conditions15.  
 
14 Thomas A Cavanaugh, Double Effect Reasoning (Oxford: OUP, 2006). 
15 Sulmasy, D.P. “‘Reinventing’ The Rule of Double Effect” in Steinbock, B. The Oxford 
Handbook of Bioethics (Oxford, OUP, 2007). 
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Running through these versions, and through the history of DER is the claim 
that intention16 is and can be morally relevant. Thus, it is fair to say that 
double effect rests on a key distinction between what is intended and what 
is merely foreseen. This distinction is certainly central, and much of this 
thesis is devoted to unpacking the theoretical context needed for intention 
to play the role DER requires of it. However, to see this as the foundation 
(and possible candidate for a singular ‘principle’) as the only nuance that 
DER offers or tool that DER uses, is misleading. DER is occasionally 
formulated along these lines, without reference to any other conditions; for 
example, as the claim that “it is sometimes permissible to bring about as a 
merely foreseen side effect a harmful event that it would be impermissible 
to bring about intentionally”17.  
 
This formulation, while certainly a good explanation of the relevant 
distinction and thus the function of DER in some examples, cannot account 
for the full range of cases, some of which are only accounted for by the other 
conditions. Side-lining one or more conditions in the interests of a concise 
 
16 It is important to distinguish between "doing X with the intention to Y" from "intentional Y-
ing", or as Anscombe introduces the distinction, between "Intentional Action" and "intention-
with-which". The intention with which an action is performed refers to an agent's deliberation 
and the reason(s) for and against a particular course of action. "Intentional Action" seeks to 
identify the broader set of purposive actions, and for Anscombe these are actions for which a 
special sense of the question "Why?" is applicable. This broader category includes actions that 
are not of primary relevance to double effect, such as instinctive responses, and even actions that 
are intentional but that are done for "no reason" (see Anscombe, GEM. Intention Section 16-18). 
So, the question "Why?" is relevant to a broader class of actions than those which are done with 
an intention (as in "doing X with the intention to Y"), and the latter are the actions and intentions 
that are crucial for DER. 
17 McIntyre, A. “Doctrine of Double Effect” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/) 
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explanation (and even then only an explanation in some cases) can lead to 
confusion and tendency to emphasise problems that arise when applying 
DER. For example, a case that satisfies the intention requirement, where the 
good effect is intended and the bad merely foreseen might still fall foul of the 
fourth proportionality condition of DER.  
 
Formulations that focus exclusively on intention might, however, indicate 
that DER is being understood in a non-traditional way. Though DER’s origin 
is in a tradition that deploys absolute moral prohibitions, its core insight has 
also been used in non-absolutist contexts. Rather than determining 
permissibility, this approach to DER finds that harmful intended outcomes 
are harder to justify than harmful foreseen outcomes. There are some 
theoretical differences to note here. While the version of DER that is tied to 
prohibitions involves intentions in a way that is morally decisive (because 
DER is used to apply prohibitions), the non-traditional use of the 
intend/foresee distinction treats intention as a worsening factor that might 
tip the balance against acting. This thesis focuses on the traditional way of 
understanding DER as relating to prohibitions, rather seeing intention as a 
potentially worsening factor that might render an action impermissible. It 
may well be possible to reconcile these versions of DER, but given the even 
greater variety of positions in the philosophy of action and meta-ethics that 
one could hold alongside the non-traditional formulation, that is a task for 




§1.5 The Structure of the Thesis.  
 
The history of DER is interesting, and the subject of Chapter 2. In it I 
consider whether some early case based discussion found in the writings of 
St Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle are good examples of DER. DER is usually 
traced back to St Thomas’ account of the permissibility of killing in self-
defence, and I argue that his writing contains the ingredients for DER, but 
deploys them in a somewhat inchoate way. Recent discussion of Aristotle on 
‘Mixed Action’ is also of interest, due to the diversity in how Aristotle has 
been interpreted. Pakaluk takes Aristotle to provide an early example of 
DER, whereas DiNucci finds the cases under discussion to provide 
convincing counter-examples to DER. I argue that Aristotle does not deploy 
(an early version of) DER, but that his consideration of mixed action is 
compatible with DER. Finally, I argue that DER can be traced further back 
than St Thomas, to St Augustine, and develop the thought that Augustine’s 
theodicy (if slightly exotic in philosophical terms) is an early example of 
DER.  
 
DER is paradigmatically a non-consequentialist kind of reasoning, because 
central to DER are the ideas that bringing about certain bad effects 
intentionally would be impermissible even if overall consequences are 
beneficial, and that bad outcomes may not be used as a means to further 
good ends. It is not the case that all non-consequentialists embrace DER. 
Indeed, some of the most prominent critics of DER, including J.J.Thomson 
and T.M.Scanlon, are deontologists. For many non-consequentialists this 
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kind of principle is intuitively very plausible, however, not only does it face 
challenges concerning its coherence, clarity and usefulness, but DER also 
raises a number of deep and significant puzzles in normative ethics, the 
philosophy of action and moral psychology.  
  
One of the wider questions, or sets of puzzles raised by DER concerns the 
moral significance of intention. Intention is important because it is a special 
kind of attitude that is connected to our appraisal of actions and agents. 
From our earliest stages of development we are used to using the fact that 
something happened ‘by accident’ or ‘involuntarily’ as an excuse when we 
are blamed. These cases are examples of not having an intention and where 
this is exculpatory. They are not, however, examples of what Anscombe 
might call ‘human actions’, because the effect occurs involuntarily. The 
question for DER is whether the absence of an intention in relation to a bad 
outcome can be exculpatory, or render the action permissible, when that 
outcome is caused voluntarily, with foresight and as the result of an action 
that has been the subject of deliberation.  
 
Intention and moral character are thought to be closely related, since by 
deliberately being charitable, for example, we might become a charitable 
person, and someone who has charitable virtues is the kind of person who 
tends to give to charity deliberately and on purpose. On the other hand, 
what may be driving objections to double effect is the fact that when we 
deliberate about what to do in moral situations, we think about the object of 
deliberation, that is, what to do and perhaps the reasons for and against 
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acting in that situation. We do not think about whether we ought to intend 
or merely foresee particular outcomes.  
 
Anscombe makes a closely related point, that intention is not an extra 
feature of an action: “We do not add anything attaching to the action at the 
time it is done by describing it as intentional…The question does not 
normally arise whether a man’s proceedings are intentional; hence it is 
often ‘odd’ to call them so.”18 This feature of intention is very strange if 
intention is supposed to be morally relevant and even central to our analysis 
of the permissibility of actions, as is claimed by DER. For intention to be so 
crucial at one level, but not even considered in situations where double 
effect would normally apply, begs the question about whether double effect 
reasoning is really doing any moral work at all.  
 
There are three possible ways to proceed in the face of the concern that we 
do not typically deliberate about intentions. Firstly one might reject double 
effect outright, in consequentialist fashion, thinking that it depends on “a 
distinction without a difference”19 and that outcomes are what matters in 
coming to ethical conclusions. The second possibility is to try to account for 
the intuitive plausibility of double effect reasoning without giving intention 
the prominent role it usually takes. T.M. Scanlon takes this line in Moral 
Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame20. The third option is to develop 
 
18 Anscombe, G.E.M. Intention (Harvard University Press, 2000) §19 pp28-30. 
19 Glover, J. Causing Death and Saving Lives 1979 p88. 
20 Scanlon, T.M. Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, Mass, Belknap 
Press, 2010). 
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an account that explains how intentions are actions, subject to obligations in 
the way required by DER and at the same time not ordinarily the object of 
deliberation. I develop and defend this account pace Scanlon and others in 
Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
Chapter 3 highlights two schools of action theoretical thought that I argue 
are helpful here, in particular the differences that are generated due to their 
position on whether intention formation is an action, or whether it is the 
(passive, non-voluntary) cause of action. DER depends on and is deeply 
connected to this kind of question in the philosophy of action, but this is 
normally in the background.  
 
In considering Scanlon’s views in Chapter 4, a number of key issues emerge 
which deserve further consideration. One of the challenges that Scanlon 
levels at DER is that there are features other than intention which more 
fundamentally explain the permissibility of actions. He argues that “the 
intention is wrongful because the act intended is wrongful, and the act is 
wrongful because of its likely consequences, not (fundamentally) because of 
the intention”21. On this model, intention is morally relevant only 
derivatively, in the way it affects character and as a predictor for behaviour. 
It is not foundational in what makes something wrong in the first place.  
 
 
21 Scanlon,  T Moral Dimensions (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 2008) p29. 
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According to Scanlon, the distinction between the deliberative and critical 
use of principles matches up to the difference between permissibility and 
fault. The more foundational concept, permissibility, relates to “those 
features of our situation that we should take as counting for or against an 
action”22. Following Scanlon’s contractualism then, “both permissibility and 
fault are determined by the principles that we can ask each other to use in 
deciding what to do. An act is permissible if it would be licensed by these 
principles, and an agent is at fault when these principles are used critically 
to evaluate an agent’s action”23.  
 
I argue that Scanlon’s account does not establish that intentions can only 
have derivative moral significance. Other people (such as our friends) have 
interests not only in our voluntary actions that affect them, but also in the 
attitudes which motivate, explain and with which we carry out those actions. 
I provide an account of the way we might deliberate about intention that 
avoids on the one hand the thought that we can look inward and direct our 
intention away from impermissible parts of our plan (a view Anscombe 
described as a travesty of the doctrine of double effect), and on the other, 
the view that the non-voluntariness of intention means that we cannot 
deliberate about or take intentions into account when deciding what to do.  
 
Another persistent problem for DER in the literature concerns the ‘means 
condition’ and how it should be interpreted. The intended aspects of a plan 
 
22 Scanlon, p50 my emphasis.  
23 Scanlon, p49. 
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and the means used might appear to be separable, particularly as there is a 
separate condition in DER concerning the means, but this may prove to be 
problematical if the central feature of DER is that intentions matter, because 
if plans are to be effective, one needs to choose a means to accomplish it. 
This relationship between intention and the means is not straightforward. 
Shelly Kagan’s discussion of ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ means conditions24 
differentiates between including the means that are deliberately chosen on 
the one hand and the causal chain that is actually employed in achieving the 
end on the other. The tactical bomber pilot will cause some wear and tear to 
his aircraft as a means to bomb the factory in the strong version, but not in 
the other; if asked about this he might reasonably deny that he deliberately 
chose to diminish the flying capability of his aircraft in any way! This kind of 
problem is brought into sharper focus where it is unclear whether a morally 
problematical effect (of an otherwise good action with other good intended 
outcomes) ought to count as a means, as intended, and therefore ruled out 
by DER. There are deep challenges to DER arising from the question of what 
ought to count as intended, and what fixes those things which an agent 
intends when they act to achieve an end.  
 
Chapter 5 addresses this kind of puzzle for proponents of DER, the ‘problem 
of closeness’, which arises because a very fine grained description of what 
an agent actually intends counter-intuitively appears to allow agents, via a 
slight of hand, not to intend harmful effects, even effects that are very close 
 
24 Kagan, S. The Limits of Morality p141ff. 
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to what they do intend. A terror bomber might (not only claim, but actually) 
intend only to make the civilians appear to be dead by exploding his bomb, 
and an assassin might claim that all they intended was to scratch their index 
finger on the trigger of the gun. In these cases we are tempted to think that 
the agent is being disingenuous, or that the deaths actually feature as part of 
the further ends motivating them to act. In what I take to be an important 
test case for closeness, this is not the case.  
 
The craniotomy case involves a tragic situation where during labor the 
baby’s head becomes stuck (‘obstructed labour’) and risks the life of both 
the mother and child. This problem can be averted by caesarian section but 
historically (and perhaps in some places with little or no midwifery 
provision) this real case presents a difficult dilemma, because in doing 
nothing both mother and child will likely die, and the only apparent solution 
is to crush the skull/narrow the dimensions of the head of the baby in order 
to remove it from the birth canal.  Here, we can safely assume that the 
doctor does not secretly desire the death of the child, as we were tempted to 
say in the terror bomber and assassin cases. Is it possible for the doctor to 
intend to crush the head without intending its death? I argue that solutions 
to closeness that rely on coarser grained accounts of intention that might tie 
the crushing to the death in some way (so that we can say that the doctor, in 
crushing, will intend the death of the child) are difficult to sustain. I suggest 
that a more satisfactory solution does not seek to distort the first-personal 
practical reasoning account of intention, and appeals to ‘close’ prohibitions 
instead, such as a prohibition on lethal targeting (of innocents).   
 27 
 
The final chapter (6) considers the application of double effect to decisions 
at the end of life, and in particular it reviews the way English law has had a 
mixed approach to DER in end-of-life cases. In this chapter I note that the 
discussion of DER has been dominated (at least in the philosophical 
literature), by hard cases and philosophical problems, and argue that this 
may have made lawyers too dismissive of DER. If DER is broadly true, then it 
applies right across our acting lives, from difficult life and death decisions, to 
mundane acts like buying a coffee. It would be wrong to exploit workers in 
the coffee supply chain, and though my purchase is made in the knowledge 
that some exploitation is extremely likely, it is not intended. It it is hard to 
find actions that don’t have some harmful consequences, indeed Joseph 
Boyle has argued that all voluntary action involves DER, because we need to 
account for the opportunity cost of what we do. By choosing to pursue one 
good end, I fail to pursue another, and this failure is a bad side effect that is 
permitted through DER. We do not need to take a decisive view on the 
pervasiveness of DER in our moral lives to see that DER is and can be 
applied in the law, and the final chapter does so in relation to disputed cases 









Chapter 2 The tradition of double effect reasoning.  
 
(Exodus 22:2): "If a thief be found breaking into a house or undermining it, 
and be wounded so as to die; he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood."  
 
§2.1 Historical sources of DER 
 
The task in this chapter is not to provide an authoritative historical account 
of the origins of DER25. It is, rather, to consider the plausibility of some of 
the attributions of DER to Aquinas and more recently to Aristotle . To what 
extent do these authors show or argue for double effect reasoning as we 
know it today, involving or approximating the four conditions (outlined in 
Ch1) leading to a judgment of permissibility? After arguing that Aquinas 
presents a plausible origin for DER, and that Aristotle’s account of mixed 
actions is not a plausible origin (but is compatible with DER), I present a 
further example that I have not seen recognised in the literature; that 
Augustine’s theodicy and account of evil presents all of the elements of DER, 
and should be seen as an early origin (albeit slightly removed from 
normative ethics).  
 
 
25 See e.g. Cavanaugh, Double Effect Reasoning., Joseph T Mangan, “An Historical Analysis Of 
The Principle of Double Effect,” Theological Studies 10 (1944). Christopher Kaczor, “Double-
Effect Reasoning from Jean Pierre Gury to Peter Knauer,” Theological Studies 59, no. 2 (1998): 
297–316, doi:10.1177/004056399805900206. 
 29 
One might think that the task of finding examples of DER type positions 
would not be very difficult, since with enough leeway in how DER ought to 
be interpreted, any mention of the significance of intention in relation to 
ethics might count as an early example. Peter Abelard’s intentionalism26 is 
an early (12th century) example that focuses moral evaluation radically on 
intentions, in that it is an agent’s intention alone that determines the moral 
worth of an action. This position may be related to DER, but goes very far 
beyond it. A proponent of DER need only claim that intentions are 
sometimes morally decisive, rather than being always the only proper 
subject of moral evaluation. 
 
We should not think that every self-proclaimed case of double effect 
reasoning is in fact a good example of the theory. There is reason to think 
that Peter Knauer’s reinterpretation of double effect has more in common 
with consequentialism than the contemporary version of Double Effect 
outlined in Ch1. For Knauer interprets intention not in terms of one’s 
practical reasoning (ends and means), but in terms of what one has a 
proportionate reason to favour27. “If there is a commensurate reason for the 
permitting or causing of the evil, the means is effectively willed only in its 
good aspect. The effect or, more exactly, the aspect which is physically evil, 
remains morally outside of what is intended”28.  I will not dwell on this 
 
26 See e.g. http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/articles/Abelard_on_Ethics.pdf accessed June 2016 
27 See Knauer, P. (1979), ‘The Hermeneutical Function of the Principle of Double Effect’, in C. 
E. Curran and R. A. McCormick (eds.), Readings in Moral Theology, i: Moral Norms and the 
Catholic Tradition (New York: Paulist Press), 1–39. See also Kaczor, C. Proportionalism and the 
Natural Law Tradition for a robust critique of Knauer and the ‘proportionalist’ school.  
28 Knauer, P. (1979), ‘The Hermeneutical Function of the Principle of Double Effect’ p20. 
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version that collapses DER into the fourth proportionality condition. Since 
here we are considering early examples that may exemplify the standard 
conception of DER, principally from St Thomas, Aristotle, including a recent 
dispute over whether Aristotle’s ‘mixed actions’ are a good example of 
double effect type reasoning, and St Augustine, where I argue that elements 
in his thought exemplify very well the conceptual moves made by DER.   
 
§2.2 St Thomas Aquinas 
 
Joseph Mangan authored the most often cited history of DER29, tracing the 
historical beginning of DER as a formulated principle to his discussion of 
whether killing in self defence is permissible. This is not to say that four 
conditions are clearly articulated in the passage in questions (reproduced 
below), but that the spirit and elements of DER are there, and can be filled in 
with details from St Thomas’ other writings (e.g. Summa Theologica I – II, 
Q20, A1). 
 
Under a question on murder, St Thomas considers whether it may be 
permissible for a private individual to kill in self defence. He accepts that 
public authorities may kill to preserve the common good e.g in just war, but 
is now considering in general whether without explicit public authority one 
may cause death. St Thomas suggests that a private individual may cause the 
death of the attacker, but only where the effect of an assailant’s death is 
 
29 Mangan, “An Historical Analysis Of The Principle of Double Effect.” 
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judged to be praeter intentionem (beside or outside the intention) of the 
defender who uses lethal force: 
 
Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is 
intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take 
their species according to what is intended, and not according to 
what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained 
above (II-II:43:3; I-II:12:1). Accordingly the act of self-defence may 
have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying 
of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save 
one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything 
to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. 30 
 
The literary style of the Summa involves St Thomas citing and considering 
sources that fall on both sides of the answer to the question under 
consideration. In this case, St Thomas does not have as his target writers 
who take it that that one may intend to kill the attacker.  This passage is set 
against the background of St Augustine, who thinks lethal self defence is 
impermissible, interestingly not because it would be an instance of or 
tantamount to murder, but because one’s own life ought not to be valued 
over that of the assailant’s31. St Thomas takes the view that one is primarily 
responsible for the protection of one’s own life over that of another.  
 
 
30 Aquinas, St Thomas, Summa Theologica  tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province 1920: 
henceforth abbreviated: ST IIa IIae Q64 A7. 
31 ST IIa IIae Q64, A7, Objection 2. 
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The fact that St Thomas did not provide a precise formulation of a set of 
conditions has caused some to think that it would be a mistake to believe 
DER (as we encounter it today) as originating with St Thomas. First of all, 
though Aquinas’ account in Q64 A7 does not spell out whether the death of 
the assailant may be intended as a means to saving one’s life, or whether it 
must not be intended as an end or as a means. Alonso SJ, for example, 
writing in 193732 sees a discontinuity between St Thomas’ account and 
more familiar scholastic four-condition formulations, since he understood St 
Thomas to assert that one may intend the death of the aggressor as a means, 
but not as an end. Mangan argues convincingly that St Thomas is committed 
to the view that means are intended as ‘proximate ends’, or ‘intermediary 
ends’ from his discussion earlier in the Summa of more general principles of 
action33 and therefore cannot be praeter intentionem. He would therefore be 
committed to the means condition.34 The ingredients, then, are all present in 
St Thomas, and in their application to self-defence.  
One further notable query over whether modern forms of DER are to be 
traced to St Thomas comes from Elizabeth Anscombe, who believes that a 
different passage in the Summa shows St Thomas’ general opinion on 
responsibility for the evil consequences of actions, and that cannot easily be 
squared with DER:  
 
32 quoted in Mangan, “An Historical Analysis Of The Principle of Double Effect.” 
33 See ST Ia IIae, q.12, a. 2c; q. 1, a. 3, ad 3. 
34 Interestingly some interpreters of St Thomas argue that the means condition cannot be found in 
St Thomas’ treatment. See Mangan, “An Historical Analysis Of The Principle of Double Effect.” 
P46, citing Vincentius M. Alonso S.J. El principio del doble efecto en los comentadores de Santo 
Tomas de Aquino Romae, 1937). 
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“If [the effect] is preconceived, it manifestly adds to the goodness or 
badness of the action. For when someone considers that much that is 
bad can follow from what he does, and does not give it up on that 
account, this shows that his will is the more inordinate” (Ia, IIae, Q.20 
art.5)35 
 
This appears to show that a foreseen evil effect, even one falling outside 
one’s intention, can show that one’s will is inordinate. It may be possible to 
argue that this is compatible with DER, since one is still responsible for the 
bad effects caused by an action DER renders permissible, and that the quote 
from Aquinas above is an expression of the proportionality condition, in 
which the agent is supposed to consider both foreseen and intended effects. 
Nonetheless, the connection Aquinas makes here between foreseen evil 
consequences and ‘inordinate will’ is not obviously compatible with the 
moral implications of the intend/foresee distinction that DER relies upon.  
 
On the basis of this, Anscombe argues that DER ought to be understood in a 
more restricted sense (as ‘the principle of the side effect’), specifically that 
“the prohibition on murder does not cover all bringing about of deaths 
which are not intended”36. As opposed to a view that DER’s conditions can 
provide a reliable guide to permissibility for causing death in general. On 
 
35 Quoted in G. E. M. Anscombe, “Action, Intention, and Double Effect,” in The Doctrine of 
Double Effect: Philosophers Debate a Controversial Principle., ed. P.A. Woodward (Notre 
Dame Press, 2001), p65. 
36 G. E. M. Anscombe, “Action, Intention, and Double Effect,” in The Doctrine of Double Effect: 
Philosophers Debate a Controversial Principle., ed. P.A. Woodward (Notre Dame Press, 2001), 
p61. 
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Anscombe’s more modest formulation, an action that causes death may still 
be bad, or even impermissible, but not in respect of the prohibition on 
murder if the relevant effect is praeter intentionem. I consider this and 
related positions in more detail in my chapter on closeness below.  
 
So, there is good reason to think that double effect is closely tied to 
particular moral prohibitions, and that Aquinas is the source of the modern 
discussion around double effect. There is enough in St Thomas’ writings to 
support the claim that DER is present, though may in places be “inchoate” or 
implicit37. In the next section I consider whether the conceptual ingredients 




Two authors have recently attempted to trace DER’s origin further back 
than St Thomas, to Aristotle. On the face of it, St Thomas was instrumental in 
incorporating insights from Aristotle’s works into the Christian theological 
tradition, so there is a plausible story to be told in terms of the intellectual 
tradition here.  
 
Pakaluk (2011) makes a favourable comparison between Aristotle’s 
discussion of ‘mixed actions’ in the Nicomachean Ethics. Though Aristotle is 
considering differences in the action in terms of the ‘voluntary’ (hekousion) 
 
37 Cavanaugh, Double Effect Reasoning. p15. 
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and ‘involuntary’ (akousion), an interesting dispute has arisen as to whether 
as Pakaluk claims, mixed actions should count as good early examples of 
DER type thinking, or whether they are not good examples and rather point 
the way to substantial criticism that may be levelled at DER. The key 
passage is the following:  
 
 “Some things are done because of the fear of greater evils or because 
of the hope of some good. Thus a tyrant, having in his power the 
parents or children of a certain man, commands him to do a 
disgraceful deed on condition that they will be spared if he does it 
but killed if he does not do it. Here a doubt arises whether his actions 
are voluntary or involuntary. A similar case is found in the decision 
to throw goods overboard during storms at sea. Absolutely speaking, 
no man would do so voluntarily, but if it means that his life and that 
of others are saved as a result, a sensible man will do it. Operations of 
this kind are mixed. However they approach more closely to 
voluntary action for they are voluntary at the time they are done, and 
the end of action conforms to this particular time. ” (1110a4-11;388-
389)38   
 
So Aristotle’s view is that considered in the particular circumstances, the 
actions are voluntary (they do not arise from violence or from ignorance 
(see 1109a35 – 1110a1;386). In support of the view that this exemplifies 
 
38 Thomas Aquinas, C. I. Litzinger, and Ralph McInerny, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics (Dumb Ox Books, 1993). p127. 
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double effect type reasoning, Pakaluk writes that “ These [Aristotle’s cases] 
are akin to cases in which one would naturally wish to bring in [DER]: in 
throwing cargo into the sea—which is itself neither immoral nor unlawful—
one both saves the ship and incurs a monetary loss”.39  
 
DiNucci argues that Aristotle’s mixed actions produce “countless 
counterexamples to [DER] by generating cases where the bad means…is not 
even remotely morally comparable to the good effect (such as saving the 
crew). And the problem for double effect is that it would not allow for such 
cases of marginally bad means.”40 The example he provides is where the 
captain is considering whether to jettison a cargo of mobile phones in a 
storm in order to save the lives of the crew.  
 
Though both DiNucci and Pakaluk consider throwing the goods overboard 
to be intuitively permissible, Pakaluk takes this to be a case of DER, and 
DiNucci takes it to be a hard case that calls the means condition into 
question. If the former, then Aristotle’s mixed actions could more plausibly 
be read as a precursor to DER.   
 
It is not clear to me that we should agree that the ‘bad means’ on DiNucci’s 
reading of this case should be prohibited by DER. True, jettisoning the cargo 
is the means one adopts to secure the aim of saving the crew, but it would be 
a mistake to read DER as prohibiting any harmful means at all. Amputation 
 
39 Michael Pakaluk, “Mixed Actions and Double Effect,” in Moral Psychology and Human 
Action in Aristotle, ed. M. Pakaluk and Giles Pearson (OUP, 2011). 
40 Ezio DiNucci, Ethics Without Intention (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014). p60. 
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of a gangrenous limb is typically defended on the grounds of double effect, 
even though some harm is done as a means to save the life of the patient 
(some portion of not-yet-infected limb is amputated). On standard readings, 
the harmful means relates to the prima facie prohibited effect that may not 
be used as a means to achieve the good effect. When DER is applied in a non-
absolutist way, or by an absolutist in relation to non-absolutely prohibited 
harms, the verdict the various conditions supply is not one of permissibility, 
but that actions are harder to justify if the harm is intended compared to 
cases where the harm is merely foreseen. In this sense, compared to the case 
described, it would be harder to justify jettisoning the cargo if the captain 
were taking advantage of the storm to harm the business interests of the 
cargo owner.  
 
So, if DiNucci’s “objection from marginally bad means” includes means that 
might fall under an absolute prohibition, then his objection is just a 
restatement of the consequentialist critique of DER. If the means on the 
other hand does not fall under an absolute prohibition, then his objection 
looses force because the harmful means is merely harder to justify under 
DER, and jettisoning the cargo is an example where even this harder-to-
justify means is in fact permissible, because lives will be saved.  
 
I would suggest, then, that there are some similarities with examples that 
are often found in the DER literature. However, Aristotle’s discussion does 
not relate directly to the I/F distinction and is not an early example of 
double effect reasoning. What is mixed in Aristotle’s account are voluntary 
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and involuntary aspects of action, whereas the distinction that makes a 
difference for DER is between intended and foreseen good effects, both of 
which are caused voluntarily. The examples Aristotle raises are typical of 
the DER literature, and the established criteria map onto them well, but 
there does not appear to be enough evidence that the solution Aristotle 
envisages to account for these cases is much like DER. The Philosopher 
makes the point that these are cases of voluntary action – in the sense that 
they are not coerced.  
 
I would, though, pace DiNucci, say that Aristotle’s treatment of those two 
cases is compatible and consistent with DER. The tyrant example is 
important here. DiNucci suggests that the disgraceful deed could be a 
security official passing secret information to the enemy tyrant. He asks “can 
we say that, when the security official passes the relevant information to the 
enemy, he does not intend to do so and that passing information to the 
enemy is not a means to save his family?”41. DiNucci is searching for a way 
for DER to render passing information to the enemy to be permissible, 
which he argues is the “most natural reading of Aristotle”42, and he argues 
that we are bound to see passing information as the means to save the 
family.  
 
It seems that we are ex hypothesi bound to see the passing of information to 
the enemy as the means used in order to save the family, however neither 
 
41 Ibid. p48 
42 Ibid. p55 
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Aristotle nor a standard reading of DER would necessarily concur with the 
thought that this is a case where permissibility is to be found and explained. 
In the very next section of the Nicomachean Ethics, when considering the 
merit of voluntary actions, The Philosopher writes that:  
“Some actions do not deserve praise but only pardon, for example, if 
a person does things that are wrong because he fears evils beyond 
human endurance which no one would undergo in any case. Yet it is 
probable that there are some actions that a man cannot be forced to 
do and he ought to undergo death of the cruellest kind rather than to 
do them” (1110a19-26)43 
 
So the voluntariness (or not) does not determine an act’s permissibility, and 
while the act would be voluntary in the circumstances, it is probable that 
there are actions that are so disgraceful as not to be permitted. The further 
point to notice is that in this case, the harmful effect of one’s family suffering 
would fall under DER criteria, if the act is so disgraceful, one’s intention to 
preserve integrity (in refusing to comply with the tyrant’s demands), would 
have terrible foreseen side effects that are not intended as a means nor as an 






43 Aquinas, Litzinger, and McInerny, Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. p131 
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§2.4 St Augustine 
 
We have seen that St Thomas is a very plausible origin for DER, and that 
while Aristotle’s passage on mixed action does not exemplify DER type 
reasoning, he considers relevant cases in relation to voluntariness in a way 
that is compatible with DER. Finally, I will argue that approaches to 
theodicy, in particular St Augustine’s early account of evil and God’s creative 
power and will, share many of the features of DER. That is, how an agent can 
remain good even though he causes evil to occur, and knows (with 
certainty) about this upshot of his action.   
 
In a passage at the beginning of a work in which he considers the problem of 
evil, Augustine writes the following: “Those who ponder these matters [i.e. 
the problem of evil] are seemingly forced to believe either that Divine 
Providence does not reach to these outer limits of things or that surely all 
evils are committed by the will of God.  Both horns of this dilemma are 
impious, but particularly the latter”44.  
 
Here we have a structural similarity with DER type reasoning. One finds 
both good and bad effects in the world that God created. The combination of 
God’s goodness, omnipotence and omniscience create the classic problem 
for theologians like Augustine: how and why evil exists in the world given 
those attributes. 
 




Fergusson summarises Augustine’s approach to solving this dilemma: 
“Augustine’s solution to this problem is three-pronged:  (1) he holds that 
evil is a privation and cannot be properly said to exist at all; (2) he argues 
that the apparent imperfection of any part of creation disappears in light of 
the perfection of the whole; and 3) he argues that the origin of moral evil, 
together with that suffering which is construed as punishment for sin, is to 
be found in the free choice of the will of rational creatures.”45 
 
The double effect type move is in (1); involving a privation account of evil, 
and in (3), where the origin of evil is traced to free choice found in the will of 
rational creatures.  
 
The privation account suggests that everything of substance is created and 
therefore willed by God. However, evil as a privation or parasitic on the 
good, is not substantial so was and is not willed by God. This approach 
resembles double effect because the world has mixed effects – both good 
and evil, God’s activity is wholly good (ex hypothesi), and He is omniscient 
(that is, He has perfect foresight). The double effect-type move here is to say 
that both divine providence and God’s foreknowledge do reach the ‘outer 
limits of things’, so that evil is foreseen as a side effect of the free will of 
rational creatures. It is not intended or willed by God.   
 
 
45 Fergusson, W. Beyond the Problem of Evil [http://faculty.georgetown.edu/jod/augustine/ferg] 
accessed April 2016 
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There is a long Platonic history of understanding evil to be a privation, or 
parasitic on the good (see e.g. Proclus), but with Augustine’s theodicy, we 
have an agent, God, who wills, whose will is ex-hypothesi entirely good, and 
who is omniscient, and this context is what gives rise to double effect type 
reasoning.  
 
Though the privation account has the character of DER, it is most useful if 
one believes that God intends everything He creates or causes to exist. This 
is not necessarily the case, and if it is not, could we still have a double effect 
based theodicy in Augustine?  
 
We could, and this has its basis in the third of Augustine’s approaches to 
theodicy as identified by Fergusson. In this approach, the origin of moral evil 
is in the free choice found in the will of rational creatures. If the will is free 
to choose independently of God’s will, then this introduces an element into 
creation that God foresees, causes, but does not intend (or determine). 
Moral evil comes into the world as a foreseen but side effect of the creation 
of free will.   
 
This is far from a thorough exegesis of St Augustine, and there may well be 
earlier Christian neo-platonists who have similar theoretical commitments 
in relation to privation and others who use free will to account for evil. Also, 
drawing out this kind of early example of double effect reasoning may be of 
limited application: it is not obvious what we can learn from Augustine’s 
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solution to the problem of evil. Some legal scholars46 have traced the 
concept of mens rea back to St Augustine (354 – 430 AD). Mens rea is the 
mental element of a crime, the ‘guilty mind’, involving intention or 
knowledge, and most crimes require proof of (or a jury to believe that) mens 
rea is present. Augustine writes in relation to perjury that: ““[r]eam linguam 
non facit nisi mens rea,” “[p]erjury does not exist absent the mental 
element” (Augustine, Sermones, No. 180, c.2., Migne, Patrol. Vol. 38, col. 
974). In other words, simply saying something under oath that is false does 
not constitute perjury; one must also intend, thereby, to deceive those to 
whom one speaks.”47  
 
While it may be tempting to read into this an understanding of intention and 
permissibility of the kind DER deploys, that would be too hasty. Mens rea is 
used in an exculpatory way, in that absence of a mens rea is considered to 
reduce the severity of the crime, and therefore punishment. It is not just an 
absence of mental element that can excuse, but both recklessness and 
negligence are considered to be lower forms of mens rea. So, there is more 
work to do if we are to situate normative (rather than theological) double 
effect type reasoning in St Augustine’s thought.  
 
 
46 Pollock, F and Maitland, F. The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1952) quoted in Thomas A Cavanaugh, “Abuses of Double Effect, 
Anscombe’ s Principle of Side Effects, and A (Sound) Account of Duplex Effectus 
Recommended Citation,” Philosophy Paper 51, 2015. 
http://repository.usfca.edu/philhttp://repository.usfca.edu/phil/51. 
47 Ibid. n52 
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So to conclude this section, we have given some consideration to the origins 
of double effect, and that DER is rooted in traditions that recognise absolute 
moral prohibitions. Recent scholarship that has traced DER back to Aristotle 
is interesting, but neither provides an early example of double effect, nor a 
robust challenge to DER in the ‘marginally bad means’ argument. Finally, 
Augustine’s thought displays many of the ingredients of DER, but in 





















Chapter 3 Intention in Action and Double Effect 
 
A man can form an intention which he then does nothing to carry out, 
either because he is prevented or because he changes his mind; but the 
intention itself can be complete, although it remains a purely interior thing. 
All this conspires to make us think that if we want to know a man’s 
intentions it is into the content of his mind, and only into these, that we 
must enquire, and hence, that if we wish to understand what intention is, 
we must be investigating something whose existence is purely in the sphere 
of the mind; and that although intention issues in actions, and the way this 
happens also presents interesting questions, still what physically takes 
place, i.e. what a man actually does, is the very last thing we need to 
consider in our enquiry. Whereas I wish to say it is the first.” (Anscombe 
1957 p9)   
 
§3.1 Actions and Intentions 
 
As we have seen, DER is not a simple philosophical conundrum, nor solution 
to a clearly articulated problem. It makes normative claims based on a 
distinction in the moral psychology of action (intend/foresee), on the 
normative relevance of instrumental rationality, and on the importance of 
considering outcomes holistically (proportionality).  
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It should not be surprising that debates in the philosophy of action have an 
impact on normative theory, though the links between them are not often 
clearly spelled out, nor are implications drawn out for Double Effect 
Reasoning48.  Double effect is in a particularly good position to be affected 
by disputes over action as it stands between the fields of action, normative 
ethics, meta-ethics and moral psychology. In what follows, I draw some 
implications for double effect of the differences between Anscombe and 
Davidson’s account of action and intention49, and consider some 
fundamental differences in different accounts of action. The chapter below is 
not an attempt to try to derive a contribution to normative theory from the 
understanding of actions50, but to highlight how different understandings of 
action can have a particularly important effect on how DER is understood.  
 
If, for example, we think of an action as an event caused in the right kind of 
way by a mental state, then this may lend support to or tend to favour an 
event based interpretation of normative aspects of double effect reasoning, 
over and against other theories of action that involve closer connections 
between the content of mental states and the nature of action. Nancy Davis 
has for example contrasted ‘event’ and ‘agent’ interpretations of the means 
condition51. She argues that the literature on DER has suffered from 
confusion over how the means condition ought to be understood, and this 
 
48 Though there are some rare exceptions see e.g. Daniel P. Sulmasy, “‘Reinventing’ the Rule of 
Double Effect,” in The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, 2009, 1–41, 
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199562411.003.0006. 
49 See Anscombe Intention, Davidson “Actions Reasons and Causes” and “Agency”, both in 
Essays on Actions and Events. Hornsby “Actions in their Circumstances” 
50 See Nussbaum, the Constitution of Agency and Enoch, Agency, Schmagency. 
51 Davis, N. “The Doctrine of Double Effect: Problems of Interpretation” in Woodward The 
Principle of Double Effect p129. 
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seems right, but more on this later (Ch5). My approach in this chapter is not 
to suggest that action theory favours a particular interpretation of DER, 
rather I aim to make the claim that action theoretical commitments, and in 
particular the relationship between intention and action stand to affect the 
general plausibility of DER.  
 
Holton presents a challenge to the methodology often used in DER that is 
not only worth addressing in its own right, but also because it points the 
way towards the importance of the theory of action in the debate around 
DER. He writes:  
“The standard move in trying to assess [DER] is to take apparently 
identical actions, and then to vary the intention with which they are 
performed: the actor does the same thing, but with different intent. 
Then a judgement is made about whether the two cases differ in their 
permissibility. The defender of the doctrine says sometimes the 
permissibility does differ; the opponent, says that it does not. My 
contention [is] that this approach is methodologically flawed. If 
actions are to be characterised in intentional terms, holding the 
action fixed whilst varying the intention is not in general possible.”52 
 
In essence his view is that it is not possible to strip intentional action 
concepts down into a non-intentional verb and an intention that may or may 
not be present.  
 
52 Richard Holton, “We Don’t Torture : Moral Resolutions , Temptation , and the Doctrine of 
Double Effect,” Journal of the British Academy 5 (2017): 309–29. 
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This echoes nicely a question posed by Wittgenstein and which is often seen 
as the beginning of modern philosophy of action:  
“When ‘I raise my arm’, my arm goes up. And the problem arises: 
what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the 
fact that I raise my arm?”53  
 
While Wittgenstein was making a point about the difference between a mere 
happening and an action, both Wittgenstein’s question and Holton’s 
paragraph taken together show that there are important distinctions to be 
drawn in the philosophy of action that have the potential to cash out in 
terms of different approaches to normative ethics, particularly when we 
seek to address hard cases that test our intuitions. I am sympathetic to the 
view that intentional action cannot be reduced to the intention and a non-
intentional act or event, and I explore this further below since the difference 
between a reductionist and non-reductionist approach to intentional action 
will, I argue, play a role in explaining some of the differences between 
supporters and critics of double effect reasoning. 
 
Holton’s characterisation of the DER literature as involving the same actions 
with different intentions is however contestable, and misleading. As we saw 
in Ch1, the example pairings typically involve the same effects and different 
intentions. It is a further leap to say that they involve the same actions and 
 
53 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Trans. G.E (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1953), doi:10.2307/2217461. §621 
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different intentions, so I am not convinced that Holton’s methodological 
complaint applies in general. If DER is taken to be an exploration of the 
application of absolute moral prohibitions, then it is in the business of 
determining what kind of action took place on the basis of the various 
conditions – was it a murder or a killing? It is open to the defender of DER to 
agree with Holton that the pairs of cases do not involve the same action.54  
 
Indeed, there is a significant strand in the DER literature that argues 
precisely this. Joseph Boyle argues that an act’s moral kind is determined by 
the agent’s intention55, John Finnis that “what is being done…is settled by 
what one chooses under the description that made it attractive to choice”56 
and these can be traced to accounts of action, including Aquinas’ (and others 
in the scholastic tradition) in which actions are morally specified (“receive 
their species”) according to what is intended, and not according to what falls 
outside what is intended (praeter intentionem)57. This is not to say that 
 
54 This thesis considers both types of action, and action tokens, and a short note on this will be 
helpful. Much of the debate around DER proceeds on the basis of casuistry; considering the 
moral intuitions we have when faced with particular action tokens, which may either be thought 
experiments or particular acts. On the other hand, when we use DER deliberatively or 
prospectively, action types are under consideration: "if I were to act in this way and with this 
intention, it would fall under this action description". This difference explains my argument 
above. I do not dwell on the distinction in this thesis, but note that others have seen a type/token 
mistake in some critiques of DER. See for example FitzPatrick, W. "Acts, intentions and moral 
permissibility: in defence of the doctrine of double effect." Analysis 63.4, October 2003, pp217-
21. As the argument in this thesis develops, it will be clear that both act types, and act tokens are 
under consideration, but DER's central and more theoretically important role (I suggest) is in 
relation to action types. The distinction does not pose any particular problem for the methodology 
or argument put forward in this thesis, but it is hoped that this clarification will help those 
looking at DER through the lens of the type/token distinction. 
55 Joseph M. Boyle, “Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect,” Ethics 90, no. 4 
(July 19, 1980): 527–38, doi:10.1086/292183. 
56 John Finnis, “Intention and Side Effects,” in Intention and Identity (Oxford University Press, 
2011), 173–96 
57 Aquinas, ST I-II Questions 6-21 also Steven Jensen, Good and Evil Actions: A Journey through 
St Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2010). 
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intentions are always or the only morally relevant features of actions, but 
they are a “key part”58.   
 
But this is just to say that some proponents of DER would not agree with 
Holton’s characterisation of paired cases as involving the same actions plus 
or minus an intention. The cases may involve the same bodily movements, 
the same effects, but not necessarily the same actions.  
  
In order to address Holton’s methodological point, I have suggested that we 
are not tied to thinking that the pairs of cases elicit judgments about the 
same actions (which each involve different intentions). We may be making 
judgments about permissibility on the basis that we interpret the pairs of 
cases to involve quite different actions because of their different intentions. 
Not just a difference between the intentions of two doctors who administer 
the same dose of morphine (to use an example that is now out of date by 
some 25 years59), but that there is only one instance or act of euthanasia 
(there are two different types of act); to state the moral claim more starkly, 
one doctor murders and the other does not. A good example is an insulting 
gesture, where the intention quite obviously matters to our understanding 
and assessment of what is done. An insulting gesture is quite a different kind 
of thing to a gesture that causes insult, when it is done on purpose and 
 
58 Jean Porter, “Choice, Causality, and Relation,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 89, 
no. 3 (2015): 479–504, doi:10.5840/acpq201561558. p495. 
59 See Ch 6 and Regnard, C. ‘Double Effect is Leading a Double Life.’ BMJ. 2007 Mar 3; 
334(7591): 440. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1808133/ See also Morita T, 
Tsunoda J, Inoue S, Chihara S. Effects of high dose opioids and sedatives on survival in 
terminally ill cancer patients. J Pain Symptom Manage 2001;21:282-9 and Sykes, N. “The use of 
opioids and sedatives at the end of life” The Lancet Volume 4, No. 5, p312–318, May 2003 
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without apology. While both gestures might cause offence, only one was 
rude. We might think that this begs the question, but the possibility of this 
line of argument should mean that our case based approach is not 
irredeemable. The intention may be bound up in what is done, a part of the 
proper descriptions of the action. 
 
What I want to bring to the fore in this chapter are some wider implications 
of the relationships between actions, effects and intentions, from the theory 
of action.  Differences in accounts of action will, it is argued, play a role in 
the way we think about the normative elements involved in DER.  
 
The view that the DER literature involves intention in a way that is separate 
and separable from our characterisation and understanding of action, which 
Holton suggests is implicit in the whole of the methodology around DER, 
may lead us to think that intentions have a secondary, merely derivative or 
indirect role in relation to action. If intentions are ‘merely derivative’ or 
indirectly related to action, they may not be able to play the kind of role that 
DER suggests when we consider the permissibility of actions, and a number 
of philosophers argue precisely this60. On the other hand, if the formation of 
an intention is itself an action (and other people’s interests are affected by 
our attitudes towards them, such as the purposes for which we act) in a way 
that is directly rather than derivatively subject to obligations, then different 
 
60 See for example, Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, “Physician‐Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments,” Ethics 109, no. 3 (April 
20, 1999): 497–518, doi:10.1086/233919; T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, 
Meaning, Blame (Harvard University Press, 2008); Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Self Defence,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 20, no. 4 (1991): 283–310. 
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models of action stand to affect the way we interpret DER and its plausibility 
as a way of determining the permissibility of acting in difficult cases.  
 
§3.2 Bennett on Action and Double Effect 
 
There is a straightforward way in which one’s philosophy of action might 
affect one’s approach to double effect. Jonathan Bennett, at one point, took 
the view that first order morality (what one may or may not do) does not 
address intentions on the basis of his action-theoretical understanding of 
intention. He writes that:  
 
“My [view] was based on two truths: (1) What I intend in ϕing is 
defined by which of my beliefs and desires I am motivated by; and (2) 
I cannot turn beliefs or desires on and off at will. From these I 
inferred that (3) I cannot turn intentions on and off at will, which 
implies that (4) intentions are not under the command of first-order 
morality”61. 
 
This is an example where a belief-desire model of intentional action is used 
to show that intentions (being made up of or ‘defined by’ beliefs and 
desires) are passive, not voluntary and therefore cannot be commanded by 
moral rules. This is easily read as a position incompatible with Double Effect 
Reasoning. Bennett, however, while going on to challenge DER, 
 
61 Bennett, The Act Itself. p195 
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acknowledges that the inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is not correct. He 
writes: “Although it does not make sense to forbid me to believe P and want 
Q, it does make sense to forbid me to act on this belief and desire.” So, 
Bennett lands at a position more sympathetic to there being a role for 
intentions, albeit “limited in scope and indirect in effect”.  
 
A more plausible role of intention in double effect, then, is not as something 
separate from the act that can be turned off and on, but rather as a non-
voluntary act of will part of a proper explanation of what is done voluntarily 
and these further actions (or tryings etc.) are what DER’s judgment of 
im/permissibility relates to.  
 
Perhaps we should not be as quick as Bennett, and others in this tradition of 
thinking about action motivation, to dismiss the possibility of intention as a 
non-voluntary element in trying/acting with an intention. Peter Geach 
articulates this well “it seems absurd that intention should steal upon one 
unawares, like a fit of anger or fear. On the other hand, how can there be 
voluntary acts of intending? If an act is voluntary, one may be ordered or 
advised to do it; but as Wittgenstein pointed out, the verb ‘to intend’ has no 
useable imperative, one cannot use such an imperative to order or ask or 
advise someone to intend something”62 
 
 
62 Peter Geach, “Intention, Freedom and Predictability,” Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplement 46 (March 12, 2000): 73, doi:10.1017/S1358246100010389. 
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Geach contrasts the proper view of intention with that which some take to 
be an intention, namely “saying in one’s heart something like ‘I’m going to 
do so-and-so”. This approach to intention has the advantage that it is 
voluntary, and so more clearly within the scope of moral appraisal. It raises, 
however, more problems that it promises to solve.  
 
The ‘little speech’ approach is not appropriate for DER because, as 
Anscombe63 and others have pointed out, it is vulnerable to “sophistical” 
abuse. An agent may ‘direct his intention’ away from harmful parts of his 
plan, restricting it only to beneficial outcomes. Thus an agent may say (to 
themselves) that they are merely firing bullets in order (say) to hear their 
report, and do not intend the death of a rival through whom the bullet 
passes. “’Nonsense’ we want to say, ‘doing that is doing this [murdering your 
rival] and so closely that you can’t pretend only the first gives you a 
description under which the act is intentional’. For an act does not merely 
have many descriptions, under some of which it is indeed not intentional: it 
has several under which it is intentional, so you cannot choose just one of 
these, and claim to have excluded others by that.”64  
 
When an agent is deciding what to do in the cases found in DER literature, 
we would find it odd (to say the least) if they were deliberating about which 
intention with which to cause their desired outcomes. The bomber pilot in 
Enola Gay (the first aircraft to drop an atomic bomb), who having chosen to 
 
63 Anscombe, “Action, Intention, and Double Effect.” 
64 Ibid. 
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kill civilians decides only to intend that they appear dead after the atom 
bomb detonates, is performing a kind of mental gymnastics that Anscombe 
calls the ‘gerrymandering’ of intention. Gerrymandering is a problem for 
DER, since it promises to provide a ‘get out of gaol free’ solution to 
deliberating agents, and this serves as a reductio for those who wish, as 
proponents of DER do, that intention can be determinative in relation to 
permissibility. If intentions can be gerrymandered, then they couldn’t 
possibly play the role DER needs them to.  
 
If DER is to be credible, it ought not to be able to provide agents with this 
kind of ‘get out of gaol free’ possibility. There is also at least the threat of 
regress here; if intention is a voluntary inner act of speech, it seems 
reasonable to ask with what intention the little speech was made.   
 
By way of diagnosis, Geach suggests that there is often a confusion between 
an intention (properly understood), and trying, or setting oneself. “One may 
intend to try to do something; but hardly, try to intend to do it”, since this 
would be ‘absurd’.  
 
So what does the difference between intention viewed as voluntary or not 
mean for DER? If the verb ‘to intend’ has no useable imperative because 
intentions are non-voluntary, what then are we to make of the intention 
condition of DER? This is particularly pressing given the implausibility of 
and challenges associated with the position that intentions are voluntary. A 
possible way forward is not to view intentions themselves in isolation as 
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wrong-making features of actions, but to see them (when present) as part 
and parcel of what is done. Resisting the view of human action as sub-class 
of events that have an associated intention.  
 
Bennett’s view is influenced here by a constellation of positions, including 
‘the standard view’ of action, which while being ‘standard’ and influential, 
are at the same time widely criticised. This standard view can be traced to a 
number of sources including Hobbes, Hume, and more recently Donald 
Davidson among others. This view is, very broadly, that actions are 
explained by beliefs and desires (pro-attitudes). These rationalise what I do, 
and this rationalisation is a species of causal explanation. Motivations have a 
central role here and practical rationality is (merely) instrumental on this 
view65, because it serves to secure the object of desire: “for a desire and a 
belief to explain an action in the right way, they must cause it in the right 
way, perhaps through a chain or process of reasoning that meets standards 
of rationality”66. Desire (or desire like pro-attitudes) motivate us to pursue 
an end, combined with beliefs that our action will further the end. The goal 
directedness or purposiveness of an action comes about because the action 
is an effect of the expression of attitudes (beliefs and desires). 
 
§3.3 Davidson and Anscombe 
 
 
65 Candace A. Vogler, Reasonably Vicious (Harvard University Press, 2002). 
66 Donald Davidson, Essays on Action and Events (Oxford: OUP, 1980). Essay 12, p232. 
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Actions can be described truthfully in many ways, and each way will say 
something different about what is done, some of these might have moral 
implications, others will appear innocent. Both Davidson and Anscombe 
take it to be possible for one action to fall under different descriptions, some 
of which are intentional and some are not. For an action to be intentional, 
there must be at least one description under which it is chosen/adopted by 
the agent. One and the same action or event might be described variously as 
‘pouring liquid’, ‘making a drink’, ‘quenching the thirst of the victim’ and 
‘administering poison’. 
 
However, there is an interesting tradition of contrasting Anscombe and 
Davidson’s approach to action that I explore below67. Davidson and 
Anscombe are not normally contrasted, and Hornsby cautions that the 
details of their disagreement are not clearly to be found in the authors’ 
primary sources, because she argues, they did not appreciate the depth of 
disagreement between them. However, it may turn out that their approach 
to agency and actions are “utterly different”68. 
 
Where Davidson’s view of action is broadly that actions are events caused in 
the right kind of way by mental states (including beliefs, desires etc.), 
Anscombe presents a challenge to the standard view expressed by Davidson 
along these lines: An action’s various properties (to which its various 
 
67 See for example, Julia Annas, “Davidson and Anscombe on `the Same Action’,” Mind 85: 
251–57, doi:10.2307/2253123; Jennifer Hornsby, “Actions in Their Circumstances,” in Essays on 
Anscombe’s “Intention,” ed. A Ford, J Hornsby, and F Stoutland (Cambridge, MA, 2011), 105–
27. 
68 Hornsby, “Actions in Their Circumstances.” p105. 
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descriptions are owed) “do not have their source in the workings of event–
causality, but in the means/end structure of pieces of practical reasoning.”69  
 
Anscombe’s striking denial that actions are intentional in virtue of some 
“extra feature” that distinguishes them from unintentional actions or mere 
events, is aimed at positions like Davidson’s where I have acted if my desire 
(that I have ice-cream) motivates and causes a change in the world. The 
alternative Anscombian view is “to call [an action] intentional is to assign it 
to the class of intentional actions and so to indicate that we should consider 
the question ‘Why?’ relevant to it.” 70§19 . This is the class of actions for 
which the content of an agent’s practical reasoning is relevant to proper 
understanding, correct descriptions and explanations.    
 
This denial of an ‘extra feature’ that distinguishes actions from events is not 
to deny that there are psychological events, nor even that these may cause 
actions71. What Anscombe does deny is that a reason for an action is 
necessarily this kind of event. “In particular, ‘intention’ does not refer to a 
mental event (or state) which precedes or accompanies an intentional act 
and makes it intentional; there may be mental events which immediately 
precede intentional actions but there need not be”72 
 
 
69 Hornsby p118. 
70 G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). 
71 Ibid. See §11. 
72 Rosalind Hursthouse, “Intention,” in Logic, Cause and Action, ed. Roger Teichmann 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2000). 
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The descriptions of an action that an agent must admit are those that feature 
in his or her practical reasoning. 
 
“Suppose we take a countable concept of an action or event like, say, 
administering poison. Such an event will split up into lots of sub-
events or sub- actions; there might even be a gap in the process, 
which yet counts as one administration of poison – the 
administration being interrupted, say, by a fit of coughing on the part 
of the administrator. However we are willing to counter the whole 
episode as just one Time that the person administered poison, One 
administration.”73  
 
The conclusion that Hornsby draws is that there are radical differences 
between Anscombe and Davidson not just in relation to the cause of actions, 
but due to their understanding of action itself. She summarises these 
differences in terms of what has the ‘central place’ in our understanding of 
agency. For one it is the agent, for the other it is the event.74  
Where actions are compound, their components constitute the whole 
by virtue of the intention that unites them. The answer to the 
question why she is doing what she is doing (whisking eggs, say) can 
at any point be that she is doing the whole thing (making an omelette, 
 
73 G. E. M. Anscombe, “Under a Description,” Noûs 13, no. 2 (May 1979): 219, 
doi:10.2307/2214398. 
74 Hornsby, “Actions in Their Circumstances.” p125 
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say). There is then a sort of structure in ‘by’-chains that makes no 
appearance in Davidson’s account.75 
 
So, even though pouring liquid out of a vial is a true description of the action, 
it is part of a unity that is specified by the agent’s intention to administer 
poison. “In Anscombe’s treatment, when there is a compound action, the 
series of means the agent takes are united by reference to the agent’s end, 
not by summing the several, separately conceived components of the action 
(still less to summing such bodily movements as those components might 
involve).”76 For Anscombe, ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions will reveal the unity of 
‘administering poison’. The Davidsonian position is reflected in the latter 
approach, which gives events rather than agents the central place in agency. 
This difference of ‘centrality’ is clearly significant if it is read across into our 
interpretation of DER.  
 
Davidson’s error is to fail to take account of the way reason informs what 
people do as they go along, rather than just being in people before they do 
things, and causing them to act. Here we should be able to see that the 
framework with which actions are explained is quite different to that 
proposed by Anscombe. Reasons for acting feature as a cause, rather than in 
the proper explanation of ongoing action. As Vogler puts it:  
“It is not that we have, on the one side, someone with a lot of things 
in mind, and on the other an event describable in indefinitely many 
 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. p124. 
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ways, and now confront the onerous task of connecting mental 
representation to event. It is rather that some of the salient 
descriptions of what one has in mind will (if all goes well) line up 
with the salient descriptions of what one does. Representation of 
practical inferences, on Anscombe’s reading, is partly a device for 
understanding intentional action, not by giving its cause, but by 
revealing its grounds, by showing “what good, what use, the action 
is””77 
 
There is a significant difference, then, between how Anscombe and Davidson 
see actions are correctly to be conceived: “a person’s moving her fingers in a 
certain way may in some circumstances be her kneading the dough, in other 
circumstances her massaging someone’s back. In such examples we find two 
actions between which Davidson would find no inherent difference, because 
(a) he would say that the events are of different kinds only insofar as they 
relate differently to other events, and (b) the bodily movements are of the 
same kind ex hypothesi.”78 Harking back to the criticism levelled by Holton at 
the methodology of DER, we can see how it might have purchase against the 
Davidsonian view in which there is no inherent difference between these 
two actions of ‘a person’s moving her fingers in a certain way’. Are they 
really best explained as the same action, done from different beliefs and 
desires, or are they different actions?  
 
 
77 Vogler, Reasonably Vicious. p221. 
78 Hornsby, “Actions in Their Circumstances.” 
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For Davidson, Vogler suggests, the need to provide a special kind of 
explanatory causal story is motivated by a failure to attend to the rational 
structure in action. On Anscombe’s view, acts that are derailed and then 
resumed do not present a problem of whether there was one act or two. 
 
“In Davidson’s view, events constitute a neutral, unconceptualised 
category. He thought of the domain as, so to speak, standing ready – 
ready for us to pick out this or that item belonging in it. That is how 
he could seek a criterion for things in the entire domain “for 
occurrences just as such” – as if the intrinsic nature of any event were 
a matter simply of its being an event, and independent of the nature 
of any other things”79 
 
This is at least very close to the view that intentions are something that can 
be added or taken away from the very same action, which, as we saw with 
Holton at the top of this chapter faces difficulties when applied to DER, since 
it is less well equipped to provide for differences in kind in the pairs of cases 
DER judges between.  
 
 
It is worth considering whether the Davidsonian picture might be 
incompatible with DER, hostile to DER or neutral. If we view intention as the 
operative or primary cause of an act, then that can specify the descriptions 
 
79 Ibid. p116. 
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under which an agent intends to act, which should provide enough for DER’s 
intention condition to operate. On this view DER prohibits particular kinds 
of outcome causation. However, there are reasons to be cautious here. Even 
if we grant that a causation based account provides the correct account of 
acting for a reason and intention, it is not at all clear that it can render 
meaningful differences between effects that are intended and those that are 
merely foreseen. Since foreseen effects are caused alongside intended 
effects, by the relevant motivating intention80. On the other hand, if foreseen 
effects are not desired, but are believed to result from action, then this 
difference in desire could do the moral work. Another reason for caution 
comes from Jonathan Dancy, who has argued that the belief/desire model is 
“incompatible with moral realism”, because what makes an action right in 
the normative sense is not the agent’s psychological state, but some salient 
state of affairs in the world. So if causalism is right it would appear that we 
cannot act for a normatively good reason.”81 Commitments to anti-realism in 
ethics and support for double effect would be difficult to square. However, it 
should be enough, for now, to make the necessary point that there are 
difficulties associated with the Davidsonian model of action that have 
bearing on DER. 
 
My suggestion, then, is that there is a conceptual space opened up on the 
Davidsonian model which distances the mental element of an action from 
 
80 It would not be difficult to construct scenarios where the harmful side effect would not occur 
without the motivational cause.  
81 For a useful discussion of Dancy’s position see e.g. Stephen Boulter, “Aquinas on Action and 
Action Explanation,” in New Essays on the Explanation of Action, ed. Constantine Sandis 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), https://philpapers.org/rec/BOUAOA. 
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events that follow from them. This will favour, or rather tend to support and 
provide a plausible theoretical background for a popular strand of criticism 
of DER that distinguishes between the relevance of DER in appraising an 
agent’s character, on the basis of their state of mind, intentions etc. on the 
one hand, and in providing criteria for permissibility which do not directly 
involve these psychological pre-cursors on the other. Bennett, Thomson, and 
Scanlon run variations of this argument, arguing that intention and one’s 
motivations are only indirectly relevant to permissibility (though directly 
relevant to the appraisal of character).    
 
If this is the case, then it is worth noticing one feature of the debate around 
DER.  
Separately to whether a Davidsonian picture of action favours the view that 
intentions have an indirect relevance to action, we might also worry that the 
way most of the cases which serve as examples of DER are set up in the 
literature82 may be hostile to an Anscombian understanding of intention in 
action. In the distinction between tactical and terror bomber, the morphine 
example83 and many others, philosophers have found cases in which the 
outcomes and circumstances under question are identical or at least 
indistinguishable, and only the intentions are different. The search for 
examples with as few ‘moving parts’ as possible that motivates drawing up 
the examples in this way is a good way to tease out our intuitions about 
 
82 That is, the familiar casuistical methodology of analysing pairs of cases (see my Introductory 
chapter for examples).  
83 See Chapter 6 for further discussion of this case. 
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particular concepts, in this case intention, because confounding factors are 
minimised.  
 
However, this may create or increase the burden of proof on accounts that 
hold intentions to change the nature of the action, and therefore the way 
effects are characterised turns what are taken to be canonical DER examples 
into hard cases for the Anscombian view. These are hard cases because it 
can be hard to see why a change in mental state should cause a radical 
change in the permissibility of indistinguishable sets of events.  
 
One charge that might be brought against this picture is that it does not 
delineate clearly enough between intention-with-which and intentional 
action. The central case of DER is where an agent can specify the intention-
with-which they act – the goal that structures their means-end reasoning. 
The class of intentional actions, however, is broader than the standard way 
we consider DER cases – an agent deliberating about what it may be 
permissible to do or not. Intentional actions that are not typically 
considered in the DER literature include instances where there is no, or no 
obvious intention-with-which one acts e.g. habitual actions, actions done ‘in 
the heat of the moment’, or the special case of non-voluntary actions (like 
acts of will, see below). 
 
I am reluctant to argue for or against the application of DER to the wider 
category of intentional action here, but I do note that if DER is to apply, it 
may need to be supplemented with other considerations. The permissibility 
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of intentional actions done from habit may depend in part on the 
background of how one has developed that habit (tried to avoid it through 
training etc), an evaluation of the habit itself, as well as the typical 
conditions of DER. It seems to me, however, that actions done out of habit 
and actions done in the heat of the moment sound more like reasons to 
excuse, rather than reasons to permit (reasons to think the act does not fall 
under a particular prohibition).  
 
§3.4 Two Models of Action and the Indirect Relevance of 
Intention 
 
Finally I want to draw out a way of understanding Anscombe’s dispute with 
Davidson in terms of wider differences about agency and reasons in action. 
While we have considered some aspects of Davidson’s model in detail, and 
linked it with a motivation based model of action, an alternative model of 
human action has its origins in the Scholastic tradition84 and can be 
characterised as the ‘practical reason-based’ model of action85.  
 
Rather than construing human action as an effect of a desire or other 
motivating pro attitude, human action is the exercise of a distinctively 
practical capacity for rationality. On the one hand a complete account of an 
 
84 Thomas Pink "Intentions and two models of human action" in Bruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons 
and Intentions. Ashgate (2007); Jensen, Good and Evil Actions: A Journey through St Thomas 
Aquinas; Thomas Pink "Suarez, Hobbes and the Scholastic Tradition in Action Theory" in 
Thomas Pink, M.W.F. Stone (eds.) The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present 
Day. London : Routledge, 2003. 
85 Pink, “Intentions and Two Models of Human Action.” 
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action must include the agent’s psychological states, but also, it must include 
the external ‘desired object’, that is, the object or state of affairs which the 
agent apprehends as good and subsequently has reason to pursue. An 
intention, on this view, is a distinctive kind of reason-applying attitude, 
rather than reducible to beliefs and desires. Intentions are a non voluntary 
act (of the will), they are an instance of agency, of self-determination 
because they are an exercise of our capacity practically to respond to 
reasons – the desirability of what is intended. Actions themselves, then 
(rather than just their causes) are defined by features in what McDowell 
might call “the realm of reasons”. This makes it more likely that pairs of 
cases with the same effects could be understood as different kinds of 
actions. 
 
The content of intentions – their objects, provide the goal at which an agent 
is directed when he acts. These brush strokes are far too broad, and in 
identifying these two schools of thought, there will necessarily be 
generalisations and blurry edges. There are however a few key differences I 
would draw out. 
 
On one view, practical rationality is (merely) instrumental; all of one’s 
reasons for acting express, engage, or otherwise involve one’s desires; and 
desires, being non-voluntary, are not necessarily subjectable to rational 
criticism. On the other practical reason based view, the connection between 
intentions and action is not causal, but explained through the content of an 
agent’s reasoning. Intentions are non-voluntary, but because they do involve 
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an exercise of our capacity to reason about practical goals etc, they are 
rationally appraisable.86  
 
“Suppose that I am deliberating about whether to stand up or stay 
sitting down, on the basis of considering what ends these actions 
might further, and conclude that I should get up. My deliberation has 
then left me, as Aquinas put it, commanding myself to get up – getting 
up hence counting as an actus imperatus or commanded action, 
which as based on beliefs about what ends its performance might 
further, is accordingly purposive. But there is also the prior action of 
deciding to get up an action which I haven’t been deliberating about, 
which has been explained instead simply by my deliberation about 
whether to get up, and so simply by my beliefs about what ends 
getting up would further, and which is, accordingly non-purposive. 
This action Aquinas regards as an actus elicitus: an action which is 
elicited by my practical reason, rather than commanded by it. And so, 
for Aquinas, we have the possibility of deliberate will agency that is 
motivated in non-purposive form. What makes such decisions actions 
themselves, is the fact that they as much count as exercises of a 
distinctively practical rationality as do the actions decided upon 
which they explain.”87 
 
 
86 Thomas Pink has a well developed account of this view in Self Determination: the Ethics of 
Action (Oxford, OUP, 2016). 
87 Thomas Pink, “Reason and Agency,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1997): 263–
80, doi:10.2307/4545265. 
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Having this kind of second order action, a decision or intention elicited from 
my practical reason on the basis of my understanding of the result of my 
action has the potential to explain the moral relevance of intention in DER, 
in a way that a Hobbesian/Davisonian account is not able to offer. 
Conceptual space is created on the latter account. According to the Practical-
Reason model, there is a non-voluntary act that explains further voluntary 
actions, tryings etc, but that is closely connected to the content of reasons as 
pro-attitudes, as opposed to the Davidsonian account, where what explains 
an action is the causal story of beliefs and motivating desires. An intention 
to A is itself a non-voluntary action, and is part of what is done voluntarily 
on the basis of the intention, rather than being explained in terms of 
causation on what McDowell (derisively) calls the “hydraulic” picture of 
rational motivation.  
 
Following Anscombe, actions are to be understood to relate foundationally 
to the means-end structure of practical reasoning, intentions have 
motivational power but also have explanatory power not as causes of 
actions (e.g. a particular pro-attitude), but in virtue of their contents, the 
object of intention and the practical reasoning that is shaped by that goal88. 
From the scholastic model of action, intentions are part of a special rational 
and practical capacity we have to respond to the desirability of goals.  
 
 
88 Cf. Michael. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Harvard University Press, 
1987). 
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How can these differences in philosophy of action help navigate the DER 
literature? The main thrust of this chapter has been to show that an 
Anscombian action theory, and Scholastic practical reason based accounts of 
action and intention are more hospitable to the kind of distinction that DER 
draws, since intentions are more clearly linked to differences in kind (i.e. the 
kind of action undertaken), even where the third person view of the 
situation, i.e. our description of events abstracted from the practical 
rationality of means end reasoning that they contain, sees no (or only a 
limited) difference.  
 
One long running and forceful set of arguments against double effect focus 
on intention, and the intuition that when it comes to permissibility, we 
ought to be looking outward, rather than inward to find an action’s morally 
decisive features89. We ought to be looking at the positive or negative 
characteristics of events in the world rather than an agent’s state of mind. 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, and T M Scanlon, for example, have made the case 
that intentions (and states of mind) are relevant to assessing the character 
of agents, but that this is distinct from permissibility, properly understood. 
However, as we have seen above, a model of action that sees intention as 
part of a proper explanation of action – what is done, has less conceptual 
space for this type of distinction and a Davidsonian/Hobbesian account of 
action encourages the separation between character and permissibility 
judgments in relation to actions. An Anscombian or Scholastic model of 
 
89 Holton, R. “We Don’t Torture: Moral Resolutions, Temptation and the Doctrine of Double 
Effect”. The Journal of the British Academy Vol 5 (2017), pp309 – 329.  
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intention in action has the resources to hold both the psychological element 
and the rational, outcome/goal direction focussed elements of action 
together.  
 
The connection between the Hobbesian motivation based model of action 
and Davidson’s views can be seen in their view of motivation and causation. 
Hobbes writes that actions by their nature are expressions of prior passive 
motivations, and Davidson that an action is an event caused by a mental 
state (belief/desire)90. The link between Anscombe and the scholastic 
tradition is found in her approach to practical reason. Anscombe wants to 
preserve the structure of reasons in action, and the practical reason based 
model of action is able to accommodate this because a decision or intention 
is the exercise of our capacity to respond to reasons in a practically 
orientated way. An account of action and agency that finds intentions to be 
actions (rather than pre-cursors to action) is much more hospitable to the 
thought that obligations can govern what one intends. We might go further 
to say that under this kind of theory of agency, the primary case of agency 
might be deciding what goals I aim at, and if obligations govern agency, then 
the position that I can be under obligations not to aim at certain goals, as in 
DER’s intention condition, has a strong action theoretical basis.  
 
This, of course, is too quick, but enough it is hoped, to establish that there 
are good reasons to think that one’s philosophy of action is significant for 
 
90 See Thomas Pink, Self-Determination : The Ethics of Action. Volume 1, n.d. p228ff 
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the way we interpret intention’s role in normative ethics, and DER’s core 
claims. It suggests a deeper connection between DER and more general 
theories of agency and the significance of agency. A more full and systematic 
exploration of the links between Anscombe’s approach to intention, 
scholastic action theory and DER would be fascinating, but beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  
 
So to reprise the main parts of the chapter, intention is best understood as 
non-voluntary, but that this may challenge intentions’ moral relevance if it is 
relevantly similar to beliefs and desires (for which we have at most indirect 
moral responsibility, depending on how we have chosen to affect our own 
desires etc.). This is not fatal to DER, because we can distinguish between 
two schools of thought in the philosophy of action, one of which includes an 
account of intentions that are non-voluntary and up to us/an action. On this 
model of action, we have a more plausible way of understanding how 
intentions can affect the kind of actions performed, even in circumstances 
where the effects are the same, and because intention formation is itself an 
action, we have an opening for obligation to apply to our attitudes. The 
reason our attitudes might be subject to obligations is considered in the next 
chapter, where I argue that others have interests in what our attitudes (such 
as intentions) are, as well as in the voluntary actions that result from them. 
We should, then, be wary of criticism of DER that is motivated by a view of 
intention as voluntary, of action as separate from the means-end structure 
of practical reasoning, and of intention as anything other than bound up in a 
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proper understanding of what is done, both through our motivation, and 
reason based explanation of what is done.  
 
In showing how different models of action can affect the way DER is 
interpreted, and affect important elements in the theoretical background in 
which DER operates, I have taken a position contrary to Warren Quinn, who 
in his “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double 
Effect”, argues that “If [DER] is sound, its force ought to be capture-able on 
any plausible theory of the intentional, even one that would revise ordinary 
ways of speaking” 91. Differences in accounts of the structure of actions 
plausibly play a significant role in how interpreters view, and are likely to 
view DER, and we should expect differences in action theory to cash out in 
terms of differences in normative claims in relation to intention.  
 
It is one thing to argue that the way we understand action matters for our 
account of intention, and intention’s relation to wrongdoing, but it is 
another to argue that we can make a case for a moral difference between 
intention and foresight in the way that DER suggests. I approach that 






91 Warren S Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect,” 








This chapter will consider differences in the role intention might play in 
establishing judgments of permissibility and impermissibility. A number of 
challenges to DER proceed along the lines that intention is not morally 
relevant in the way its proponents claim. Some argue that there are 
alternative and preferable explanations for the cases that are usually used as 
examples of and to support DER. These arguments suggest that something 
other than intentional-wrongdoing is doing the explanatory moral work, 
and therefore that double effect is illusory, false, or has merely secondary 
moral significance. In this chapter I will focus on T M Scanlon’s influential 
approach to the relationship between intention and permissibility, and the 
arguments he contends establish DER’s illusory appeal.  
 
Double effect reasoning ranges over judgments of permissibility. It provides 
an account in which harms that are intended are distinguished morally from 
harms that are foreseen to result from one’s action or inaction. It is found in 
a moral tradition in which certain kinds of intentional actions fall under 
absolute moral norms, which impose obligations not to act in certain ways. 
This is not a simple or straightforward moral distinction, because not all 
wrongdoing is intentional, and merely foreseeing that harm will result from 
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an otherwise good action does not mean that the action is permissible. 
There does, however, seem to be an interesting and persistent core claim to 
DER that intentions matter, in some foundational and direct way.  
 
I begin with an outline of Scanlon’s view, and a related position that 
distinguishes first and second order moral significance. Both of these views 
challenge DER. Two cases in particular support these positions – those of 
blameless impermissible action, and blameworthy permissible action. I then 
focus on three strands of Scanlon’s position, firstly that the reasons for 
which we act and our intentions can impart meaning to our actions that is 
relevant to permissibility. Scanlon argues that this is only of derivative 
relevance, and I consider some counterexamples. Secondly, that intention 
can have predictive significance, and I argue that DER could not be grounded 
on intention’s predictive role without collapsing into consequentialism, and 
thirdly, Scanlon’s contention that intention cannot be relevant to 
permissibility because we do not deliberate about our intentions, in the 
sense of choosing between the intentions we might apply to a particular 
course of action. In this final section I will argue that Scanlon fails to 
establish that intention has no relevance to permissibility, particularly if 








§4.2 Scanlon on intention 
 
TM Scanlon’s subtle criticism of DER, and specifically the way intention 
might be morally significant, has been an important contribution to the 
contemporary literature on double effect92. The main thrust of his criticism 
is that the permissibility of an action does not depend on the agent’s 
intentions in the way that the DER maintains, and that we are led to view 
what is really just an ‘illusory’ appeal of DER, because of a difference 
between two closely related forms of moral judgment, which can be based 
on the same moral principles. The deliberative use of moral principles 
answer the question of permissibility, whereas the critical use of moral 
principles answers questions about the agent’s blameworthiness. Scanlon 
argues that intention does not and should not feature in our deliberative use 
of moral principles, and therefore it is not non-derivatively relevant to 
permissibility.93  
 
"It remains true that a person who intends to kill noncombatants in 
order to shorten the war by undermining morale (and has no further 
justification for her action) acts wrongly - she has an intention that 
she should abandon. But this truth should not be taken to suggest 
that intention has a fundamental role in determining the 
impermissibility of this action, in the way claimed by double 
 
92 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. 
93 Ibid. Chapter 1. 
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effect.  The intention is wrongful because the act intended is 
wrongful, and the act is wrongful because of its likely consequences, 
not (fundamentally) because of the intention."94  
 
Before approaching Scanlon’s position in more detail, and offering some 
objections, I consider a line of thinking that is also critical of DER and close 
to Scanlon’s view. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s approach to DER rests on a 
distinction between evaluating acts and evaluating agents. Scanlon’s view is 
distinctive and more subtle than Thomson’s argument. 
 
§4.3 First-order and second order moral significance. 
 
Alan Donagan casts first- and second-order morality in terms of a distinction 
between: “actions considered materially and actions considered formally. 
Considered materially, an action is a deed, and no reference is made to the 
doer’s state of mind in doing it.” 95. For Donagan, first-order morality 
concerns actions as permissible and impermissible, and “considers effects 
attributable to an agent without reference to the agent’s epistemic and 
volitional states”. In this way, intentions, beliefs and other volitional or 
mental states are excluded from the question of whether an action is 
permissible. Thomson suggests a general thesis that follows this line of 
 
94 Ibid. p29. 
95 A. Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1977). p55 and see 
Bennett, The Act Itself. p46ff.  
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thought: “it is irrelevant to the question of whether x may do alpha what 
intention x would do alpha with if he or she did it”96. 
 
There are a number of related distinctions in the literature. It should be 
noted at this stage that the first order/second order characterization of this 
distinction departs from the way this pairing is normally employed in 
philosophical contexts. Second order beliefs, for example, are beliefs about 
beliefs, and first order beliefs are just beliefs. Second order beliefs differ 
from first order beliefs in virtue of their subject matter (other beliefs). The 
distinction between first and second order moral significance is not like the 
epistemological distinction because second order moral features (such as 
the appraisal of moral character) are not necessarily evaluations of first 
order moral features (such as the results of actions), but may involve a 
range of considerations such as what the agent ought to have known, their 
motivations, desires etc. The difference between agents and acts is not like 
that between beliefs-about-beliefs, and beliefs. That said, this language runs 
through the literature on double effect97, and is helpful in characterising a 
certain kind of objection to DER, which relegates intention not just to a 
second order significance, but to a secondary moral significance.  
 
The question “May one do alpha?” is the first order question of 
permissibility, which, it is argued, is not only separable from the question of 
the evaluation of the intentions with which one acts, but is primary, or 
 
96 Thomson, “Self Defence.” p294. 
97 Cavanaugh, Double Effect Reasoning. 
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foundational. Thomson argues that it is a “very odd idea” that intentions 
play a role in fixing what one may or may not do, because “Can alpha be 
done?” and “Can this agent do alpha?” Are different kinds of questions. 
When considering the deliberations of the tactical and terror bomber (in the 
example above), she asks “can anyone really think that the pilot should 
decide whether he may drop the bombs by looking inward for an intention 
with which he would be dropping them if he dropped them?”98.  
 
Thomson’s rhetorical question about the bomber ‘looking inward’ for an 
intention that might attach to dropping the bombs will be familiar from 
Chapter 3 (on Intention in Action and Double Effect), where I noted 
Anscombe and Davidson’s contrasting accounts of action. A Davidsonian 
view might lead one to think that looking inward will be of incidental 
importance to the act (understood as an event with a particular cause). 
Anscombe’s view, on the other hand, takes intentional actions to be those 
for which the question ‘why?’ have application, and is better able to account 
for rational structures found in actions. The Anscombian view can explain 
the unity of an action that extends over time and might be interrupted. The 
agent’s practical reasoning provides important elements in understanding 
the action itself (rather than just features of one’s inward mental life), and 
this gives us grounds to think that the difference in the bombing example 
may be a question of different kinds of actions, rather than (merely) 
different answers to introspective questions.  
 
98 Thomson, “Self Defence.” 
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Scanlon does not make a distinction between acts and agents in quite the 
way Thomson does, since the distinction that motivates his claim that DER is 
illusory is between the deliberative and critical use of moral principles. 
Scanlon and Thomson are aligned, however, in that they both deploy in their 
favour the thought that an agent can culpably do something that is 
permissible, and inculpably do the impermissible 99. 
 
These possibilities may show that intention and permissibility come apart in 
a way that could undermine DER. If permissibility does not (ever) depend 
on intention then the intention condition of DER is incorrect.  
 
§4.4 Blameless, Impermissible Action 
 
Does the possibility of inculpably or blamelessly doing the impermissible 
show that that intentions have no role in establishing permissibility? The 
most obvious way one can blamelessly do something that is impermissible is 
if one acts in inculpable ignorance of a morally relevant feature. In not 
knowing that the wine I give you is poisoned, and having no reason to 




99 See e.g. Donagan, The Theory of Morality. P118, Thomson, “Self Defence.” Scanlon, Moral 
Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Chapter 1.  
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The poisoning in this case is accidental and involuntary in a relevant sense, 
and since the voluntary “serves as morality’s threshold” 100 then not 
knowing the wine is poisoned is fully exculpatory (providing I have not 
having been negligent or reckless in not having tested the wine first etc). 
The agent does act voluntarily, but because he neither knows nor could be 
expected to know about the poisoned cup, this puts the poisoning beyond 
the bounds of morality. There is a striking parallel between the unwitting 
poisoner and a poisonous tree (to modify one of Cavanaugh’s examples); 
saying the tree acts impermissibly is incongruous (to say the least), and 
“what the tree did is more clearly not an act than what I involuntarily 
caused”101. Thomson’s “Day’s End” case is a version of this kind of argument: 
 
“Day’s End: B always comes home at 9:00 pm, and the first thing he does is to 
flip the light switch in his hallway. He did so this evening. B’s flipping the 
switch caused a circuit to close. By virtue of an extraordinary series of 
coincidences, unpredictable in advance by anybody, the circuit’s being 
closed caused the release of electricity (a small lightning flash) in A’s house 
next door. Unluckily A was in its path and was therefore badly burned.”102  
 
B, according to Thomson, violates a claim of A, where ‘ought’ is understood 
in the objective sense and does not entail fault. B therefore ought not to have 
flipped the switch. We might question, however, whether B 
 
100 Cavanaugh, Double Effect Reasoning. p128  
101 Ibid. 
102 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1990). p229.  
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acts impermissibly in this case. Thomson’s objective ought, which is the 
basis for saying that B’s action is impermissible but not 
blameworthy, is hypothetical - if these other conditions are met, then 
the action would be impermissible.   
 
It might seem “odd” to Thomson that permissibility turns on whether or not 
we tell B some extra information (that flipping the switch will cause A’s 
electrocution) however, there are grounds to think that, as Scanlon 
argues pace Thomson, the objective moral ought that we are tempted to 
apply to Day’s End lacks the right kind of moral content 10. For Scanlon 
permissibility is determined by “those features of our situation that we 
should take as counting for or against an action”, and ”this is what makes it 
seem that the idea of permissibility might coincide with the ‘objective 
ought’”103. Scanlon’s subtle position is that “the sense of ‘ought not’ that is 
directly linked with the moral impermissibility of actions is [not] the 
objective sense“ but is linked to those features that it would be reasonable 
for an agent to believe (whether or not an agent actually does believe them).  
 
An advantage of Scanlon’s view is that it avoids a danger that an objective 
sense of ought might apply to natural disasters, since we can say something 
similar about them: if they were caused willingly, they would be 
impermissible. However it is much less intuitively plausible to claim that 
natural disasters are impermissible. Here we can see that Scanlon avoids 
 
103 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. p50. 
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Cavanaugh’s critique (based on morality’s threshold) and the problematic 
association in evaluating acts completely apart from volitional states. He 
does this by tying permissibility to the deliberative use of moral principles.  
 
It remains to be seen whether there can be an inculpable, impermissible and 
voluntary act that would establish a separation between permissibility and 
mental states of the kind Thomson is looking for. In Day’s End, we should 
reject the premise that B’s action is impermissible. Scanlon suggests that 
acting in extreme fear might fit the bill as an inculpable impermissible 
action: “extinguishing fault without making what is done permissible”104. 
Scanlon does not develop this example, but it is at least plausible to suggest 
that fault is extinguished only to the degree that we think of the act-in-
extreme-fear to be involuntary, which means that the fear example would be 
relevantly similar to Day’s End. We therefore have reason to question some 
of the main lines of argument that claim intention cannot be relevant to 
permissibility on the basis of differences between first and second order 
considerations arising from blameless impermissible actions. 
 
§4.5 Blameworthy Permissible Action  
 
It is possible for a proponent of DER to grant that some morally relevant 
states of mind do not relate directly to permissibility; for example, someone 
might reluctantly do a good (i.e. permissible) thing, and be blameworthy for 
 
104 Ibid. p220 n7. 
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that reluctance. How he feels about doing the right thing is relevant to his 
character, and can mean he is blameworthy even while doing the right thing. 
If this kind of case is supposed to ground the primary/secondary distinction, 
notice that nothing prevents there from being more than one state of mind 
at work in this example: a permissible action might require a certain state of 
mind (or for DER, the absence of certain intentions, and the presence of due 
care etc.), and also be accompanied by blameworthy attitudes. So, the fact 
that it is possible for an agent to be blameworthy for some aspect of his state 
of mind while he is acting permissibly does not establish the requisite 
separation between intention and permissibility on the basis of primary and 
secondary moral features.  
 
There is more, however, to the case of blameworthy permissible action. For 
Scanlon, this kind of case is central to his critique of DER. He views DER as 
too restrictive, and that cases of permissible action that are impermissible 
by the lights of DER show that DER merely has illusory appeal. One such 
example used by Scanlon105 is that of a voodoo practitioner who appears to 
be morally blameworthy (and culpable) for maliciously sticking pins in a 
doll in order to harm an acquaintance, but given that we have no reason to 
think that sticking pins in dolls is harmful, how could it be impermissible?  
 
In response to Scanlon’s example, take a case where the voodoo practitioner 
sticks pins in the doll in order to kill the acquaintance, and not merely harm 
 
105 Ibid. p46. 
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them. From Scanlon’s point of view, based on the argument provided in the 
voodoo/harm case, this would still be a situation where the action is 
permissible, but the agent blameworthy. When the action that is subject to a 
judgment of permissibility is described in stark terms; sticking-pins-in-dolls, 
it is easy to view this as permissible. This is not, however, a full description 
of the action in question. There are other pertinent descriptions of the 
voodoo practitioner’s action. Indeed, the rational structure found in the 
action – the chain of means and ends that function as answers to ‘why?’ and 
‘how?’ questions, and that help explain the events as an action (see Chapter 
3) reveal that the action is chosen as an attempted killing, rather than just as 
sticking pins in dolls. Though not a killing, what is done is still an attempt to 
kill, and this is determined or constituted by the agent’s intention; an 
attempt cannot be identified without reference to the agent’s intention. It is 
relevantly incomplete to say that the voodoo practitioner is ‘just’ sticking 
pins in a doll. Her action is more ‘thick’ than this, in that it is also an attempt 
to harm or kill, and the rationale for her action is that it harms. The worry 
here is that in divorcing intention from a fundamental role in permissibility, 
it may be difficult to account for the impermissibility of attempts.  
 
This counter to Scanlon’s voodoo objection is not complete. He might still 
respond that even if the action is properly described, the role of intention in 
an attempt is not to define what is permissible, though it will involve a 
critical use of moral principles in assessing the blameworthiness of the 
agent. In order to understand the permissibility of attempts, Scanlon may 
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say, we need to look elsewhere, perhaps to the endangerment106 or the 




It is not clear, however, that this is a reliable strategy for Scanlon to use, 
since he grants that an agent’s reasons for action can affect the meaning of 
an action, and this can be relevant to permissibility. If this is the case, then 
there may be a way of characterizing the voodoo practitioner’s action as 
impermissible due to its meaning, and there can therefore be a role for 
intention in defining what is permissible.  
 
The example he uses is calling a sick relative, and that the meaning of this 
call is different for all concerned if it is done in order to care for them, in 
order to display the appearance of concern in order to impress a wealthy 
relative, or even if it is done in order to take pleasure in the relative’s 
suffering. Scanlon writes: 
In each of these cases my call indicates something different about our 
relationship, and we have different reasons for valuing it, being 
disappointed by it, being ashamed of it, resenting it, cherishing it, or 
reacting to it in other ways.108 
 
106 This is suggested by Ulrike Heuer, “Intentions, Permissibility and the Reasons for Which We 
Act,” in Practical Normativity. Essays on Intentions in Law and Practical Reason, ed. George 
Pavlakos and Veronica Rodriguez Blanco (Cambridge: CUP, 2015), 
https://philpapers.org/rec/HEUIPA. p27ff. 
107 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. p42ff. 
108 Ibid. p52. 
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It seems here that permissibility may depend here on meaning, and not just 
on whether in acting harms are facilitated. However, Scanlon argues that 
this dependence is derivative, depending not on actual intentions and the 
reasons the agent has, but on “other moral principles requiring openness 
about one’s aims.”109  
 
Heuer presents a stronger case110 where the ill person is a friend of the 
person visiting. If the sick person finds out that the visitor is not visiting 
with friendly intentions, and is, say, trying to win a bet, the person visited 
may be outraged, take the friendship to be over, and may also think that 
what was done was wrong. If this is a case of wrongful action, Heuer argues, 
then it would be wrong on Scanlon’s account because the behaviour is 
misleading (the friend is not being open about their aims). However, it is 
also plausible (pace Scanlon), that it is wrong because the visitor fails to act 
like a friend. “As a friend you ought to have acted for certain reasons but not 
for others, [and…] Scanlon has to deny that, as a friend, you ought to have 
acted differently (i.e. for different reasons).”111  
 
This reading views acting for certain reasons, in a friendship, to be relevant 
to permissibility, and therefore undermines Scanlon’s charge that meaning 
(and intention) is only derivatively relevant to permissibility. Friendship 
does not just involve norms in relation to how we believe our friends might 
be harmed in being misled, but involves norms about (not) acting with a 
 
109 Ibid. p62. 
110 Heuer, “Intentions, Permissibility and the Reasons for Which We Act.”. 
111 Ibid. p29. 
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particular intention. If this account of friendship is plausible, we should 
consider the possible scope its implications. Scanlon argues that in general 
intention is not relevant to permissibility, but we might say that in general 
we find ourselves in some form of relationship with the people we 
encounter (as friends, colleagues, family members etc.), and in general our 
actions are imbued with meaning given by the reasons for and intentions 
with which we act in the context of those relationships.  
 
Applying this to the voodoo example, friends and even acquaintances 
deserve not to be the subject of actions the meaning of which is to kill them. 
Just as friendship provides reasons for (not) acting with a certain intention 
or for certain reasons, some more wide-ranging relationship may provide 
reasons for not acting with the intention to kill an acquaintance. As Garcia 
puts it: “What matters to us and to her moral status (and that of her choices 
and actions) is how a moral subject feels about some person; it is her inner 
life, not her condition as a possible cause of external advantages or setbacks. 
That inner life matters to us, and therefore in morality, in its own right, not 
in a way that is merely contingent on causal outcomes. This is part of a 




112 See for example Jorge Garcia, “The Virtues of the Natural Moral Law,” in Natural Moral Law 
in Contemporary Society (Ed. Zaborowski, H). (CUA Press, 2010), 359. Owen Flanagan, 
Varieties of Moral Personality (Cambridge, MASS, Harvard University Press, 1991). 
GEMAnscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 124 (January 1958), is 
also relevant here, as she argues for greater attention to moral psychology as a foundation for 
moral philosophy. 
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If we grant that the meaning of action can be relevant to permissibility, as 
Scanlon begins to suggest, but that Heuer builds on, then a defender of DER 
may be able to claim that the scope of meaningful action is so wide as to 
support the claim that intention can be morally determinative in just the 
way suggested by DER.   
 
§4.7 Predictive Significance 
 
Aside from having a role in determining meaning, Scanlon argues that 
intentions can also have predictive significance, as “determinants of the 
likely consequences of the proposed course of action”113. He argues that this 
significance is valid114, but is derivative and does not give intention a 
foundational role.  
 
This appears to be correct; a clear intention might not only more reliably 
cause outcomes as part of the current proposal or plan, intentions might 
also make future decision making of the same type more likely. Intentions 
would be seen as good predictors, increasing the chance of success of 
current plans, and involved in building habits that influence future behavior. 
 
It is noteworthy that some have sought to interpret DER as being founded 
on this kind of consequential significance. In terms of this chapter, the line of 
argument is that intention does and can have the kind of moral significance 
 
113 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. p87. 
114 Ibid. p30. 
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that DER requires, a moral relevance for permissibility that Scanlon denies. 
In this section on predictive significance, I consider one form of significance 
that Scanlon accepts, and that I agree is non-foundational, but that others 
understand to be at the heart of the distinction between intention and 
foresight. I will consider whether this kind of consequential understanding 
of the significance of intention could function as a basis for DER’s intention 
condition. This is interesting territory, since DER is widely understood as an 
archetypally non-consequentialist approach, and the predictive significance 
of intention may open up the way for an interpretation of DER that has a 
consequentialist character.   
 
Consequentialists could view intentionally causing effects differently to 
causing those same effects unintentionally, or accidentally. These effects will 
be magnified and have more impact on the future, for better or worse, than 
causing effects unintentionally or as a merely foreseen side effect. 
Consequentialism, then, could offer an account of intentions in which they 
carry a special moral significance, but this predictive sense would be only 
one of a range of ways that intention carries significance.  
 
Thomas Cavanaugh argues that H.L.A. Hart shares this understanding of the 
distinction between intention and foresight, and adds that Hart rejects the 
ethical relevance of double effect reasoning because he believes the 
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distinction between intention and foresight to be based on the probability of 
causing a particular outcome 115. Hart writes that: 
 
if the craniotomy is contrasted with the removal of the womb 
containing the foetus as a case of ‘direct’ killing it must be on the 
basis that the death of the foetus is not merely contingently 
connected with craniotomy as it is with the removal of the womb 
containing it. But it is not clear that the supposition of the survival of 
the foetus makes better sense in the one case than in the other. [Hart, 
quoted in (Cavanaugh 2006, 119)] 
 
Focusing on Hart’s use of contingency, (I shall put aside the difficulties 
surrounding this particular pair of cases in the current chapter (see Chapter 
5 on closeness)), it does appear that Hart takes this (the contingency or 
necessity of the outcome) to be the only possible basis of a moral distinction 
between the two cases. On these grounds, Hart is quite right that the 
distinction between the craniotomy and hysterectomy cases would be 
unsustainable, since the thought experiment is constructed with cases in 
which death is just as likely.  
 
The claim of DER is that there is a moral difference between intending an 
outcome and foreseeing an outcome even where that foresight is certain, so 
in focusing on the likelihood of the outcomes in the quote above, Hart tries 
 
115 Cavanaugh, Double Effect Reasoning. 
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to find moral significance in the wrong place, and we can say that predictive 
significance alone cannot account for the intend/foresee distinction in 
craniotomy/hysterectomy cases.  
 
It does not make sense to ground DER’s intention condition as being simply 
about, or ultimately grounded in future outcomes. Jonathan Glover pushes 
this kind of interpretation in his critique of DER. He argues that any intuitive 
appeal of the double effect cases is mistaken, or due to what are in fact 
consequentialist features of the case. He further suggests that once some 
utilitarian calculation is admitted by the double effect reasoner, as in the 
fourth proportionality condition, it becomes difficult to maintain any other 
non-utilitarian conditions: “having allowed [a] concession to utilitarian 
calculation [as part of the fourth proportionality condition], where is a line 
to be drawn, and why?”116  
This is perhaps just to say that a consequentialist interpretation of the moral 
significance of intention is not a viable version of the intention condition in 
DER, it is a rejection of the doctrine, involving and entailing a different moral 
theory. Glover is right to say that the consequentialist is “bound to see this 
moral doctrine as unacceptable: depending on a distinction without a 
difference”117. So, if intention’s only moral significance is in its predictive 
significance, then DER could not be supported.   
 
116 Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin, 1979). 
117 Ibid. p88. 
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On the standard formulation of DER that we are testing against Scanlon’s 
objections in this chapter, intention condition is pertinent to DER even if a 
particular bad intention, say, to kill, were to lead to remorse, reform and 
future good acts, the fact that it is intentional killing is conclusive, and the 
further predictable effects (which might include remorse, reform etc) are 
non-foundational. For the intention condition to be distinct, involving a 
different kind of concern to the other conditions (and it is often picked out 
as providing ‘the’ key underlying insight associated with DER), and in order 
for DER not to collapse into a convoluted version of consequentialism DER 
needs not to be founded entirely on intention’s predictive significance.  
 
So, while there are elements of a consequentialist approach to DER that 
could be admitted and shared by a supporter of DER, namely a 
consideration of the predictive significance of intention, this cannot be the 
basis of the moral significance of DER. Hart’s consequentialist basis for the 
intend/foresee distinction cannot explain the distinctions made in the DER 
literature, and Glover’s approach is to offer a consequentialist critique of 
DER, rather than an interpretation. The fact that DER involves some 
consequential thinking is not enough for it to collapse into 
consequentialism. What is needed for DER to survive is a non-






§4.8 Deliberation and Intention  
 
Cases of blameworthy permissible actions and his diagnosis of the confusion 
made between deliberative and critical uses of moral principles are not 
Scanlon’s only arguments against double effect and the role that it implies 
for intention.  
 
Scanlon also puts pressure on the idea that we can choose between the 
reasons for which we act, whether we can choose which intentions to deploy 
in acting. We can on his account choose what to do, but not which 
considerations to see as reasons for acting. If we cannot choose between our 
intentions then intention is disconnected from the deliberative use of moral 
principles, and this, according to Scanlon is what determines permissibility.  
 
In “autonomous benefit” cases, like Gregory Kavka’s ‘toxin puzzle’, one 
stands to benefit from forming a certain intention but not from carrying out 
the associated action. The example arose in a normative context in relation 
to nuclear deterrence, but for our purposes it raises interesting questions 
about intention and deliberation, and could serve to bolster Scanlon’s case.  
 
An eccentric billionaire strikes the following bargain, providing you with a 
vial of toxin:  
“If you drink [the toxin], [it] will make you painfully ill for a day, but 
will not threaten your life or have any lasting effects…. The billionaire 
will pay you one million dollars tomorrow morning if, at midnight 
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tonight, you intend to drink the toxin tomorrow afternoon…. You 
need not drink the toxin to receive the money; in fact, the money will 
already be in your bank account hours before the time for drinking it 
arrives, if you succeed…. [The] arrangement of…external incentives is 
ruled out, as are such alternative gimmicks as hiring a hypnotist to 
implant the intention…”118   
 
The conclusion we are invited to draw from the puzzle is that it is not 
obvious you can win the million dollars, since it is presumed that you cannot 
form the intention to drink the toxin if, once midnight passes, you are 
confident that you will have no reason to drink it, and good reason not to, so 
you will not drink it. Knowing that you will have good reasons to abandon 
your intention once the money has been won, means that it is hard to see 
how you could honestly form the intention to drink the poison and win the 
prize. 
 
When considering a series of puzzles over whether an agent may do the 
right thing for the wrong reason, that is, act permissibly but with an 
intention to harm, Scanlon notes that  
[I]t is odd to say, in the case of the person who thinks that the only 
good reason to save a person is the advantage to her of that person’s 
staying alive, that the only permissible course of action for her is to 
save the person for the right reason. Saying this is odd because it 
 
118 Gregory S. Kavka, “The Toxin Puzzle,” Analysis 43, no. 1 (January 1983): 33, 
doi:10.2307/3327802. p33-34 
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presupposes that it is open to her to choose to act out of concern for 
the person’s well-being. It is open to her to choose whether to save 
the person or not, but not open to her to choose to see a certain 
consideration as a reason for doing so. Therefore, according to the 
hypothesis we are considering, the question of permissibility applies 
only to the decision whether to save.119   
 
So the argument is that permissibility only applies to the decision to act, and 
not to one’s intention (the reason she chooses to save), because it is not 
open to the agent to choose which intention she adopts in acting.  
 
In this way, the toxin puzzle could be seen as support for Scanlon’s 
argument that intention does not have deliberative moral significance. One 
does not or cannot deliberate about which intention to deploy, but rather 
about what to do, then Scanlon’s point about deliberative significance may 
be borne out.  Deliberation in the toxin case seems tied to drinking the toxin 
in a way that makes it very hard to see how one could deliberate about 
forming an intention just to win the money.120  The formation of one’s 
intentions are influenced or governed, not by reasons for or against having 
the intention, but by the reasons for or against acting (drinking the poison). 
 
 
119 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. p61. 
120 Some have argued that it would be possible to win the billionaire’s bargain and defeat the 
puzzle – to form the relevant apparently contradictory intention though on these accounts it is a 
difficult and remote possibility (see Mele “Intentions, Reasons, and Beliefs: Morals of the Toxin 
Puzzle” Philosophical Studies 68:171-194, 1992). Irrespective of whether it is difficult or 
impossible to form the prizewinning intention, this is all grist to Scanlon’s mill, or rather water 
for his intuition pump, that intentions themselves only have indirect or derivative moral 
deliberative significance.  
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One possible response to this line of criticism of Double Effect might be to 
say that even though we do not deliberate about intention formation, we can 
choose to act with the knowledge that in acting we would have a particular 
intention. We can therefore take intentions into account in a way that is 
relevant to permissibility. We would not be deliberating directly or only 
about the intention (which per the toxin puzzle is at least suspect), but we 
can deliberate about what to do, taking into account our beliefs, desires and 
what our intention would be in acting.  
 
Alongside a consideration of possible outcomes, it seems reasonable for an 
agent to ask what in fact they would choose to do (intend as a means or as 
an end) in the relevant scenarios; whether the proposed action would in fact 
be e.g. a murder or a killing. In this way it would still be possible to take 
intentions into account, even granting the view that intentions cannot be 
manipulated in the way necessary to win the toxin puzzle.  
 
The argument then is that it is possible to take intentions into account, even 
if we cannot choose what to intend on the basis of the desirability of that 
intention.  It is a mistake to see DER as involving an internal deliberation 
about the desirability of intentions. Wedgwood, rightly in my view, observes 
that Scanlon and Judith Thomson’s understanding of how to apply DER 
involves a ‘looking inward’ to work out what intention I would have in 
acting (say, dropping the bombs). We see this when Thomson asks:  “can 
anyone really think that the pilot should decide whether he may drop the 
bombs by looking inward for an intention with which he would be dropping 
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them if he dropped them?”121. Wedgwood echoes Anscombe in calling this a 
‘travesty of the doctrine of double effect”122, since double effect does not 
concern an internal investigation into what one would be intending in 
dropping bombs (and the reasons for or against particular intentions, but 
the thought that one should never choose to “drop-the-bombs-to-kill-the-
civilians”. In deciding whether to drop-the-bombs-to-kill-the-civilians, one 
can take intentions into account, and the various means that one might 
adopt. 
 
The question of exactly how intentions might feature in our deliberation is 
not clearly defined by proponents of double effect. The history of DER (see 
Chapter 2) might seem to bear out the thought that it is primarily focused on 
critical rather than deliberative use of moral principles. It grew to 
prominence in the late scholastic and manualist traditions, where the 
manuals were used to guide confessors in attributing blame (they were 
interested in any exculpatory or aggravating factors, and how severe a 
penance would be appropriate). On the other hand, DER is very widely taken 
to provide principles that ought to guide action and deliberation about 
action.   
 
The view that double effect is a helpful moral heuristic and should be seen 
as a guide to deliberating about difficult moral cases is not universal among 
those that defend DER. Frey argues, for example, that ““double effect” is not 
 
121 Thomson, “Self Defence.” 
122 Wedgwood 2011; 468 
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a principle that guides sound practical deliberation, in the way that “you 
may never do evil that good may come” is.”123 Anscombe is also wary of 
reading too much into double effect (see Chapter 2 on her interpretation of 
St Thomas) and rather than endorsing double effect in its traditional 
formulation, prefers to characterise the central insight as “the principle of 
the side effect”, which (merely) blocks an inference from the 
impermissibility associated with a prohibition to the impermissibility of 
causing similar outcomes as side effects: “the prohibition on murder does 
not cover all bringing about of deaths which are not intended”124.  
 
This is all the more plausible if the intention condition of DER functions as 
or expresses ‘exclusionary reasons’ along the lines that have been developed 
by Raz125 and Heuer126: though one may have many reasons to act in a 
particular way, (or, one may have a range of different intentions in so 
acting), acting for particular intentions or with particular intentions are 
excluded from the range of permissible actions. On this view an action may 
be wrong if done for certain reasons but may be permissible if done for 
other reasons. The friendship example above is a case where the friendship 
excludes acting with selfish or malicious intentions, and Heuer suggests 
another: 
 
123 J. A. Frey, “Practical Knowledge and Double Effect,” in Intention and Double Effect (Notre 
Dame Press (forthcoming), n.d.). 
124 G. E. M. Anscombe, “Action, Intention, and Double Effect,” in The Doctrine of Double 
Effect: Philosophers Debate a Controversial Principle., ed. P.A. Woodward (Notre Dame Press, 
2001), p61. 
125 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198268345.001.0001. 
126 Heuer, “Intentions, Permissibility and the Reasons for Which We Act.” 
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You have a reason to give your child the best education available, but 
you also have a reason to take the costs to yourself into account. 
However, you promised the child’s mother not to act for reasons to 
do with your own convenience…The reason to keep your promise is 
an exclusionary reason: it is a second-order reason, a reason not to 
act for certain reasons. Thus it is not a reason for or against sending 
the child to a particular school. 
 
This kind of second order reason is a robust counterexample to Scanlon’s 
argument that intentions do not have deliberative moral significance, and 
therefore that DER is merely illusory. Even if the Toxin Puzzle strengthens 
his point, it still appears as though we can take the reasons with which we 
act into account. When combined with our discussion on meaning, and the 
example where acting out of friendship requires that it be done with certain 
intentions, we have arguments against both Scanlon’s relegation of intention 
from the deliberative use of principles, and against the argument that 
intentions are merely of derivative or secondary importance to 
permissibility.   
 
The move to see DER as involving exclusionary reasons (i.e. excluding 
certain intended actions), may introduce a problem to a supporter of DER, 
since it means that the deliberation that takes intention into account is not 
directly related to what we cause, but is rather about our reasons for action. 
This dislocation from normal ethical decision-making may be problematic in 
its own right, nonetheless, this indirect deliberation stands as a counter-
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example to Scanlon’s claim that intentions cannot have deliberative 
significance, and in light of this, we should question Scanlon’s conclusion 
that DER merely has ‘illusory appeal’.  The question about whether 
intentions are foundational will not be settled by a distinction between the 
deliberative and critical use of moral principles, but by whether 
exclusionary reasons exist and are relevant to permissibility.  
 
To conclude, I have argued that DER’s intention condition cannot be based 
on the predictive significance of intention. There is more opportunity to 
ground a fundamental moral significance of intention in meaning, and 
particularly if we have reason to believe that exclusionary reasons exist. 
Scanlon's argument that intention cannot have deliberative significance 
(and he needs intention to be excluded if his charge that DER is illusory is to 
be sustained) is not robust even when supported by Kavka’s Toxin puzzle, 
since we can take intentions into account in deliberation, even if we cannot 
choose intentions on the basis of their desirability. The reasons an agent has, 
her actual intentions, can contribute to the meaning of actions (which are 
relevant to permissibility), and can be deliberated about. They can therefore 
appear on both sides of Scanlon’s distinction between the deliberative and 












This Chapter considers the problem of closeness as a challenge to defenders 
of DER, and evaluates a number of strategies that might resolve or 
otherwise deal with this problem.  I outline the problem and focus 
discussion on how the first personal account of intention might address 
closeness.  I also consider a hylomorphic approach, Wedgwood’s non-
absolutist solution, and conclude with Watt’s approach that does not 
attempt to understand how intentional killing should encompass very close 
actions, but that emphasises the relevance of close prohibitions.  I favour a 
two-pronged approach involving a development of the first personal 
practical reason approach to resolving some of the difficult cases, combined 
with Watt’s insight that there may be relevant prohibitions beyond a 
prohibition on killing that explain the impermissibility in closeness cases. 
 
§5.1 The Problem of Closeness 
 
As a very quick explanation of the focus of this chapter is that we are 
interested in blocking an argument that the terror bomber might make that 
they are not really intending to kill the civilians, but are in fact intending 
something that is very close to killing, results in civilian death, but is not 
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prohibited. The standard version of the ‘problem of closeness’ relates to and 
is understood to be a problem for the moral distinction between intention 
and foresight, so is a key challenge to double effect reasoning. Responses to 
the problem of closeness have been many and varied. It has motivated some 
authors to supply new versions of DER, and some to modify or interpret the 
traditional conditions127. Marquis identifies thirteen different approaches to 
solving closeness128, ranging from logical, inevitable and ‘felt’ connections to 
fine grained act analysis, desire based approaches and counterfactual tests. 
 
The heart of the problem is that there is a significant lack of clarity as to 
what should be considered to be intended in some cases. Delaney 
summarises the problem well: “With regard to many activities that double 
effect is traditionally thought to prohibit, what might at first look to be a 
directly intended bad effect is really, on closer examination, a directly 
intended neutral effect that is closely connected to a foreseen bad effect”129. 
 
The problem of closeness challenges the distinction between intention and 
foresight by arguing that it is either arbitrary or so difficult to draw as to 
 
127 See Warren S Quinn, Public Affairs, and No Autumn, “Actions , Intentions , and 
Consequences : The Doctrine of Double Effect Actions , Intentions , and Consequences : The 
Doctrine of Double Effect” 18, no. 4 (2007): 334–51; Alexander R. Pruss, “The Accomplishment 
of Plans: A New Version of the Principle of Double Effect,” Philosophical Studies, April 17, 
2012, doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9925-4. 
128 Donald B. Marquis, “Four Versions of Double Effect,” The Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 16 (1991): 515–514. In Woodward, P.A. The Doctrine of Double Effect: 
Philosophers debate a controversial principle (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame, 2001) 
pp156 – 185  
129 Delaney, N. “Two Cheers for Closeness: Terror, Targeting, and Double Effect”, Philosophical 
Studies 137: 335-367 
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compromise the usefulness of double effect reasoning130. This lack of clarity 
‘on closer examination’ suggests that differences in intention and the 
intent/foresight distinction more generally cannot explain the moral 
phenomena, that is, moral judgments and intuitions about the various cases.  
 
The set of cases that form the focus of the problem of closeness apply it to 
the means condition, that is, to the relation between on the one hand what 
one intends or adopts as a means to achieve one’s end (see chapter on the 
means condition) and on the other, what one foresees but does not intend 
results from that means. The difficulty is in specifying what does, or can, or 
should count as intended, and what is merely foreseen.  
 
Philippa Foot’s original formulation of the problem of closeness is as 
follows: 
 
Consider the story, well known to philosophers, of the fat man stuck 
in the mouth of the cave. A party of pot-holers have imprudently 
allowed the fat man to lead them as they make their way out of the 
cave, and he gets stuck, trapping the others behind him. Obviously 
the right thing to do is to sit down and wait until the fat man grows 
thin; but philosophers have arranged that flood waters should be 
rising within the cave. Luckily (luckily?) the trapped party have with 
 
130 See (among others) Hart, H.L.A. Intention and punishment (1968) in Punishment and 
Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, Davis, N. The Doctrine of Double Effect: 
Problems of  interpretation in the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65, 107-123, Marquis, D. Four 
Versions of Double Effect (1991) in Woodward (ed.) The Principle of Double Effect, Bennett, J. 
The Act Itself (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) and DiNucci Ethics Without Intention pp104ff. 
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them a stick of dynamite with which they can blast the fat man out of 
the mouth of the cave. Either they use the dynamite or they drown. In 
one version the fat man, whose head is in the cave, will drown with 
them; in the other he will be rescued in due course. Problem: may 
they use the dynamite or not? [This example is introduced in part] 
because it will serve to show how ridiculous one version of the 
doctrine of the double effect would be. For suppose that the trapped 
explorers were to argue that the death of the fat man might be taken 
as a merely foreseen consequence of the act of blowing him up. (“We 
didn’t want to kill him…only to blow him into small pieces” or even 
“…only to blast him out of the cave.”) I believe that those who use the 
doctrine of the double effect would rightly reject such a suggestion, 
although they will, of course, have considerable difficulty in 
explaining where the line is to be drawn. What is to be the criterion 
of “closeness” if we say that anything very close to what we are 
literally aiming at counts as if part of our aim?131 
 
Closeness in this example is used as a solution to a problem rather than 
being a problem itself, and some writers argue as though closeness is 
enough of a solution to be used in defense of DER. Delaney writes that “due 
to the closeness between detonation and killing, an intention to 
detonate…just is part of a limit complex intention to kill”132 Blowing up the 
pot-holer is, it seems, so close to killing him that we ought to evaluate those 
 
131 Foot, P. “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect” reprinted in 
Woodward The Doctrine of Double Effect (South Bend, IN, Notre Dame Press, 2001) p145ff 
132 . 
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two actions in the same way. That is, if it is impermissible to murder him it 
is impermissible to blow him up, and one cannot use the excusing factor of 
one’s limited intention to avoid blameworthiness via double effect. So, the 
problem is how closeness should be understood, and where the limits ought 
to be drawn.  
 
To take the problem example further, if an action is described or specified 
very narrowly and an agent intends the narrow description, it stands to lose 
morally salient descriptive elements (if described narrowly enough); 
Samantha might just be moving a knife through space, but this action might 
equally be “replacing the knife in a rack” or “parting skin in order to injure”. 
Furthermore, “parting someone’s skin” might be a true description of an act 
that is also “murder”, and a true description of an act that is also 
“healthcare”. If Sam decides to kill the first mammal he sees, perhaps 
because a magnate has offered a huge charitable reward, and the first 
mammal he sees happens to be a human, does Sam intend to kill the 
human?133 It seems that intention can be fine-grained in this way, that is, it 
is entirely plausible that an agent may intend very limited descriptions of 
their actions. This is most plausible where an agent does not realize that her 
action has other consequences, but it also seems possible that intentions are 
fine-grained when harmful effects are known/foreseen and not intended, if 
the intend/foresee (i/f) distinction is robust (see Ch3 and Ch4).  
 
 
133 This example is from Alexander R. Pruss, “The Accomplishment of Plans: A New Version of 
the Principle of Double Effect,” Philosophical Studies 165, no. 1 (2013): 49–69.  
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Running up against these cases where intention is confined to a morally un- 
or less problematical act description, is the strong intuition teased out by 
the potholer case that exploding should just be seen (in moral terms) as a 
killing, or at the very least, tantamount to a killing. The Talmud presents a 
closely related thought:  Pseek raisha ve-lo yamut (You can’t cut off the head 
of a chicken and then say you’re not responsible for its death.)134.  
 
§5.2 Describing plans/finagling closeness.  
 
So far, this seems to be a problem of description. A pair of actions can belong 
to the same action type under some descriptions and different action type 
under other descriptions. In Intention¸ GEM Anscombe argues that 
intentional actions, which admit of many descriptions, will be intentional 
under one or some of those descriptions, and that ‘Why?’ questions about 
plans of action “enable us to narrow down our consideration of descriptions 
of what he is doing to a range covering all and only his intentional 
actions”135, because why and how questions uncover the agent’s practical 
reasoning. In this way we can draw a principled distinction between 
intentional descriptions and non-intentional descriptions of an action, the 
“special sense of the question ‘Why?’ will reveal “the order there is in this 
chaos””136, that is, the agent’s purposes and rational agency in the world. 
 
134 Quoted in John Martin Fischer, Mark Ravizza, and David Copp, “Quinn on Double Effect: 
The Problem of ‘Closeness,’” Ethics 103, no. 4 (1993): 707, doi:10.1086/293549. 
135 GEM Anscombe Intention (London, Harvard University Press, 2000) section 23 p38 
136 Anscombe, Intention.p80. 
 108 
What is intended is seen in the context of a practical plan137 involving a 
chain of means-end steps (see Ch1). This approach gives us some resources 
to respond to a particular kind of closeness case. This is the kind of case 
where a plan is incompletely described, and it is merely claimed that the 
intention is innocent. For example, the orders received by RAF Bomber 
Command in 1941 regarding the carpet-bombing of towns do not mention 
the deaths of civilians, only destruction and the fear of death that bombing 
will cause: 
 
“The ultimate aim of the attack on a town area is to break the morale 
of the population which occupies it. To ensure this we must achieve 
two things: first, we must make the town physically uninhabitable 
and, secondly, we must make the people conscious of constant 
personal danger. The immediate aim, is therefore, twofold, namely, to 
produce (i) destruction, and (ii) the fear of death.”138  
 
One can assume that if the RAF, or Parliament, could have asked the Air 
Ministry some ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions about this plan, such as asking how 
fear of death is in fact being achieved, it would eventually become apparent 
that widespread civilian death is one element in the means-end chain of 
reasoning that forms their plan of action. It might be the case that the 
description is deceptive, or self-deceptive and either inculpably or culpably 
 
137 See Anscombe Intention and for example, Bratman Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason 
(1987). 
138 1941 British Air Ministry directif, quoted in DiNucci, E. Ethics Without Intention (London, 
Bloomsbury, 2014) p107.  
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so. Either way, investigating a plan of action fully can deal with this kind of 
closeness case.  
 
This is far from a complete solution to the problem of closeness, as it does 
not deal with effects that without deception are close to one’s plan of action. 
It is possible that the potholers are not mis-describing their practical plan 
when they say that the death is not intended. They do not need the death 
(per se) of the person blocking the exit in order to make sense of their plan 
to escape, so it is plausible that the death does not need to feature in their 
plan (the means they adopt to achieve the goal of escape), though it will of 
course feature in their deliberation unless they are so callous as to ignore 
the plight of the stuck potholer.  
 
§5.3 Debate over practical reasoning  
 
At this point it will be important to introduce a gruesome but important 
example that has shaped much of the literature, in particular the debate 
among those who are sympathetic to DER. The craniotomy case involves a 
tragic situation where during labor the baby’s head becomes stuck 
(‘obstructed labour’) and risks the life of both the mother and child. This 
problem can be averted by caesarian section but historically (and perhaps in 
some places with little or no midwifery provision) this real case presents a 
difficult dilemma, because in doing nothing both mother and child will likely 
die, and the only apparent solution is to crush the skull/narrow the 
 110 
dimensions of the head of the baby in order to remove it from the birth 
canal.  
 
One can see how this case is structurally very similar to the potholing 
example raised by Foot; an individual becomes a life threatening blockage 
through no fault of their own and in circumstances where the only way to 
save a life is by means that are extremely close to intentional killing.  
 
An influential approach here is to agree that the potholers would not intend 
the death of their stuck colleague in blowing him up, and that the problem 
ought to be solved by challenging our intuitions, finding the blowing up to 
be permissible, rather than finding or relying on a criterion of closeness to 
bridge the gap between the intention and the clearly proscribed action. 
Notably, some philosophers in the natural law tradition of ethics (whom 
some have labeled proponents of ‘New Natural Law’ (NNL) theory) 
including Germain Grisez, John Finnis and Joseph Boyle139 suggest that what 
is intended, what is ‘being done’ and what constitutes the object of the 
action, is settled “by one’s practical reason in terms of the desirability 
characterisation under which one wills the end and the description under 
which one judges one’s chosen means appropriate to that end.”140 Thus, 
under this theory of action, Grisez writes that “even craniotomy (and a 
fortiori, other operations [that lead to the death of an unborn baby] meeting 
 
139 A central text is Grisez, G. Finnis, J. and Boyle, J.  “Direct and Indirect: a reply to our critics” 
The Thomist 65 (2001): 1-44. 
140 ‘Intention and Side Effects’, Finnis, J. Intention and Identity Collected Essays Volume 2.  
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… conditions [that relate to there being no other life saving option141]) need 
not be direct killing, and so, provided the death of the baby is not intended 
(which is possible but not necessary)…could be morally permissible.”142 
Finnis, Grisez and Boyle write in a later piece that “a surgeon who 
performed a craniotomy and could soundly analyse the action, resisting the 
undue influence of physical and causal factors that would dominate the 
perception of observers, could rightly say “No way do I intend to kill the 
baby” and “It is no part of my purpose to kill the baby””143. Citing this 
possible ‘undue influence’ of causal factors is important for their view, 
because the craniotomy is physically indistinguishable from partial birth 
abortion, but they argue, is to be differentiated morally. I shall call this view 
the first personal practical reasoning account.  
 
This view, I think can fairly be characterized as ‘radically first personal’144 as 
it ties the agent’s intentions, the descriptions she must admit intending to 
the desirability characterization of what the agent is trying to achieve. The 
morally salient features are a “matter of the heart”145, and are not 
determined by third person descriptions of what is done. Even though what 
would be a morally important description of an action might be very close to 
one that is intended, if it is not (and there is no deception etc.) then, 
 
141 See N. Austriaco OP “Abortion in a Case of Pulmonary Arterial Hypertension: a test case for 
two rival theories of human action” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly Vol. 11, Number 3, 
(Autumn 2011) p511 for an enumeration of the Grisez’s four conditions.  
142 Grisez, G The Way of the Lord Jesus, Vol. 2, Living a Christian Life (Quincy, IL: Franciscan 
Press, 1993) pp502-503, quoted in Austriaco, N. Abortion in a case of PAH p511. 
143 John Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle, “Direct and Indirect: A Reply to Our Critics” 
2, no. March 1995 (2001): 1–44. p24. 
144 Frey, “Practical Knowledge and Double Effect.” 
145 Christopher Tollefsen, “Is a Purely First Person Account of Human Action Defensible?,” 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9, no. 4 (2006): 441–60, doi:10.1007/s10677-006-9024-8. 
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according to this view, that description does not apply to the act, and does 
not determine permissibility. Tollefsen expresses this quite strongly:  
 
”If the purely first person account is correct, there can be no criteria 
[for determining what is intended, and what are side effects]: there is 
nothing against which to test the agent’s action to determine what 
intention an agent had, or must have had, for it is the agent herself 
who is the sole determinant of what her intention is”146 
 
As I have set this up, there is a significant difficulty for the 
Finnis/Grisez/Boyle  NNL approach to the craniotomy case in that it results 
in a counterintuitive answer, since the actual death of the foetus does not 
need to feature in the proposal of the doctor; intentions are fine-grained 
enough to allow that he merely desires, intends and plans to narrow the 
skull of the foetus in order to remove the life threatening obstruction. If the 
death of the foetus in the craniotomy case is a side effect rather than an 
object of intention, then it ought to be evaluated in the same way (at least in 
terms of double effect) as the hysterectomy case, as opposed to the 
‘physically indistinguishable’ act of partial birth abortion, which (as a 
premise) falls under the prohibition on deliberate killing of innocents. 
 
The important question here is how fine grained one’s account of intention 




personal characteristics, the granularity appears to be determined by the 
question of conceivability.  That is, how an agent can or might understand 
his plan and the available options involving means and chosen ends. This, I 
suggest below, is not the only constraint or consideration relevant to the 
way agents form, conceive of and adopt plans.  
 
For Finnis et. al., what is done is determined by one’s practical reason, and 
limited by conceivability. This distinguishes strictly between ends and 
means that are included in practical plans, and effects that fall outside of 
those plans. However, there is still a pressure to find a more coarse grained 
account/criterion of closeness. Bennett proposes what a ‘plain man’ would 
think as a way to adjudicate in closeness cases147, but this is, he 
acknowledges, perhaps too vague to be useful. He does however indicate a 
direction that the debate could go, and this reflects an interesting passage in 
St Thomas’s Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics:  
 
“[Aristotle] says it is not easy to assign the sort of thing we must 
choose in such circumstances [i.e. the case of ‘mixed actions’148]. 
[Aristotle] assigns as the reason that many differences are found in 
singulars. Hence the judgment of them cannot be comprised under an 
exact rule but they are to be left to the evaluation of a prudent 
man.”149 
 
147 Bennett The Act Itself Chapter 11. 
148 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of whether Aristotle’s ‘mixed actions’ are a good example of 
DER. 
149 St Thomas Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics p133. 
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How can this appeal to the plain or prudent man be helpful? I argue in §5 
how this might be developed, and how might it constitute a useful approach 
to the problem of closeness. I go on to argue that the plain man thesis is 
better applied as a modification of or limit to how the options over which an 
agent exercises choice are conceived, and this can be understood in the 
context of cognitive virtue. This goes beyond conceptual conceivability. 
Conceptual conceivability (that is the ‘first personal’ desirability of an end 
and the means the agent takes herself to adopt in achieving this end) is 
without doubt a robust limit on intention, but it does not seem that we 
should consider this to be the only factor that determines the granularity of 
an agent’s intentions. Bennett’s ‘plain man’ will have a more restricted set of 
conceivable plan-proposals than what would be conceptually conceivable, or 
possibly conceivable by an agent that is unencumbered by causal and other 
factual beliefs.  
 
The suggestion that the first personal practical reasoning version of DER 
(such as that espoused by Finnis) might render counter-intuitive judgments 
about cases (including the permissibility of craniotomy) is far from a knock 
down argument against DER (or Finnis’ view for that matter). For one might 
think that on reflection the balance lies in favour of the truth of DER and that 
one ought to bite the bullet on cases of closeness, such as craniotomy, in the 
interests of following strictly what is intended. This kind of strategy for 
dealing with closeness cases is risky, not just because it does not resolve the 
tension, but because DER gains much of its general plausibility and 
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rhetorical force from its ability to explain intuitions. Indeed, the aim of the 
many attempted solutions to the problem closeness is to account for our 
intuitions in these difficult cases, showing how double effect can work or be 
revised in accordance with intuitions in a theoretically reliable and 
psychologically plausible way. Perhaps because this approach ‘bites the 
bullet’ in analyzing craniotomy and the potholing examples as permissible, 
authors, including authors from the same Natural Law stable as Finnis, 
Grisez and Boyle, have continued to look for solutions to closeness.  
 
§5.4 The hylomorphic approach. 
 
Among those who think that we ought to look to an account of intentional 
action to help deal with the problem of closeness, a recent train of 
research150 has argued for an account of action which is hylomorphic151, 
involving both the physical and intentional in their account of action, the 
physical and intentional being understood as the matter and form of an act 
respectively. An “act has a being, a nature and a natural order, such that the 
act itself and its integral nature are always materially included within the 
 
150 Steven Jensen Good and Evil Actions (Washington, CUA Press, 2010), Steven Long The 
Teleological Grammar of the Moral Act, (Naples, Florida, Sapientia Press, 2007) Matthew 
O’Brien and Robert Koons “Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural 
Law Theory” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly (Fall 2012) Vol. 86, Issue 4, available 
online at 
http://villanova.academia.edu/MatthewOBrien/Papers/1562291/Objects_of_Intention_A_Hylomo
rphic_Critique_of_the_New_Natural_Law_Theory [accessed 31 May 2012]) and Nicanor 
Austriaco OP “Abortion in a Case of Pulmonary Arterial Hypertension” The National Catholic 
Bioethics Quarterly Autumn 2011 Vol II Number 3 p503ff.  
151 They consider the origins of this thinking to be found in the “Thomistic commentatorial 
tradition” (see Austriaco, N. Abortion in a Case  and Long, S. The Teleological Grammar). 
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moral object"152, thus the moral object is not “merely a proposal” which is 
adopted to achieve an end. In arguing for the hylomorphic approach, Long 
writes that: "To refuse to acknowledge that the physical structure of the act 
materially enters into the moral object of an act is pure angelism, a residue 
of Cartesian error. It is cognate with logicism in treating that which is 
natural as reducible to a cognitive entity."153 The bold claim that advocates 
make to differentiate their theory from the intentional account is that the 
hylomorphic account of human action “acknowledges that persons live and 
act in a real world structured by cause and effect relationships.”154  
 
As Nicanor Austriaco OP writes: “consider the naughty child who claimed 
that she did not intend to burst her brother’s balloon when she pricked it 
with her mother’s sewing needle in order to annoy her older brother”155. 
The teleological move is to say that “the physical act of pricking a balloon 
with a needle is, by its nature, ordered toward the destruction of that 
balloon”156. In this way, a solution to the craniotomy/hysterectomy problem 
emerges; the killing is understood to be part of the integral physical and 
teleological structure of narrowing a foetus’ skull.  
 
This goes further than claiming, as Anscombe does, that facts about one’s 
circumstances constrain which descriptions one must admit are intended, 
because it posits that those circumstances include teleologically structured 
 
152 Long The Teleological Grammar (my emphasis) p109. 
153 Long The Teleological Grammar p108. 
154 Austriaco N. Abortion in the case of PAH. p509, p511, see also fn22. 
155 Ibid p510. 
156 Ibid p511. 
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physical events, which are hylomorphically combined (or inseparably 
connected) with intentions in an action. An agent adopts this unity in its 
entirety when he acts in that way. ‘Teleology’ needs some further thought 
here, because in the hysterectomy case, the death of the foetus is also an 
integral part of the scenario – it is a causally inextricable result of the means 
to save the mother (the foetus could be saved if it were older, in the same 
way that the foetus in the craniotomy could be saved if restorative foetal 
skull surgery were further advanced).  
 
This approach provides a way to bind an agent’s intentions to close effects 
that might not be part of the agent’s first personal view of their plan. In 
doing so by way of a hylomorphic combination of intentions and physical 
and teleological structures found in actions, this approach raises a number 
of further questions. How much of the teleological structure associated with 
intended means should count as combined with the agent’s intention 
hylomorphically? The physical ramifications of our actions are very 
extensive, and even if we find a way to read goal directedness into physical 
actions without the use of intention, there will be a scoping problem. Also, if 
we are not relying on practical reason to identify the salient descriptions of 
an action, we may have difficulty identifying which physical teleologies are 
to be combined with an agent’s intention. Sticking a needle in the balloon 
might be “by its nature ordered towards” many further effects: destroying 
the balloon, causing a popping noise, slightly blunting a needle, and even 
ordered towards what we might consider as more remote effects, such as 
polluting the ocean (or landfill), etc. Another way to express this objection is 
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as an epistemological concern over which physical teleological features 
ought to be included within the moral object, if practical reasoning is not the 
guide.   
 
There is a significant strand of thought among authors157 who favour a 
hylomorphic account of action, that argues that social, psychological and 
circumstantial factors should be incorporated in the formation of intentions, 
and as ‘material’ part of an action’s substance. They appeal to the concept of 
a practice158 (such as Medicine) and the socially constructed nature of the 
way agents think about cases to provide an important element of their 
response to closeness cases and the perceived problem with Finnis, Grisez 
and Boyle’s approach. It is not clear, however, whether in these cases it is 
the hylomorphism or conclusions drawn from conceptions of practices or 
social construction that are doing the work of providing a response to the 
problem of closeness.  As I argue below, this way of thinking can be 
separated from hylomorphism and developed into a less metaphysically 
exotic approach to the problem of closeness.  
 
§5.5 A practical proposal 
 
 
One of the problems of the first person practical reason account of intention 
(such as that advocated by Finnis) identified by the proponents of the 
hylomorphic approach is that it involves too weak a connection between 
 
157 Including Jennifer Frey and Matthew O’Brien. 
158 in a broadly MacIntyrean sense. 
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agents’ possible plans and reality159. This can be understood in terms of the 
fine granularity of a ‘conceptual conceivability’ approach to intention. The 
thought is that it might be possible for someone to conceive of themselves as 
merely making a hole in an inflated balloon with a pin, or that ““I am merely 
moving a knife through such-and-such region of space” regardless of the fact 
that the space is manifestly occupied by a human neck”160 however, for 
anyone who is a competent (and honest) agent, this just is “bursting the 
balloon” and is ceteris paribus “injuring a person”. While the 
teleological/hylomorphic account seeks to anchor plans to the real world in 
the inherent teleology which “orders physical acts towards” an end, one 
might hold that one's planning (and direct intending) is constrained to 
include those things which are believed to be instrumental to the plan161, 
and that there are constraints on the descriptions under which our action is 
intentional which come from the way we conceive of plan-proposals (that is, 
the practical options before us) as opposed to logical or conceptual 
conceivability. So, some of the things believed to be instrumental might not 
be instrumental, but closely united with them in the agents’ understanding, 
which is formed by social, psychological and circumstantial factors, and 
includes the way shared practices such as medicine form that 
understanding. Some descriptions under which an act may be described are 
bundled together by this practical conceivability. I differentiate ‘practical’ 
 
159 That is, a difference between the action that one merely conceives of oneself as performing, 
and the action that one is ‘really’ doing.  
160 Anscombe, “Action, Intention, and Double Effect.” 
161 I use “instrumental to” as opposed to something being a “necessary part of” a plan to achieve 
an end, since this will help to maintain a distinction between the hysterectomy and craniotomy 
cases.  
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from ‘psychological’ conceivability in order to capture the necessarily 
outward and experience based perspective that people qua agents, require.  
 
Practical conceivability can be developed further, and since it is normative 
and plans can be better or worse suited to reality there is an opening for 
virtue.162 A norms-of-conceivability approach is likely to find support from 
some modern forms of virtue ethics. Hursthouse writes of virtues being 
multi-track dispositions: “A virtue such as honesty…is far from a single track 
disposition to do honest actions, or even honest actions for certain 
reasons…it is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and 
emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, 
interests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain 
sort of person with a certain complex mindset”163. Furthermore,  “Some 
recent thinkers including Lawrence Blum [Blum Moral Perception and 
Particularity and John McDowell [McDowell “Virtue and Reason” the Monist 
62], have stressed the cognitive  aspect of virtues in helping agents to 
recognize morally salient features of their situation and see what is at stake 
more clearly”164. Just as perceptual content is conceptual ‘from the ground 
up’ (see McDowell) one can argue that actions are, to some extent, coarse 
grained/normative from their conception and imagination onwards.  
 
 
162 Which is tied in other ways to double effect (see Chapters 1,2 etc). 
163 Rosalind Hursthouse (2012) “Virtue Ethics” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
[plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue] accessed June 2015. 
164 Zaborowski, H. Natural Moral Law in Contemporary Society (CUA, 2010) p105. 
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There could be failures in this practical conceivability - it would be 
practically negligent or some form of mistake, not to associate moving one's 
finger on the trigger of a loaded gun with firing it, or suddenly making a hole 
in an inflated balloon with bursting it. But 'associate' here is too weak – 
there is a normative force inclining us to think of them as 'tantamount' to 
the same thing or two true descriptions of the same action, other things 
being equal. This understanding of conceivability could be used as an 
answer to the problem of the craniotomy case for a first person account by 
saying that killing is practically conceived as the same thing as crushing the 
skull and removing the brain of the foetus. We can regard experienced 
doctors, due to their experience and the norms of the practice of medicine to 
find it very hard to regard the practical plan involved in a craniotomy as 
anything other than an instrumental killing, a killing in order to save.  
 
This practical conceivability account ought to be seen as a modification of 
the first person practical reasoning account, rather than as a version of the 
teleological account (even though there are elements of it in some 
hylomorphic literature). This is because the metaphysically more 
complicated (and it can be assumed more controversial165) theoretical 
elements are not a necessary part of this argument. Norms of 
conceptualization, characterisation and psychology of action provide 
resources to question the kind of conceptual distinctions necessary for 
Finnis’ account to render craniotomy permissible. Tying “actions to the real 
 
165 As per Ockam’s Razor. 
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world” appears necessary to account for our intuitions in the craniotomy 
case, and in this way it is hoped that a first personal account may not have to 
bite the bullet and accept the permissibility of craniotomies.  
 
This is not un-problematical. To begin with, I have argued that a psychology 
of action which limits/bundles together the descriptions under which one 
performs an intentional action could solve a problem for a proponent of the 
first personal view, but I have not shown (beyond the appeal to intuitions) 
that such a moral psychology is evident.  
 
One might think that in the course of avoiding mere psychological 
conceivability, which could vary widely between people, relying on practices 
and cognitive virtues to secure what is conceivable is not robust enough to 
anchor craniotomy to killing, since practices may change over time and any 
particular action may be considered as part of a number of practices. 
However, craniotomy and killing should not be too firmly connected since if 
medicine advances to a stage where the foetal life can be saved, the practice 
will revise the practically conceivable. I take it that an action may be part of 
a number of practices, but do not see this as a serious objection to the 
account sketched here, because common across all practices will be shared 
understandings of cause and effect, based on the necessarily shared features 
of action and expectation.  
 
Another objection might be that if the work is being done in this account by 
the practical inconceivability of the separation of the killing from the 
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craniotomy, then the same may be true of the hysterectomy case. Some 
people, doctors (or indeed mothers) may not be able to see a difference 
between killing the foetus and hysterectomy of a gravid uterus. In this case, 
the importance of the instrumental part that killing plays if the act is to be 
impermissible might be underlined. Where killing is practically conceived of 
as instrumental to the achievement of the end, then the means condition of 
double effect is violated166. In the hysterectomy case the death appears in 
the plan as an undesired outcome rather than an instrumental step. There 
remains, however, a fundamental difficulty in navigating the fine line 
between an account that is too permissive and too restrictive, and this, I 
suggest, is best handled through a theory of virtue based analysis, which 
includes intellectual, practice based aspects and sensitivities, rather than 
through a more formulaic approach.  
 
A possibly serious objection can be generated from Anscombe’s view that 
answers to 'why?' questions are how the descriptions under which acts are 
intentional are identified. It is clear how the ‘radically’ first personal 
intentional account fits in with this test, since agents conceive of their means 
as desirable because it achieves their end, and this description cannot fail to 
appear in a truthful and coherent means/end story elicited by appropriate 
questioning. The practical conception view is challenged because if the 
description of the means under which it is desirable is ‘bundled’ with a 
description of the means that is undesirable, it would be possible for both 
 
166 The question of exactly why instrumental choices can be morally determinative, and known 
outcomes of actions which feature in the reasoning about those actions are not crucial in the same 
way is an interesting one which is considered in Ch 1 and 4.  
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agent and questioner to circumvent this undesirable description, and still 
find a satisfactory account of the means end reasoning through ‘why?’ 
questions. A potential solution to this would be to think of the dialectic 
between the agent and the questioner as more than just a one-question-and-
one-answer encounter. The questioner may recognise that an answer under-
describes an act or means, and while the under-description provides a 
sufficient explanation of the means/end reasoning, it is not an adequate 
account of a practical conception of what was done. A precocious child may 
say that they made a hole in a balloon in order to annoy their sibling167, but 
the questioner (and the child) will have a practical conception of suddenly 
making holes in inflated balloons which closely ties sudden-holes-in-
inflated-balloons to bursting.  
 
We should question the idea of a practice, introduced by some authors to 
explain why descriptions should be bundled together. In particular, how 
strongly associated one person might be with the thinking associated with a 
practice. How easy it is to avoid the practical conceivability involved in a 
particular practice?  If it’s possible to think or train oneself out of the way of 
understanding involved in the practice, then it will not be a robust 
resolution to closeness problems. If it is not possible to avoid the concepts 
binding descriptions of actions together oneself, then it might be possible to 
recruit someone from outside the practice to ‘do the dirty work’, without 
their forming the relevant wrongful intention. Both of these possibilities, I 
 
167 Austriaco, N.  Abortion in the case of PAS p510. 
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would suggest, would be unacceptable, in the first instance because it is not 
clear how helpful a defeasible psychological association between two 
descriptions of an act would be in resolving closeness, and in the second 
because it raises a host of other moral questions, since presumably we do 
not think that the prospect of recruiting people who do not know or realise 
what they are doing (because they do not share the same practice based 
understanding as us) is an acceptable way to ensure that harmful intentions 
are not generated.      
 
One possible objection to modifying the first personal practical reasoning 
approach to include a consideration of practical conceivability is that only a 
fine-grained way of understanding intention can do the job needed in 
double effect cases. The threat of a coarse grained approach to intention is 
that it may fail to make just the kind of distinctions we ask DER to make.168 
Though the hysterectomy/craniotomy case is more controverted, there are 
plenty of standard examples, such as the submarine captain who closes the 
bulkhead door in order to save the ship and who does not intend the deaths 
of those stuck in the flooded part of the submarine, where fine-grained 
intentions make all the difference.  
 
I am not sure that the introduction of practical conceivability necessitates 
coarse-grained intentions. What an agent intends can be extremely fine 
grained, and differentiated from what she foresees, while at the same time 
 
168 I am grateful to Dr Joseph Shaw for emphasizing this line of argument in responding to the 
presentation of an earlier version of this Chapter at a symposium on Double Effect Reasoning 
organized by the Anscombe Bioethics Centre and held at Blackfriars, Oxford.  
 126 
being influenced by what the agent understands to be practically 
conceivable. It is plausible to understand that the submarine captain closing 
the door to a flooded compartment does not involve the deaths as either her 
means or end. Some descriptions of what he does might be close to killing 
the sailors, but from his point of view, what he does (closing the door) is 
separable from the deaths. This is in contrast to the craniotomy case, where 
there may be more reasons to think that (from the doctor’s point of view) 
they will need to be performing some kind of mental gymnastics not to see 
crushing the skull just as killing. What I want to claim is that it is not obvious 
that the doctor is entirely free to believe that narrowing the head is all they 
are doing when they choose the means to save the mother. If they are not 
free in this way, then there are limits (other than conceivability) to what the 
doctor could be intending.  
 
It is, even taking into account practical limits on what could be conceived, 
hard to resist the possibility that the doctor need not choose the child’s 
death as a means to saving the mother. If it is possible (as well as 
conceivable) that a doctor does not choose the death of the child in a 
craniotomy case, then this question of practical conceivability may suggest 
that it might be difficult for doctors (and the rest of us) to make this specific 
kind of choice, and form this extremely fine grained kind of intention. As a 
solution to the problem of closeness, if practical necessity cannot establish 
that the craniotomy involves an intention to kill, then it at least explains why 
many view the craniotomy case as having such force as an action close to 
and tantamount to killing.  
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If the stronger version of my practical conceivability argument (that it 
would be impossible for a doctor, given current medical science, not to 
intend the death of the child whose scull they crush) proves not to be 
sustainable, we might still think that medical norms, the practice of 
medicine and the way we typically understand what we are doing plays an 
important role in how we form and deliberate about possible intentional 
actions.  
 
§5.6 Wedgwood on closeness 
 
So, the prospects for a first personal approach to intention to solve the 
problem of closeness are limited. Ralph Wedgwood seeks to solve the 
problem by identifying criteria for identifying bad states of affairs that 
should not be intended. He suggests a proponent of DER ought to accept that 
one only intends the collision and not the death in the bridge/fat man case; 
and that one intends the only blowing up and not the death of Foot’s exit 
blocking potholer. He suggests that this should not be seen as a problem or 
embarrassment for DER, because the collision and the explosion are ‘bad 
states of affairs’ in the sense relevant for DER’s intention criterion. These 
bad states of affairs can, argues Wedgwood, be distinguished from the 
trolley case, where the train car is diverted from five towards the one.  
 
 128 
Wedgwood’s proposal is that “for a state of affairs S to count as a bad state 
of affairs in the relevant way is for the following two conditions to be met: 
first, a virtuous agent, guided by her knowledge of … true ceteris paribus 
moral generalisations [such as the generalisation that other things equal, 
and under normal conditions, when a collision between a person and a fast-
moving railway trolley occurs, the person suffers serious injury or even 
death as a result], would form the kind of expectations about S that would 
lead her to view it as bad news in this way;  and secondly, in this particular 
case, these expectations are borne out – that is, things turn out badly in 
more or less the very way in which S would lead such a virtuous agent to 
expect them to.”169 
 
This solution to the problem of closeness is neat, because it gives a tool for 
difficult cases that may well coincide with widely held intuitions, since it is 
assumed that those intuitions are reliable, or persuasive, and are those of 
virtuous agents. It is therefore a more sophisticated version of Bennet’s 
‘plain man’ quasi-solution, because rather than leaving us to wonder why a 
‘plain man’s’ opinions might be important, Wedgwood points the way 
towards virtue. Some might argue that virtue is no more helpful than 
plainness, but it does at least involve normativity in the context of seeing 
and interpreting events, rather than mere popularity.  Wedgwood’s attempt 
to tie a feature of action planning down to wider normative standards, that 
is, whether a state of affairs should be seen as good or bad based on moral 
 
169 Ralph Wedgwood, “Defending Double Effect,” Ratio 24, no. 4 (December 1, 2011): 384–401.  
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generalisations and virtuous reasoning, and therefore whether outcomes 
count as means or side effects, provides DER with a more nuanced 
application (though it may cast aspersions on those who in the end deny the 
force of the intuitions).  
 
DiNucci objects to this approach on three grounds170. Firstly using the 
expectations of virtuous agents to determine bad states of affairs cannot 
account for ‘freaky accidents’, which would not count as bad states of affairs. 
Secondly, DiNucci pushes Wedgwood on the closeness of his virtue-
generalisations. This second objection is much more persuasive than the 
first and will be considered below. In response to the first, in this context 
Wedgwood need not account for the badness of freak accidents. As far as I 
can see he does not need to offer a general theory of normativity via the 
expectations of virtuous agents (or virtues themselves, which would be the 
claim of some virtue ethicists), just a theory that is good enough for 
prospective action planning. While a general theory would need to account 
for the badness of freak accidents, it would be extremely odd for someone to 
avoid, say, playing table football because of the remote chance of injuring 
their foot. In terms of their practical deliberation, we do not need to count 
table football as a risky game for toes.  
 
DiNucci’s second objection is effectively to say that the problem of closeness 
still applies, but to the generalisations, rather than to actions. Wedgwood is 
 
170 DiNucci, Ethics Without Intention. 
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committed to the claim that the standard trolley case is permissible, because 
switching the points towards the siding is not ‘bad news’ in the way that 
pushing a fat man off a bridge in order to stop a trolley is. The objection is 
that we know there is a person stuck on the siding, so why not include this 
in the state of affairs that is to be judged by the virtuous agent? “Without 
criteria for the inclusion of the victim in one description and exclusion of the 
victim from the other description, we are back at the beginning.”171. Merely 
stipulating the criteria for including the death would be question begging, 
and he writes that Wedgwood does not offer any other criteria.  
 
This helpful objection encourages a focus on action description, since even if 
virtue based ceteris paribus moral generalisations help us to distinguish acts 
that count as the execution of a bad intention (because virtuous agents 
expect them to cause bad states of affairs), from states of affairs that merely 
have bad consequences, this does not involve criteria for distinguishing 
effects that ought to be included in an act description from effects that need 
not.  
 
One promising move is to use the virtuous agent again, and deny that such 
criteria could be reliable. DiNucci writes that there are only three options 
for someone who wants to address problem of closeness. Firstly one could 
abandon DER, secondly find criteria or thirdly question the intuitions that 
set up the problem in the first place. However, this does not provide an 
 
171 Ibid. p126. 
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exhaustive list of the options available, since a solution to the problem need 
not be definitive for every possible scenario.  
 
Wedgwood’s approach is not absolutist, and while he distinguishes the 
standard cases in the same way as a traditional proponent of DER, he writes 
that “in cases in which an agent successfully executes a bad intention of this 
sort, then, according to [DER], there is a stronger reason against the act than 
there would have been against an otherwise similar act that is not done with 
this bad intention.”172.  
 
This ‘bad states of affairs’ approach does not translate easily into a solution 
to the problem of closeness for traditional/absolutist defenders of DER. This 
is because rather than it being harder to justify intentionally causing bad 
states of affairs, DER is understood to judge some intended actions as 
impermissible. Abandoning the close connection between exploding and 
killing, or the collision and killing as an explanation for what makes the 
exploding and colliding wrongful in favor of the more general certeris 
paribus moral judgments of virtuous agents moves away from one of the 
traditional starting points of DER, and one of the most significant elements 
in its development (see Chapters 1 and 2). Closeness is a particular problem 
for these theories/theorists because it is not just that some bad states of 
affairs need stronger justification if they are to be intended, but that some 
actions (paradigmatically, killing the innocent) are always impermissible, 
 
172 Wedgwood, “Defending Double Effect.” 
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whereas other close actions are not subject to the same explicit prohibitions. 
As argued above in sections 5 and 6, a virtue based practical conceivability 
approach to an agent’s options bundles some close actions with morally 
prohibited actions, in a way that is sensitive to social, psychological and 
circumstantial factors, and therefore, it is argued, better equipped to deal 
with intuitive judgments about marginal cases.  
 
§5.7 Close acts, or close prohibitions?  
 
Some authors have responded to the problem of closeness by appealing to a 
more broad set of moral concerns that ought to be applied to the closeness 
cases. Rather than sailing their account of intention closer to the wind of 
foreseen effects, they choose to change tack and look for another approach, 
involving prohibitions other than killing. Rather than refining our view of 
intention, and rather than biting the bullet on craniotomy type cases, they 
suggest that in closeness cases we focus too narrowly on killing, and that 
other prohibitions might explain the intuitive impermissibility found in 
close cases. Across the literature the debate over DER is almost exclusively 
couched in terms of killing and the circumstances in which causing death 
might be permissible. This is understandable because of the wide agreement 
that if any action falls under an absolute prohibition, killing the innocent is a 
prime candidate. This may have distorted the discourse to make DER seem 
to be about killing. If DER is a good account of how we ought to understand 
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the ethics of action planning, then it will apply much more broadly than just 
to killing.  
 
Helen Watt offers one way to distinguish closeness cases such as the 
trolley/fat man according to our intuitions173; she argues that moral norms 
that are closely related to those which prohibit killing the innocent prohibit 
harmful bodily invasions of them. Granting that a doctor might not intend 
(in the strict sense) the death of the child in the craniotomy case, he will still 
(have to) intend some invasive effect on the body of the young child if his 
further intention of saving the mother is to be effective. This is a neat move, 
as it does not depend on metaphysics or on a reliance on cognitive virtues 
providing norms of practical conceivability which may be hard to pin down.  
 
I am sympathetic to this approach, and agree that the double effect 
literature’s focus on killing can be unhelpful in practical scenarios. A right 
not to have one’s bodily integrity deliberately and lethally invaded does 
seem to provide a basis on which the cases can be distinguished morally, 
since the intervention is directed at, on the one hand, the mother’s uterus 
and on the other, the foetus’ cranium. This approach provides an 
independent reason to differentiate between the hysterectomy and the 
craniotomy that does not depend on an account (metaphysically exotic or 
otherwise) of intending to kill. In the craniotomy case, the bodily invasion 
 
173 Watt, H. Beyond Double Effect: Side-Effects and Bodily Harm in Oderberg, D.S. and 
Chappell, T. (eds.) Human Values: New Essays on Ethics and Natural Law (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) p241. 
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(that is known to be lethal) is subject to a prohibition and this prohibition is 
closely related to the prohibition on killing.  
 
There are, however, some challenges. It would be implausible to think that 
all intended bodily invasions are impermissible, since that would rule out 
standard cases of curative surgery. So, in this case the connection between 
intended bodily invasion and foreseen death is important. Watt writes that 
“what makes the action wrong [in a craniotomy case] is that the intention to 
invade the victim’s bodily “space” is coupled with the knowledge that this 
will not promote, but will instead destroy, the bodily functioning of that 
person.”174.  
 
One might think that it is the ‘lethal’ aspect of the bodily invasion that is 
doing the moral work in establishing impermissibility. In other words, an 
appeal to the prohibition on killing is being smuggled in behind a 
prohibition not to invade bodily integrity. However, in both the craniotomy 
and hysterectomy cases there is lethal action. Watt’s extra prohibition 
account differentiates the cases on the basis of the bodily invasion (of the 
child), rather than on the basis of foreseen death or an intention to kill, 
which we can admit might not be present in either scenario. So, her position 
should not be vulnerable to this objection.  
 
 
174 Watt, H. Letter to the Editor “The Problem of the Innocent Threat” NCBQ Spring 2012. 
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There are further challenges.  Watt’s account is helpful, but the extent to 
which it is a good solution to the problem of closeness (as opposed to a 
promising way forward for the craniotomy case) is not straightforward. 
Might there not also be closeness problems for prohibitions other than 
killing?  
 
In the craniotomy case, it is plausible to believe that the doctor does not 
intend the death of the foetus, and that what he does is close to but not 
deliberate killing. Is it really plausible to believe that the doctor does not 
intend a lethal bodily invasion? This does seem to be a necessary part of his 
plan; something the doctor believes to be instrumentally important to 
achieving his end. If he had no such intention, then the coherency of his plan 
may be called into question. 
 
So, one possibility open to Watt here is to shift the burden of a resolution to 
the closeness problem to the agent who has to determine which prohibitions 
are pertinent to their plan, given what they are trying to do. Relying on our 
abilities to understand and apply moral considerations to what we are 
planning on doing is much more appealing than trying to establish precise 
criteria for an application of intention that goes beyond a first personal 
view. This may not satisfy someone looking for a robust resolution to the 
problem of closeness, but it is the most promising way forward.  
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§5.8 Concluding remarks 
 
The problem of closeness is subtle and persistent, but I have argued for a 
two part approach. A first person, practical reason account is the most 
plausible approach to intention as we have seen in previous chapters. I have 
tentatively suggested that the way we conceive of plans and the options we 
see as realistic, may be affected by practices (e.g. medicine), social and 
circumstantial factors. This is a resource that proponents of the first person 
approach to intention do not deploy, but that might be taken to blunt the 
force of the problem of closeness for their view. This approach however, on 
its own, does not provide a robust enough account of what we can intend to 
settle controverted examples.  
 
Finally I have argued that Watt’s inclusion of related prohibitions does make 
promising headway in closeness cases. It suggests that we ought to attend to 
a wider set of morally salient features of cases, rather than trying to distort 
our view of intentional killing to include all manner of ‘close’ actions.  Rather 
than closeness being a fundamental problem for an account of morality that 
involves intention, closeness shows that there may be many different 







Chapter 6 Intention Double Effect and the Law 
 
§6.1 
The line of reasoning presented in the previous chapters focuses on 
defending double effect reasoning against criticisms relating to intention, 
the ‘core’ of DER. The positions taken in defence of DER have implications 
for debates around the use and implementation of DER. This is what I 
explore in this chapter in relation to the law, and the debate over end-of-life 
decision-making. The contribution this chapter stands to make is where if it 
turns out that writers in these areas lean on arguments that deploy 
mistaken understandings of DER, or if they take DER to be weaker than its 
position in the law may be.   
 
If the arguments of previous chapters stand their ground, then DER survives 
as a defensible position that moderates the application of absolute moral 
norms. When considering the norm against killing, DER provides a guide as 
to whether an action is permissible in respect of that prohibition. This is a 
development of DER that allows it to address closeness cases because close 
cases may be subject to close prohibitions. In this way, we are not tempted 
to stretch our concept of intention too far, nor tempted to abandon positions 
that rely on the fine distinctions that a proper understanding of intention 
allows us to make (e.g. in double effect cases). The defence of DER also 
retreats from the view that DER provides all-things-considered judgments of 
permissibility. This is preferable not only because the use of DER needs to 
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be understood and applied in respect of particular prohibitions (in order for 
us to examine whether our proposed or completed intended action falls 
under relevant proscribed category) but also because DER cannot easily 
take into account cases of recklessness or negligence. More on this below. I 
have also argued that using DER as a moral heuristic may be misleading for 
a number of reasons, but in particular because singling out intention might 
lead us to think that we can choose what to intend based on the desirability 
of having the intention. This mistaken view has led to objections to DER on 
the basis that intention can be ‘gerrymandered’, and that DER provides 
reasoning that in effect supplies a ‘get out of gaol free’ card to anyone who 
can manipulate their intention or who can tell a plausible story of innocent 
intentions. This obviously has relevance to the law. 
 
There are challenges in applying DER to the law, and in tracing the ways in 
which DER might usefully be deployed in legal reasoning. DER appears to be 
part of the law in one form or another, though this is relatively inchoate, and 
open to interpretation. I consider this below, but to begin with, it is worth 
highlighting a tension in applying DER to the law. On the one hand the law 
needs to be clear, provide workable guidance and be enforceable, but on the 
other hand, the philosophical literature most often introduces DER in order 
to deal with hard cases. These cases are developed and discussed precisely 
because the application of DER is difficult in order to test the limits of 
theory.   
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An emphasis on philosophical problems associated with DER may 
encourage lawyers unfairly to dismiss DER as too conceptually confused or 
unworkable. The project of unpacking the detailed conceptual implications 
of DER is extremely complex, and the subject of a very wide literature, but 
this should not be taken to undermine the central set of claims around DER 
(suitably adapted for legal contexts), which are much less legally 
controversial. A legal difference between tactical and terror bombers based 
in part on an agent’s attitudes and plans, does not need to involve a fully 
developed DER theory that has resolved the most prominent objections to 
DER (such as the problem of closeness). A more philosophically robust 
theory of DER will provide a more satisfactory foundation for the legal 
distinction, but the philosophical literature tends to focus on conceptually 
difficult hard cases. Following the old adage that “hard cases make bad law”, 
we have good reason to be cautious of conclusions that are drawn from 
philosophical complexity.  
 
A series of recent papers have argued about just this kind of point175. This 
chapter is a contribution to that dialogue. Recognising that the application of 
DER to hard cases may be disputed even among those who favour DER as a 
workable normative approach, DER should not be disqualified from the 
 
175 See for example, Charles Foster et al., “The Double Effect Effect.,” Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics : CQ : The International Journal of Healthcare Ethics Committees 20, no. 1 
(2011): 56–72,; Andrew Mcgee, “Intention, Foresight, and Ending Life,” Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics 22, no. 01 (2013): 77–85; S Duckett, “Knowing, Anticipating, Even 
Facilitating but Still Not Intending: Another Challenge to Double Effect Reasoning,” Bioethical 
Enquiry 15 (2018): 33–37; Richard Huxtable, “Get out of Jail Free? The Doctrine of Double 
Effect in English Law.,” Palliative Medicine 18, no. 1 (2004): 62–68; Anna Lindblad, Niels 
Lynöe, and Niklas Juth, “End-of-Life Decisions and the Reinvented Rule of Double Effect: A 
Critical Analysis.,” Bioethics 9702, no. 7 (2012): 368–77.  
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courtroom, as Foster et. al. suggest176. There is no guarantee that disputes 
among philosophers about hard cases means that the underlying theory is 
not useful, the best available, or clear when applied to ordinary cases. 
Another way to put this might be to say that philosophical complexity does 
not necessarily cash out into or entail legal complexity.  
 
As we shall see, the Law can deal with difficult cases in a number of ways, 
and they do not need to be methods that will satisfy philosophers. For 
example, we might take it that one role of the courts is to provide a way to 
manage difficult situations on a case by case basis, interpreting statute and 
precedent, and developing them where necessary.  
 
This chapter relates double effect, as outlined in the previous chapters, to 
the debate over euthanasia and assisted suicide and considers its use in the 
law (predominantly English law). It proceeds in three parts, firstly in 
relation to DER’s appearance in the law, and the ways in which we might 
expect DER to be applied differently in legal contexts. The second section 
considers DER’s application to end of life care, given that end if life care is 
one of the central or paradigmatic cases where DER is applied, and if DER is 
not applicable here, we would have good reason to doubt its applicability 
across other legal and regulatory fields such as dilemmas at the beginning of 
life, the ethics of warfare, cooperation with wrongdoing and so on. The final 
section considers a version of the problem of closeness found in legal 
 
176 Foster et al., “The Double Effect Effect.” p69. 
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contexts that has been used to challenge DER. Two arguments are proposed 
to resolve this kind of challenge, one legal and one that relies on DER.  
 
Philosophical criticisms of double effect, including some of those considered 
in previous chapters that DER permits too much or too little, that it is not 
specific enough or that it is too open to abuse, are reflected in the law via 
relevant cases and in the jurisprudential debate. These difficulties with 
motive, intention, foresight and the disputed nature of criminal acts have led 
some to argue that in some areas the law has “an obligation to be 
philosophically lax…[and that DER should be] safely penned in the 
philosopher’s lecture room”177. I argue on the contrary that if double effect 
and its elements are part of how actions ought normatively to be 
understood and evaluated, then there will be a natural home for double 
effect in the law, which also deals with an agent’s responsibility for actions 
and outcomes.  
 
§6.2 DER and Case Law - Bodkin Adams. 
 
Judge Devlin’s famous direction to the Jury in Bodkin Adams (1957) has been 




177 Ibid.  See also Saini P. “The doctrine of double effect and the law of murder Medico-Legal J 
1999; 67” 106-120 
178 See House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics. Report of the Select Committee on 
medical ethics 1994, HL Paper 21. London: HMSO, 1994 Also, R v. Bodkin Adams [1957] 
Criminal Law Review 365 cited by Foster et al. The Double Effect Effect.  
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A direction to the jury should be understood in its legal context. The judge in 
directing the jury draws attention to the salient aspects of the case and the 
law, trying to eliminate or avoid unhelpful distractions such as assumptions 
the jury might make or potentially misleading legal terminology. The judge 
expresses what the law is and does not usually form new aspects of it. This 
is the relevant part of Devlin’s direction:  
 
“[the doctor] is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to 
relieve pain and suffering, even if the measures he takes may 
incidentally shorten life.179  
 
It is noteworthy that he goes on to explain this statement, which appears to 
be a good and clear example of DER in these terms:  
 
“That is not because there is any special defence for medical men; it 
is not because doctors are put into any category different from other 
citizens for this purpose. The law is the same for all, and what I have 
said to you rests simply on this: no act is murder which does not 
cause death. “Cause” means nothing philosophical or technical or 
scientific. It means what you twelve men and women sitting as a jury 
in the jury box would regard in a common-sense way as the cause. If, 
for example, a doctor had done something or omitted to do 
something and death occurs, say on … the Monday instead of the 
 
179 R v. Bodkin Adams [1957] Criminal Law Review 365. 
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Tuesday, no one with common sense would say the doctor caused 
death. They would say the cause of death was the injury, or whatever 
it was, that brought her to hospital.”180  
 
Firstly we might note that this is a case in which DER could be employed. 
‘Incidental’ effects are those that accompany or are secondary to another 
action, and so can reasonably be understood as side effects to what is the 
‘proper and necessary’ action of relieving pain.  
 
There are however, some unfortunate confusions here. The characterization 
of an effect as incidental does not necessarily mean that it is unintended, but 
I think in this context it is safe to assume that an incidental effect would not 
be intended, particularly if we take incidental to mean incidental to the 
doctor’s plan. Further, claiming that “no-one with common sense would say 
the doctor caused death”  because their demise was imminent is unhelpful, 
and a misleading way of implying that the doctor could merely have 
foreseen the death being the ‘incidental’ result of measures to relieve pain.  
 
The explanation of this DER example in terms of causation is curious, and 
leads Foster et. al. to the view that Devlin is not referencing DER here. It is 
true that Devlin does not mention the doctrine explicitly, and it is also true 
that he does not mention all of the four conditions that usually constitute 
DER, but neither of these omissions nor the explanation in terms of whether 
 
180 R v. Bodkin Adams [1957] Criminal Law Review 365 cited in Foster et. al. The Double Effect 
Effect. 
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the doctor or disease causes the patient’s death warrant the view that 
double effect is not at play here. As noted above, a Judge’s direction to the 
jury is intended to focus the Jury’s attention on the most salient aspects of 
law in relation to the case at hand. It is fair, then, for the Judge to paraphrase 
a theoretically complicated approach to the case, which might lead jurors 
down an unhelpful path of deliberation. There are important philosophical 
differences between intention, knowledge, desires and motives, and 
between these mental features and causation, but while these are important 
for double effect, there may be good reasons for the law to gloss over them, 
for example, in the way Judges direct juries or in the criteria for assessing 
intent. 
 
This being said, that DER is in the background, it is worth attending to the 
foreground: it is not clear that the explanation in terms of causation is a 
helpful stand in for double effect. If we are to understand an account of 
causation as doing the moral work here, so that the disease and not the 
doctor kills the patient, then, as Foster et.al. argue, this explanation is not 
consistent DER. If the argument runs along the lines that one does not cause, 
and therefore is not responsible for causing death if death is imminent 
anyway, then all kinds of pre-emptive killing181, intended or otherwise, 








§6.3 Scope of DER within the law. 
 
The central distinction found in double effect between intent and foresight 
is complicated in the law by a number of factors. Firstly, the precise 
relationship between the law and morality (that is, the philosophical 
normative ethics of which DER is a part) is controversial. The law may or 
may not have a foundational basis in morality, but for our purposes we need 
only note that they are different disciplines, with different aims or ends.  
 
Setting aside some important legal questions such as how fine grained a law 
ought to be for the moment, the focus here will be on whether there is good 
reason to include intentions in the definition of criminal behaviour. The 
focus is on criminal behaviour, because this matches best with the 
philosophical literature. It should be noted, however, that in other areas of 
law intention can play a significant role in making an otherwise lawful act 
unlawful.  
 
Treason in the US requires acting with the purpose to aid the enemy, not 
merely with the knowledge that this will result from one’s action182. The 
case of a sniper foreseeably giving away their position when shooting at the 
enemy does not make them treasonous, even though what he does (shoot at 
the enemy) also aids the enemy in making it easier for them to find him. 
 
182 Wayne LaFave,1 Subst. Crim. L. § 5.2 (2d ed.) (footnote 9)  
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Also, harassment, false incrimination, hindering apprehension or 
prosecution and crimes of 'improper influence’ involve a requirement of 
having a particular purpose. 
 
There is also reason to think that English tort law also makes use of 
intention183. English law “claims not to recognize the principle that an intent 
to injure is sufficient to make unlawful an otherwise lawful action”184, 
however Finnis writes that this is undermined by case law in relation to e.g. 
fraud, and where agreements to act in a way that harms the plaintiff are 
made with the predominant intention to harm. This is considered a tort 
even the act in question would otherwise be lawful.185  
 
These examples are helpful in that they show that intention can be 
incorporated into or be part of legal concepts. There is a further question as 
to the extent to which the distinction between intention and foresight, which 
as we have seen can result in very fine distinctions between acts that appear 
similar, might be helpful.  
 
The law will be concerned with clarity (so that the law can be understood 
widely), fairness (so that judgments are consistent), with punishment, 
public safety, and forensic analysis (determining what happened). This last 
 
183 This position has changed since the 1890’s, but recent judgments support a role for 
motive/intention. See Finnis, J. “Legal Reasoning as Practical Reason” in Reason in Action Coll: 
Volume 1 (Oxford, OUP, 2011) p226 fn24 and Keith N. Hylton, Intent in Tort Law, 44 Val. U. L. 
Rev. 1217 (2010). 
184 John Finnis, “Legal Reasoning as Practical Reason,” in Reason in Action  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 212–30, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580057.003.0015. 
185 Ibid. p226 fn24 
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concern is important, because trying to work out after the fact whether an 
agent broke the law is a different endeavor to the philosophical project of 
developing clear and applicable normative concepts. The particular purpose 
and end of legal reasoning, which may or may not include double effect, is 
technical. It is concerned with “the resolution of disputes (and other 
allegations of misconduct) by the provision of a directive sufficiently 
definite and specific to identify one party as right (in-the-right) and the 
other as wrong (not-in-the-right)”186. All of these mean that we should not 
necessarily expect double effect to show up in exactly the same way in the 
law as it does in normative philosophical literature. It may be that double 
effect needs to be re-interpreted in the context of the law, or that various 
considerations need to be taken into account before the role DER might play 
becomes clear.   
 
A good example of this difference in scope between the law and morality is 
that the law needs to form specific judgments about actions and events that 
have occurred. When the inescapably forensic nature of court cases is 
combined with the ‘mental’ element of a crime, the jury will be in the 
business of attributing mental states to the accused (and, perhaps, to others 
who might not even be present during the trial). This raises a special set of 
problems concerning our ability to assess others that have caused some to 
criticize double effect187.  
 
186 Finnis, J. “Legal Reasoning as Practical Reason” Part two, Collected Works p220.  
187 Garcia Double Effect in Reich W.T. (ed) Encyclopedia of Bioethics Vol 4. New York, 
Macmillan, 1995 and Quill TE, Dresser, R, Brock DW, “The rule of double effect: a critique of 
its role in end of life decision making New Engl J Med 1998 337[24]: 1766-1771. 
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If DER is taken to be a good defence for someone who causes harmful 
outcomes, then it might be open to someone to claim that they had good 
intentions (and satisfied the other conditions), while in fact they had 
wrongful intentions. They might also be able to construct a plausible, 
innocent but false story of what their intentions were, which would be 
particularly difficult for the court to discern if the outcomes are ones that 
could be the effects of both good and bad intentions (e.g. palliative care and 
euthanasia). In this sense DER has been accused of allowing suspects to ‘get 
out of gaol free’.  
 
The question of how agent’s plans ought to be described was considered in 
Ch5 on closeness, but I only briefly considered the issue of an agent who 
might deliberately be misleading about a plan. My position here is that this 
cannot be a reason to challenge DER, nor DER’s use in the law. This kind of 
challenge should be put aside because this is exactly the kind of task that 
juries are charged with. Even though there are epistemic challenges in 
establishing what someone intended, and ‘folk’ understandings of intention 
that may carry implicit moral significance188, juries are employed to decide 
one way or the other on this kind of contested question. If a person’s mental 
states are essentially opaque, then the law would have a difficult time with 
mens rea, which precisely involves a judgement of mental states where the 
 
188 See for example Joshua Knobe’s work on intention, morality and folk psychology. Knobe, J. 
“Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language”  Analysis, 2003, 63, 190-193. 
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defendant may be obstructive, confused, or even unable to express their 
own opinion. 
 
§6.4 Palliative care, Euthanasia and the use of Morphine. 
 
Relatively recent proposals to legalise assisted suicide under consideration 
by the UK parliament (e.g. the Marris Bill189) have sought to introduce an 
exception for medical practitioners who provide lethal drugs to those who 
are terminally ill, when specific criteria are met. Double effect plays a role in 
this debate. It is used by both sides in order to justify their position, and it 
has been relevant to some of the most significant legal cases relating to the 
law on murder.  
 
The use of morphine is at once an excellent and terrible example of double 
effect reasoning. Sadly, it is only excellent as a hypothetical or theoretical 
example. This is because the theoretical case of a life being shortened 
because of a dose of morphine prescribed in order to treat pain does not 
match up with current best medical practice. In fact, it has not matched up 
with best medical practice for 25 or so years190. Instead of large doses 
depressing a patient’s breathing, the correct titrations will tend to extend 
 
189  Assisted Dying (No. 2) Bill 2015-16 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2015-2016/0007/16007.pdf (accessed 
January 2017).  
190 See for example Regnard, C. ‘Double Effect is Leading a Double Life.’ BMJ. 2007 Mar 3; 
334(7591): 440. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1808133/ See also Morita T, Tsunoda J, Inoue S, 
Chihara S. Effects of high dose opioids and sedatives on survival in terminally ill cancer 
patients. J Pain Symptom Manage 2001;21:282-9 and Sykes, N. “The use of opioids and seditives 
at the end of life” The Lancet Volume 4, No. 5, p312–318, May 2003 
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patient’s lives as they derive health benefits from the calming effects of the 
drug191. So, the correct use of morphine is doubly beneficial in relaxing the 
patient and alleviating pain rather than subject to double effect reasoning 
due to harmful effects. 
 
Furthermore, there may be unintended harmful consequences of the 
widespread use of the Morphine example as a case of DER. This application 
may perpetuate “the myth of the double effect of pain medication”, where 
the impression is given that pain medication can lead to death, which it has 
been suggested, even among medics, can lead directly “to the under-
treatment of suffering at the end of life.”192 I would want to say, however, 
that rather than this kind of phenomenon being a reason to question DER, it 
is a cautionary tale that highlights a risks of doing applied philosophy, since 
the association between palliative medication and death might come up in 
other discussions unrelated to DER.  Philosophical examples can be used in 
isolation from best practice (such as the prescribing practices in palliative 
care), and we must trust that they are not being used with the intention of 
causing suffering, and that the benefit of their use outweighs any harmful 




191 Sykes, N. “The use of opioids and seditives at the end of life” The Lancet Volume 4, No. 5, 
p312–318, May 2003. 
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanonc/article/PIIS1470204503010799/abstract 
192 Fohr, S. “The Double Effect of Pain Medication: Separating Myth from Reality” Journal of 
Palliative Medicine (1998).  
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This being said about the morphine example being inaccurate and 
misleading in the palliative care context, there may still be extreme 
circumstances where the correct titrations of morphine cannot be 
calculated, and in these kinds of cases DER would come into play. However, 
the usefulness of the example is linked to its medical plausibility in normal 
palliative circumstances. The more the case looks like it is applicable only in 
extreme circumstances, the less likely it is to be useful for end of life policy 
and legal reasoning.  
 
So, there are some important background considerations when using double 
effect in relation to end of life care. These do not undermine its plausibility, 
but do mean that the application of DER needs to be careful. Much ink has 
been spilt on DER and end of life care, and it will be helpful to consider the 
structure of this dialogue, in order to be precise about the claims being 
made by proponents of DER.  
 
Some writers in favour of assisted suicide and euthanasia argue that 
administering pain relief that hastens death is already a form of ‘indirect 
euthanasia’193, and that the law should acknowledge this. Thus, they might 
advocate for DER, but as a form of euthanasia. It should be clear that this is a 
mistaken application of DER. It is hard to see how a coherent position on the 
intend/foresee distinction could be maintained here. If, following DER, 
actions that aim at the deaths of patients are impermissible on the basis of 
 
193 See for example Smith ML, Orlowski J, Radey C, Scofield G: A good death: is euthanasia the 
answer? Cleve Clin J Med 1992;59:99-109. 
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their intention, then deploying DER as a roundabout or indirect  way of 
intentionally securing the death of patients ought also to be considered 
impermissible. The key differentiating position between a proponent of 
indirect euthanasia and DER (as outlined in this thesis) is in relation to the 
permissibility of intentionally killing someone.  
 
The debate here does not turn on whether double effect is a good theory of 
the permissibility of causing harmful side effects. At the heart of this debate 
is the question of whether it is ever permissible to aim at someone’s (or 
your own) death. This distinction between objections to killing and 
objections to double effect is important because the prohibition on killing is 
one of the starting points of the traditional approach to double effect. Wider 
objections to the prohibition on killing are not best (or at all) answered by 
double effect. Thus, while Allmark et. Al. argue that DER does not apply to 
end of life care, they do so on the basis that hastening death is not a bad 
outcome that needs justification194. How one ought to assess the health 
benefits and burdens associated with death and interventions around the 
time of death is not only medically, but also philosophically difficult and 
controversial195.  So, far from undermining DER Allmark et. al.’s position 
fails to engage with those who are not committed to the view that hastened 
death is a benefit (or neutral) to terminally ill patients196. Furthermore, a 
 
194 Allmark, Peter, Cobb, Mark, Liddle, B. Jane and Tod, Angela (2010). Is the Doctrine of 
Double Effect irrelevant in end-of-life decision making? Nursing Philosophy, 11, 170-177. 
195 On this topic see Barrie, S. “QALYs, euthanasia and the puzzle of death” Journal of Medical 
Ethics 41 (8):635-638 (2015). 
196 Nor do they consider the possibility of DER being useful for cases where benefits and burdens 
of hastened death are marginal or unclear.  
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proponent of DER might agree with Allmark that death can be a benefit, but 
still deny that death may be intended. If our intentions are relevant to 
permissibility in the way DER suggests, then intended death might still be 
impermissible even if foreseen death were to benefit the patient.  
 
§6.5 A Difficult End of Life Case.  
 
A recent and controversial example of DER in the law occurred in 2016 in 
the state of Victoria, Australia. In that state, physician assisted suicide is 
illegal, though there is precedent for DER to be invoked in end of life cases. A 
Victorian tribunal supported a doctor’s agreeing to provide pentobarbitone 
(Nembutal) to a patient at some point in the future if the patient feels (at 
that later time) that his pain is unbearable and he wants to end his life. This 
was supported on the basis of double effect, and the argument that Dr 
Syme’s primary purpose in promising the lethal drug was not the death of 
the patient, but psychological suffering that was alleviated by the patient’s 
ability to control their death.  
 
It is not at all clear that this is a proper use of DER. It is important to note at 
this stage that for our analysis, that the question of whether assisted suicide 
is or can be justified is beside the point. The question here is whether DER 
can be used, in the context of a prohibition on assisted suicide, to permit 
actions like those of Dr Syme, that facilitate assisted suicide, but that are 
(also) done for other purposes. Dr Syme wants to have his cake and eat it; 
using DER to operate in a way that is consistent with the law prohibiting 
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assisting suicide, while at the same time facilitating and promoting assisted 
suicide.   
 
There are two strands to my alternative analysis of this case. Firstly, there is 
good reason to think that Dr Syme’s actions fall under the first condition of 
DER, secondly that they fall under the intention condition.  
 
In a jurisdiction in which assisted suicide is prohibited, it is perhaps too 
much of a stretch to think that promising or prescribing lethal medication is 
a good or neutral action, even if it carries some psychological benefit to the 
patient. If the doctor promises to provide the poison, he is facilitating, aiding 
and abetting the patient’s suicide. The first condition does not specify 
anything in relation to the intention of the agent, so it would be possible for 
the legislator to take the view that such facilitation of an illegal activity is 
prohibited, and the law may indeed prohibit this. This would prevent 
further application of DER. A standard example of the first condition in 
action involves the scope of analysis, simply if the proposed action is 
wrongful, then its further effects and the agent’s intention do not make it 
permissible.  
 
It is also far from clear that the case passes the intention condition. Dr 
Syme’s defence was that his primary reason for promising to provide the 
poison was palliative, rather than to bring about the death of the patient. 
However, we might ask whether it is credible that Dr Syme did not also 
intend to facilitate the death of the patient. It is possible for one and the 
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same plan to be done for more than one reason, being part of more than one 
plan. It is certainly plausible that Dr Syme both intends that his patient’s 
fears are allayed, and that he be helped to kill himself when and if the time 
comes.   
 
It might be objected that the doctor, in promising to provide poison, does not 
intend to provide the poison. If his promise is taken at face value, he does, 
however, have a conditional intention to assist suicide: if the patient 
determines to commit suicide then Dr Syme will provide the poison. DER is 
couched in terms of straight-forward intention, and there is no reason to 
think that this would not also apply to conditional intentions. On closer 
scrutiny many intentions are in fact conditional. To take two routine 
examples, I might intend to overtake a car on the motorway, but only settle 
on the exact speed and timing of my maneuver in response to other drivers’ 
behavior, and I might settle on the route to my intended destination only 
once I have further information about traffic conditions etc. So, far from 
being a counter-example, due to DER appearing to permit the promise and 
plan of the doctor, this case is better understood as an example of an action 
prohibited by DER. 
 
Much has been made of the difficulties in applying DER, but those 
advocating for the removal of DER from the law rarely consider whether it 
would be possible to capture the main thrust of DER e.g. in statute. Richard 
Huxtable has recommended just such a statutory provision that seems to me 
to deal with many of the hard cases, though forensic challenges will remain. 
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His formulation is that “where a responsible medical professional 
administers treatment 
1. That is clearly designed solely to relieve pain, suffering and/or 
distress; 
2. In accordance with responsible medical practice; and 
3. With the intention to relieve pain, suffering and/or distress and not 
to kill the patient 
He or she shall not be guilty of an offence.”197 
 
This is a clear and concise formulation that expresses the conditions of 
double effect. 1) and 2) together address proportionality, and 3) addresses 
both the intention and the means condition. There is some precedent for 
statements like 3) above. For example the Mental Capacity Act 2005198 
states that the person determining whether a treatment is in the best 
interests of a patient “must not, in considering whether the treatment is in 
the best interests of the person concerned, be motivated by a desire to bring 
about his death.”199 
 
This kind of statement is not vague and inapplicable, plagued by being too 
complex to be applied safely200. It is a statement of the prohibition that 
references the plans and desires of the decision maker. Under this kind of 
 
197 Huxtable, R. “Get out of Jail Free? The Doctrine of Double Effect in English Law” Palliative 
Medicine 2004 18: 62-68. 
198 The Mental Capacity Act Department of Health (2005). London, HMSO. 
199 Ibid. Section 4, article 5.   
200 See Foster et. Al. The Double Effect Effect (2011) p69. 
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formulation, the Victorian Doctor’s case of promising looks very much less 
like a strange but legitimate use of DER, and more like it will be ruled out.  
  
§6.6 Murder, DER and Recklessness.  
 
So far in this thesis, when considering a prohibition on murder, we have 
looked at whether, under DER, the intention condition can navigate the 
question of permissibility. This condition functions as an exclusionary 
reason (see Ch4) – excluding particular intended ends or means. Our 
discussion of closeness has refined this to suggest that actions may be 
wrongful if they do not aim at death but aim at some closely related action. 
This is not because the action is in fact an intended death, but because there 
may be other prohibitions (such as against bodily invasion one knows to be 
lethal) that are pertinent to the case. These refinements of DER do not, 
however mean that all cases properly described as ‘murder’ are necessarily 
actions that are intentional killing, or close intentional actions that cause 
death. There may be other actions we want to class as ‘murder’201.   
 
There is more than one way not to have a proscribed intention. If DER’s 
conditions render an action impermissible on the basis of an intention, the 
way to resolve this would be not to act, or to choose to do something else, 
but this does not exhaust the ways in which one might not intend harmful 
effects. An agent may fail to have a relevant intention for morally 
 
201 See Anscombe, “Action, Intention, and Double Effect.” Who takes just such a wide 
understanding of ‘murder’.  
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blameworthy ways, as cases of recklessness. Here, the agent may be 
blameworthy for having foreseen morally important effects, or for having 
foreseen morally important effects, but without weighing them adequately. 
The agent may just not have cared about harmful foreseen effects. 
 
Cases of recklessness or negligence do appear to be both blameworthy and 
impermissible, but in a way that is not obviously captured by DER. In these 
cases the agent is culpable for different sorts of omissions, and these might 
be a failure to attend to morally important effects of their action as in 
recklessness, or culpable failures in knowledge or understanding that lead 
to negligent actions.  
 
Lord Goff, writing extrajudicially, considers a case where a bomber who 
destroys a passenger plane in order to collect insurance money has argued 
that the mens rea, the mental element of murder, ought to be expanded to 
include cases of reckless indifference to human life202. It is worth noting at 
this point that the contents of the insurance contract is crucial. If the payout 
is only in the eventuality that one or more passengers die, then their deaths 
are intended as part of the bomber’s plan (and the deaths are not ‘merely’ 
reckless). If, on the other hand, the insurance company in the example pays 
out just because the plane is destroyed, this is a case of recklessness. I will 
focus below on the latter case, where the insurance pays out if the plane is 
destroyed.  
 
202 Goff, R. “The mental element in the crime of murder” Law Quarterly Review 1988,104: 30-59 
cited in Mcgee, “Intention, Foresight, and Ending Life.” 
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The problem identified by McGee in his discussion of this example is that it 
is hard to distinguish between what an agent intends as an end or a means, 
but I suggest that this better understood, however, as a version of the 
problem of closeness. We know very well from the example that the agent 
did not intend the deaths of the passengers; he foresaw their deaths but only 
chose to destroy the plane. The question is whether this case is relevantly 
close killing those passengers.  
 
To follow the line of thinking in my chapter on closeness, it would be a 
mistake to interpret the case as one where the agent’s intentions actually 
included the death of the passengers. Due to facts about the circumstances, 
it might be implausible to believe that one could bomb the plane without 
choosing to kill the passengers (this might be practically inconceivable), 
however in this case the intentions of the agent are specified for us, and they 
do not include the death of the passengers, so it is odd (to say the least) to 
say that the agent both has and does not have the relevant intention. A more 
satisfactory move than engineering intention to include killing in this case 
would be to consider a closely allied prohibition – that of acting with lethal 
reckless indifference to human life, as Lord Goff argues.  
 
His further point that this should be included in the definition of ‘murder’, 
and falling under the mental element of murder is an interesting one for the 
proponent of DER. We have seen that intentions can determine what kind an 
action belongs to, but if we are to interpret an intention to kill as providing 
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sufficient conditions for an attribution of murder, rather than necessary and 
sufficient conditions, there is room for us to interpret murder to include 
lethal negligence or recklessness.  It may be objected that we cannot have it 
both ways. DER allows for lethal unintended side effects to be permissible in 
some circumstances, whereas we are here introducing a way for foreseen 
effects, such as those caused as side effects of otherwise good plans, to 
render an action impermissible, and not just impermissible, but 
impermissible on the basis of the very same prohibition against murder. 
This might introduce a problem for DER, that there is a kind of blind spot 
around reckless cases, where the agent avoids impermissible intention, but 
only through recklessness.  
 
There are a number of ways out of this possible complication. On the one 
hand, we might say that the legal understanding of murder is artful, in that it 
needs to prohibit more than the central cases of intentional killing. It needs 
to do this for a number of reasons, including in relation to the law’s forensic 
approach, which after the fact attempts to determine what is intended with 
imperfect evidence and potentially misleading testimonies. For this reason 
‘murder’ could helpfully include recklessness just in the way the law 
understands intention is a “legal fiction”, where evidence of foresight counts 
as evidence of intent.  
 
Alongside this broad use of the concept of ‘murder’ in the law in order to 
address Lord Goff’s closeness type-challenge to double effect, we may be 
able to deploy the fourth condition of DER to account for reckless cases. The 
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fourth condition, as we saw in Chapter 1, ought to be interpreted in two 
ways, firstly in relation to simple proportionality, that the good ought to 
outweigh the bad, but it also ought to be understood as specifying that the 
plan under consideration ought to be the least harmful way of achieving 
one’s ends (these aspects are often brought together in formulations that 
require there to be a “proportionate reason” to cause the bad effect)203. So, 
the thinking might go, someone who is destroying a passenger plane in 
order to collect insurance money does not have a proportionate reason to 
destroy the plane, because there are many lives aboard. Note that the 
condition is not that the agent takes there to be a proportionate reason, and 
we can say that the fourth condition renders the bomber’s action 
impermissible, whether or not the bomber is misguided or callous enough 
not to regard the passengers as a reason that counts against destroying the 



















203 See e.g. Daniel P. Sulmasy, “‘Reinventing’ the Rule of Double Effect,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Bioethics, 2009, 1–41, who considers the proportionality condition to be 'due 
diligence', as opposed to weighing overall good and bad outcomes. 
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Chapter 7 Concluding Remarks 
 
 
In broad terms, there have been two projects in this thesis. A number of the 
chapters undertake interpretive work on double effect, in particular the 
chapters on the history of DER, on closeness, and on DER and the law, and in 
these the main thrust has been that properly interpreted, DER is not so 
vulnerable to the criticisms often levelled against it. The key chapters 3 and 
4 on the philosophy of action and the moral significance of what is intended 
attempt to draw insights from debates in the philosophy of action, and bring 
them to bear on double effect reasoning. There has been very little attention 
to the relationship between positions in the philosophy of action and DER, in 
spite of the amount of ink spilt on both of those areas. My conclusion, that 
holding different positions in the philosophy of action will have a profound 
effect on how one understands double effect and the normative evaluation 
of actions, might not be revolutionary, but is brought into sharp focus in 
these chapters.   
That is the broad outline of the thesis, and in what follows I will outline the 
main points and conclusions of each chapter, in order to draw out the points 
of argument and connections between chapters. It should be clear at this 
point that the thesis favours DER and the moral relevance or significance of 
intentions in action. This is not to say all of the challenges to interpreting 
DER can be overcome, nor that DER provides a fool-proof moral heuristic for 
good decision-making. DER, if it does indeed reflect important insights 
about the ethics of action, works at a nexus between disciplines or fields of 
enquiry; normative ethics and the philosophy of action have been 
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considered in this thesis, but others are also highly relevant, including moral 
psychology, self-determination and free will. This makes it a particularly 
difficult topic that has implications in a number of different theoretical 
directions. DER has wide application, across healthcare, warfare and the law 
(all of which considered here to some degree), and even across all fields of 
human action (and inaction), including business, politics and everyday life.  
DER has a long history, and in Chapter 2 I argue that DER type reasoning can 
be found in St Augustine, but not as far back as Aristotle, and in so doing, I 
address some criticisms of DER that emerge from readings of Aristotle, St 
Thomas Aquinas and the Catholic intellectual tradition. The result, 
combined with introductory remarks in Chapter 1, is a more clearly defined 
sense of the role and scope of DER, which ties it to particular moral 
prohibitions, and is relatively modest; not making claims about the 
permissibility of any and all cases of causing death, rather its reasoning 
applies to whether causing e.g. death as a side effect should be considered 
murder.  
The third chapter highlights two schools of thought within the philosophy of 
action that I argue result in interestingly different approaches when applied 
to DER. Of particular interest is the question of whether intention formation 
is an action, or whether it is the (passive, non-voluntary) cause of action. I 
argue that on a Davidsonian account of action (as caused in the right kind of 
way by beliefs and desires), provides a theoretical background that supports 
criticism of DER on the grounds that intention is of secondary or merely 
derivative importance. This kind of objection has been moved by Judith 
Jarvis Thomson and T M Scanlon, among others. If intention is understood 
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(on the other hand) as non-voluntary, but also an action and up-to-us, then 
this a particular kind of objection to DER loses some of its force. The chapter 
introduces and considers this in some detail, however I contend more 
broadly pace Warren Quinn that different theories of intention and action 
have significant effects on the way DER is understood, and that this is 
worthy of further study.  
In Chapter 4 I consider the moral significance of what is intended in more 
detail. I argue that DER’s intention condition cannot be based on the 
predictive significance of intention. It is more plausible to ground a 
fundamental moral significance of intention in meaning, that is, the meaning 
of what an agent chooses to do. TM Scanlon’s argument against DER, based 
on a distinction between the deliberative and critical significance of 
intention, is not robust, even when supported by Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle, since 
I argue we can take intentions into account in deliberation even if we cannot 
choose intentions on the basis of their desirability. There are clear and 
mutually supportive links here with the arguments set out in chapter three.  
Chapter 5 considers another serious objection to DER, the problem of 
closeness. If particular intentions can be morally significant, an agent might 
merely intend something extremely ‘close’ to the prescribed action. The 
action is so close that we want to consider it morally equivalent, but it is not 
close enough to count as involving the same intention. A stock example is 
the terror bomber who (implausibly but conceivably) only intends to make 
his victims appear to be dead. After considering a few false starts, I settle on 
the need to acknowledge that, as suggested in Chapter 2, DER has a modest 
scope, related to particular prohibitions. Even if the implausible terror 
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bomber had only wanted to make his victims appear dead, and so is not 
strictly speaking guilty of intending their death, he makes them appear dead 
by intending grievous bodily harm to them, which we might also think is 
prohibited. So, we have close prohibitions rather than a difficulty for 
intention.  
The final chapter takes DER, as defended in previous chapters, and 
considers some thorny problems of application in relation to the law. DER 
has what might be called a poor track record in legal thinking, while at the 
same time appearing to lie behind a number of legal distinctions: e.g. in 
relation to mens rea, exculpatory factors, treason, tort law, and (as 
considered in detail in this chapter), a distinction between euthanasia or 
assisted suicide and palliative care.  
In order to consider DER as developed in previous chapters in relation to 
the law, some reflection on applying normative reasoning in legal contexts is 
needed, and I undertake this by way of reflection on case law and a trend 
among legal scholars to dismiss DER as too difficult to apply reliably. These 
challenges have parallels in the problem of closeness, which was addressed 
in Chapter 5, and which I draw upon here (see e.g. page 145 and p156), and 
the argument relies on clarifications made in Chapters 1 and 2. I close the 
chapter with a consideration of recklessness and negligence, which I suggest 
are under-appreciated in the DER literature. This consideration supports 
and reinforces moves made in Chapters 2 and 5, where I argue against 
reading DER as providing an all-things-considered judgement of 
permissibility. Rather, it is a coherent and important approach/guide as to 
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